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  This Comment deconstructs and analyzes the structural regulatory 
factors that have helped Canada avoid banking crises since 1840. First, it 
empirically demonstrates the sharply divergent performance of the 
American and Canadian banking sectors during the recent financial crisis 
based on equity and credit default swap data, along with consumer 
satisfaction and credit availability. Second, the Comment assesses both 
nations’ regulatory systems, highlighting how relative to the fragmented 
U.S. framework, Canada’s streamlined regulatory architecture facilitates a 
stronger and more stable financial system. Third, with respect to regulatory 
costs, the Comment finds that, relative to the Canadian framework, the 
inefficiency of U.S. regulation costs taxpayers and regulated banks over 
$30 billion annually. Finally, after addressing counterarguments, the 
analysis concludes by suggesting realistic structural changes that could 
generate aggregate cost savings potentially exceeding $350 billion for 
taxpayers and $585 billion for the industry. Most importantly, however, 
these changes would facilitate economic growth while safeguarding 
financial stability for the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“We conclude widespread failures in financial regulation and 
supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial 
markets.”1 
- Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 
 
“I think we have to give credit where credit is due. I do believe that 
we [Canada] have a strong regulatory system, so the overall governance 
structure in the country is simpler and more direct than in certain other 
jurisdictions . . .”2  
- Gerald McCaughey, CEO, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
 
The recent financial crisis “wiped out nearly two decades of 
Americans’ wealth” and upended millions of lives around the world.3  Yet, 
rather than an anomalous ‘black swan’ event, the ‘Great Recession’ was 
just the latest iteration of a pattern as old as the nation itself. For the United 
States, “[f]inancial crises are not new”; they began “during the presidency 
of George Washington” and subsequently “struck on a regular basis. . . 
every fifteen to twenty years.”4  
However, as a result of a globalizing economy and tightly 
interconnected financial systems, crises spread faster than ever and are 
seldom confined by national borders.  By some measures, America’s eerily 
 
 1.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, xviii (2011) [hereinafter, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT], 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
 2.  Interview by Doug Alexander with Gerald McCaughey, CEO, Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce (May 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/video/91847685-cibc-s-
mccaughey-on-ranking-of-strongest-banks.html (responding to reporter inquiry regarding 
the strength of Canada’s banking system; the interview was conducted after Bloomberg 
named CIBC the third strongest bank in the world.).  
 3.  Ylan Q. Mui, Americans saw wealth plummet 40 percent from 2007 to 2010, 
Federal Reserve says, WASH. POST, June 11, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/fed-americans-wealth-dropped-40-percent/2012/06/11/gJQAlIsCVV_ 
story.html. 
 4.  CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM 2 
(2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-579/4579-24.pdf [hereinafter, COP 
SPECIAL REPORT] (noting that financial crises occurred in “1797, 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 
1893–96, 1907, and 1929–33,” and subsequently, “[a]fter fifty years without a financial 
crisis —the longest such stretch in the nation’s history— financial firms and policy makers 
began to see regulation as a barrier to efficient functioning of the capital markets rather than 
a necessary precondition for success.”). 
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familiar pattern appears to be speeding up—with the Savings & Loan crisis 
in the 1980’s,5 Long Term Capital Management in 1998,6 the dot-com bust7 
and corporate governance scandals of 2000-2002,8 and now the most recent 
crisis—leaving increasingly short periods of economic growth between 
them. 
Meanwhile, Canada—a broadly similar economy, highly intertwined 
with the United States—has not had a banking crisis since 1840—“not even 
during the Great Depression.”9 In fact, Canadian banks emerged through 
the recent crisis in a position of strength, spending billions on “about 100 
acquisitions”10 between 2008 and 2012. U.S. banks, in contrast, required 
 
 5.  Described by the COP SPECIAL REPORT as “[t]he first warning,” during this crisis, 
“a combination of unsound investments and poor oversight contributed to the failure of 
hundreds of thrifts, ultimately leading to a U.S. government bailout at a cost of $160 
billion.” THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERN FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE 36 (2008) [hereinafter, TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT]; see also How a Good Idea 
Went Wrong: Deregulation and the Savings and Loan Crisis, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 643 (1995) 
(arguing that the specific manner of deregulation, rather than deregulation per se, caused the 
savings & loan crisis).   
 6.  The LTCM crisis was “[a] second warning . . . when a crisis was only narrowly 
averted” COP SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see also Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term 
Capital Management: It’s A Short-Term Memory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-07ltcm.15941880.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that to avert crisis, at the behest of the New York Federal 
Reserve, “14 banks . . . agreed to rescue Long-Term by investing $3.65 billion.”) For an in-
depth discussion of Long-Term Capital Management, see generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, 
WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1st ed. 
2000). 
 7.  After a historic rise, prices of technology stocks plummeted to the point that 
“[m]any pioneering dot-coms are out of business or barely surviving. The Dow Jones 
Internet Index, made up of dot-com blue chips, is down more than 72 percent since 
March . . . former Wall Street darlings, have seen their stock prices fall more than 99 
percent . . . .”  The Dot-Com Bubble Bursts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/24/opinion/the-dot-com-bubble-bursts.html; see also 
Steve Schaefer, Bernanke On Why Subprime Turned Out Worse Than The Dot-Com Bubble, 
FORBES (Apr. 13, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2012/04/13/ 
bernanke-on-why-the-subprime-blowup-was-so-much-worse-than-dot-com/   
 8.  In 2002 a number of unprecedented scandals, including Enron and Worldcom were 
“a third warning.” COP SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see also Anup Agrawal & 
Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals 48 J.L. & ECON. 371, 374 
(2005) (discussing the specific nature of violations at Enron and other firms). 
 9.  Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen Haber, The Political Foundations of Scarce and 
Unstable Credit presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2013 Financial Markets 
Conference, Maintaining Financial Stability: Holding a Tiger by the Tail 37 (Apr. 9, 2013) 
(transcript available at https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/Documents/news/conferences/ 
2013/fmc/13fmccalomiris.pdf) [hereinafter, Political Foundations of Credit]; see also 
Virginia Torrie, Weathering the Global Financial Crisis: An Overview of the Canadian 
Experience, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 25, 30 (2010). 
 10.  Doug Alexander & Sean B. Pasternak, Canadians Dominate World’s 10 Strongest 
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billions from taxpayers just to remain solvent.  At the same time, an 
astonishing 90% of Canadians have a favorable impression of their banks, 
compared to just 21% of Americans.11 
The resilience and stability of Canadian banks has been well 
documented by leading organizations, including the International Monetary 
Fund, Bloomberg, Newsweek,12 and even the Daily Show;13 the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) has “ranked Canada’s banking system as the most 
sound in the world, seven years in a row.”14  However, relatively scant 
attention has been paid to the causes underlying this sharply divergent 
performance. 
Traditional explanations for the success of the Canadian financial 
sector fall into two broad sets of arguments: cultural differences and 
industry structure. However, upon closer inspection, neither provides a 
cogent explanation. 
The first argument is premised on Canadians being innately different 
from Americans in their attitudes towards risk, resulting in a safer financial 
system.  However, as subsequent analyses will show, this line of reasoning 
simply does not hold water.  Canadian financial institutions can be equally 
—and even more—aggressive than their American counterparts, while 
succumbing to the same issues when operating in the U.S. 
The second argument—advocated by influential scholars including 
Simon Johnson of MIT—posits that Canada’s concentrated banking 
 
Banks, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 2, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2012-05-02/canadians-dominate-world-s-10-strongest-banks. 
 11.  What Canadians Think About Their Banks, CANADIAN BANKERS ASS’N,  (Sept. 18, 
2014), available at http://www.cba.ca/contents/files/backgrounders/bkg_annualpoll_en.pdf 
[hereinafter, What Canadians Think]; Dennis Jacobe, Americans’ Confidence in Banks Falls 
to Record Low, GALLUP (Jun. 27, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155357/Americans-
Confidence-Banks-Falls-Record-Low.aspx.  
 12.  Fareed Zakaria, The Canadian Solution, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6, 2009, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/zakaria-canadian-solution-82535.  
 13.  See John Oliver, You Can’t Jam Banking Regulation Down a Country’s Throat, 
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, COMEDY CENTRAL (June 24, 2013), 
http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/23g33k/money-boo-boo. 
 14.  See Canada’s Banks-Made of Canada, CAN. BANKERS ASS’N (last updated Sept. 8, 
2014) http://www.cba.ca/en/media-room/50-backgrounders-on-banking-issues/626-canadas-
banks-made-of-canada. It is worth noting that although frequently cited, and consistent with 
rankings by the IMF and Bloomberg (along with the findings of this Comment), the WEF 
ranking is based on a survey of Davos participants, rather than a randomized sample. 
Notwithstanding the innate drawbacks of this approach, the specific sample pool at the 
Davos Conference may well objectively reflect market conditions, or at least their 
perception amongst market participants. See generally WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013 (Full Data ed. 2012), available at 
http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2012-2013 (providing 
country competitiveness analyses across a broad array of metrics).  
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industry harms consumers.15 However, analysis of consumer welfare and 
credit availability in U.S. and Canada provides little support for the 
proposition and, in fact, suggests that Canada’s financial system delivers 
greater consumer and aggregate welfare. 
A more plausible and comprehensive explanation proposed by this 
Comment is that Canada’s superior regulatory architecture is the primary 
causal factor for its consistent resilience and performance. Designed and 
calibrated to oversee a modern financial system, Canada’s regulatory 
structure provides two fundamental advantages: effective macroprudential 
supervision and apposite allocation of responsibilities to politically 
independent regulators. 
Macroprudential supervision—which assesses systemic risks along 
with institution-specific concerns—has been widely accepted as crucial for 
financial stability.  Canada has structurally integrated macroprudential 
supervision into its regulatory framework through a single regulator with 
jurisdiction over the entire financial sector—including banks, insurers, 
private pension plans, and housing finance—the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI).16  In the U.S., there are 
over 100 distinct agencies fulfilling this role, leading to inefficient 
regulatory overlap and, more dangerously, gaps in oversight.17 
At the same time, Canada’s regulatory architecture cleanly maps along 
the functions required to regulate a modern financial system.  OSFI, for 
example, has a clear mandate: its only responsibility is macroprudential 
supervision.  The role of Canada’s central bank, deposit insurer, and 
consumer protection agency are similarly circumscribed.18  This structure 
facilitates cooperation, rather than the jurisdictional conflict unfortunately 
endemic to American financial regulation. 
This Comment finds that the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (FCIR)—
a post-mortem of the crisis—fundamentally erred in its conclusion that: 
“[i]nstitutional structure and differential regulation of various types of 
financial institutions were less important in causing the crisis than common 
factors that spanned different firm structures and regulatory regimes.”19 
 
 15.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 16.  See infra Part II.C. 
 17.  See infra Part II.D. 
 18.  See infra Part II.C. 
 19.  “Banks with different structures and operating in vastly differing regulatory 
regimes failed or had to be rescued in the United Kingdom, Germany, Iceland, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, France, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland, and Denmark.”  FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 430.  However, the report aptly noted that “the U.S. 
financial sector is now more concentrated than ever,” placing “greater responsibility on 
regulators for effective oversight.”  Id. at 386.  See infra Part I.B for discussion of banking 
sector structure and performance. 
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These common factors—most often, exposure to the U.S. market or 
American-made structured products20—originated under the U.S. 
regulatory system.  Further, nowhere else did financial institutions exhibit 
the same level of systemic weakness as they did in the United States.21 
Because of this distinction in the underlying causes of the crisis, this 
Comment disagrees with a number of important recommendations from the 
FCIR and, as a consequence, advocates for a different approach from the 
Dodd-Frank Act. Most significantly, this Comment posits that Dodd-
Frank’s heavy emphasis on the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC)—a coordinating organization for disparate regulatory bodies—is 
overly optimistic, perhaps even misguided. Such a structure fails to provide 
effective macroprudential supervision while codifying the inter-agency 
conflicts that have long stymied American financial regulation—a 
politically palatable, but ultimately shortsighted outcome. 
With a blank canvas, the solution for American regulatory reform 
would be straightforward: a dramatic consolidation of regulatory agencies.  
However, given practical and political realities, such an overhaul is simply 
not feasible.  Thus, this Comment will emphasize consolidation of 
regulatory functions, rather than agencies, to achieve many of the benefits 
of the Canadian regulatory architecture.  Notably, the changes proposed in 
this Comment broadly resemble Senator Dodd’s original legislative 
proposal to consolidate prudential supervision, which, due to political 
pressure, was ultimately abandoned in favor of the Dodd-Frank Act—a 
tremendous lost opportunity. 
This Comment will proceed in five parts.  The first will provide 
background regarding the American and Canadian markets, as well as 
empirical analyses of their respective banking sectors. It will begin by 
outlining the fundamental underlying similarities between the American 
and Canadian economies along with their high levels of economic and 
capital market integration—factors suggesting that the two nations’ 
 
 20.  The International Monetary Fund estimates that total write-downs on structured 
products, largely mortgages, could end up being as high as $4 trillion, “about two thirds of 
which would be incurred by banks.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORTS, RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISKS xi (2009), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf. 
 21.  There are two technical exceptions: Ireland, which is moving towards a regulatory 
framework modeled on Canada’s, and Iceland — “the smallest economy within the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)” and one 
“[h]istorically . . . based on marine and energy resources,”; thus, not a particularly apt 
comparison. See James K. Jackson, Iceland’s Financial Crisis, 21 CURRENT POLITICS & 
ECON. EUR. 99, 99 (2010); Heather McRobie, Canada’s banks, the envy of the world, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Mar. 19, 2009, 5:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree 
/cifamerica/2009/mar/19/canada-us-economy (noting that Ireland is considering 
restructuring its financial regulatory bodies to look “similar to the Canadian model.”). 
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financial sectors should largely mimic one another.  Then, through in-depth 
empirical analyses of equity returns and credit default swap (CDS) data, it 
will demonstrate the superior performance and stability of Canada’s banks.  
Finally, it will assess the banking sector through a broader lens, focusing 
on consumer welfare and credit costs, while illustrating the remarkable 
public trust and respect enjoyed by Canadian banks relative to their 
American counterparts. 
The second section begins by briefly reviewing the macroeconomic 
literature regarding banking crises and the interplay between financial 
institutions and the broader economy.  It then provides a taxonomical 
analysis of the financial regulatory architecture, largely based on the 
Canadian framework.  Next, it discusses the historical and statutory 
background of the American and Canadian systems, along with a brief 
analysis of contemporary changes to the U.S. system through Dodd-Frank.  
The section then thoroughly analyzes the American and Canadian 
regulatory frameworks, while critiquing various aspects of American 
approach. 
The third section discusses the success of Canada’s framework with 
respect to effectiveness and costs. First, it will illustrate the causal 
mechanism between Canada’s regulatory architecture and the stability of its 
financial sector.  Then, it expands upon existing scholarly work to develop 
an enhanced cost-benefit framework for financial regulation.  Through 
empirical analyses of financial data, the section assesses the costs of both 
nations’ systems for their taxpayers and financial institutions, finding that, 
even adjusted for banking sector size, the U.S. spends nearly three times as 
much on regulation.  Finally, it illustrates the U.S. regulatory system’s 
susceptibility to regulatory arbitrage through a case study on TruPS and 
TruPS CDOs.  The analysis suggests that the benefits of regulatory 
competition are largely undermined by the permeability of U.S. financial 
regulation. 
The fourth section addresses counterarguments—culture and industry 
structure. First, it refutes the proposition that cultural differences between 
the U.S. and Canada are responsible for Canada’s financial stability.  The 
section provides counterexamples based on Canada’s highly aggressive 
pension funds and the Royal Bank of Canada’s legal issues in the U.S., 
relative to its pristine record in the Canadian home market.  Second, it 
builds off the discussion from Part I—namely, the high levels of trust 
Canadian banks enjoy from both consumers and the capital markets—to 
call into question the proposition that Canada’s industry structure harms 
consumers or is kept afloat through government guarantees. 
The last section discusses policy implications for American financial 
regulation.  In the context of America’s uniquely complex political 
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environment, it suggests a number of changes to strengthen the regulatory 
framework—emphasizing consolidation of functions, rather than agencies.  
Specifically, this Comment recommends consolidation of prudential 
oversight for banking, securities, insurance, and housing finance within an 
agency paralleling Canada’s OSFI.  As a direct consequence, the Federal 
Reserve, FDIC, and other agencies will be freed to focus on their own 
respective mandates. 
While broadly similar to Senator Dodd’s original proposal in this 
regard, rather than simply expanding the purview of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), this Comment posits the consolidation 
as more akin to a restructuring of the agency.  It also makes a number of 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the OCC, while 
addressing some of the legitimate critiques of Senator Dodd’s earlier 
proposal. 
The section then analyzes potential cost savings based on benchmarks 
from Europe and Canada.  The analysis suggests that effective reform 
could generate cost savings with a net present value of nearly $83 billion 
based on European projections, and over $350 billion if U.S. regulation 
became as efficient as Canada’s.  Combined with lower compliance costs 
for financial institutions, the aggregate savings are almost surely an order 
of magnitude higher.  For instance, the Comment estimates that relative 
compliance inefficiency cost the six largest U.S. banks over $25 billion in 
2013—a net present value between $253 billion and $586 billion, 
depending on the methodology applied. 
Additionally, the Comment suggests allowing states to consolidate 
their individual regulators into ‘regional hubs’ to harmonize regulation 
across regions and generate millions in cost savings.  For instance, based 
on the New York-New Jersey ‘hub’ example presented in Part V.E., New 
Jersey could save nearly $880 million by combining its banking regulator 
with New York, which would experience comparable savings. 
As the evidence will show, though seemingly quite simple, Canada’s 
regulatory architecture is a powerful bulwark against crises, while 
America’s is merely a Maginot line—elaborate and extensive—but 
inherently permeable.  By incorporating insights that have proven effective 
for Canada, the U.S. can save billions and, more importantly, create a 
lasting framework to ensure financial stability for the future. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
“[W]hen Canadian and U.S. experience diverge, it’s a very good bet 
that policy differences, rather than differences in culture or economic 
structure, are responsible for that divergence.”22 
 
- Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize winning economist 
 
The deep, undeniable similarities between the U.S. and Canada 
provide close to an ideal natural experiment to analyze the divergence in 
banking sector performance.  The basic premise is that assessing two 
highly similar economies holds many variables constant, creating a natural 
baseline from which to isolate significant differences in outcomes and then 
parse through a limited universe of possible drivers. 
Both nations are highly developed economies and “Canada resembles 
the US in its market-oriented economic system, pattern of production, and 
high living standards.”23  Historically robust commercial ties were 
significantly strengthened by the 1994 passage of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, which 
created the “world’s largest free trade area,”24 and the world’s largest 
bilateral trade relationship between the U.S. and Canada.25  As a result, “the 
economies of the United States and Canada are highly integrated,”26 as are 
their equity markets—which are also tightly correlated.27  Further, 
Canadian banks have large U.S. operations, directly exposing them to 
America’s economy.28  For instance, at the end of 2007, Toronto Dominion 
 
 22.  Paul Krugman, Good and Boring, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/opinion/01krugman.html?_r=0. 
 23.  The World Factbook, Canada, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html (last updated June 23, 2014) 
[hereinafter, The World Factbook]. 
 24.  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-
agreement-nafta (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
 25.  Bilateral trade between the U.S. and Canada encompassed over $630 billion of 
goods in 2013.  See 2013 U.S. Trade in Goods with Canada, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c1220.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).  
 26.  IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33087, UNITED STATES-CANADA 
TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 1 (2011). 
 27.  See generally, Raj Aggarwal & NyoNyo A. Kyaw, Equity Market Integration in 
the NAFTA Region: Evidence from Unit Root and Cointegration Tests, 14 INT’L REV. OF 
FIN. ANALYSIS 393 (2005) (highlighting high equity market integration between the U.S. 
and Canada); Cetin Ciner, A Further Look at Linkages between NAFTA Equity Markets, 46 
Q. REV. OF ECON. AND FIN. 338 (2006) (presenting further evidence of capital market 
integration.). 
 28.  Along with TD Bank, see infra note 29, the Bank of Montreal maintained large 
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was the seventh largest bank in the U.S.29 Putting all of this together, one 
would expect Canada’s economy—and particularly its banking sector—to 
roughly track America’s. 
At the same time, an important difference, adjusted for in subsequent 
analyses, is that the U.S. is simply much larger.  America’s 2012 Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) was about 8.6 times larger than Canada’s— 
$15.68 trillion to $1.82 trillion, respectively.30  As a consequence, both the 
U.S. financial system and capital markets are larger and “more complex.”31  
Relative to Canada’s economy, however, its banking sector is 
proportionately bigger—just 4.2 times smaller than America’s.32  Further, 
whereas U.S. banking system assets are comparable to its GDP, Canada’s 
are nearly double its GDP33—casting some doubt on Canada’s capacity to 
rescue its banks if the need arose.34 
 
U.S. retail operations after purchasing Harris Bank of Chicago, while the Royal Bank of 
Canada had a large U.S. retail presence that it sold to PNC Bank in late 2011, well after the 
start of the crisis.   
 29.  See Commerce Bank to Name to Vanish, Replaced by TD Bank, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 
2008, 10:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/31/tdbank-commerce-
idUSN3133892220081031; TD Bank to Buy Commerce for $8.5 Billion, N.Y TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 2, 2007, 7:36 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/td-bank-to-
buy-commerce-for-85-billion/?_r=0 
 30.  JAMES R. BARTH, CHRIS BRUMMER, TONG LI & DANIEL E. NOLLE, MILKEN INST., 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS IN THE POST-CRISIS ERA: THE GLOBAL RESPONSE AND 135 
COUNTRIES RESPONSES 10 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2294641. 
 31.  JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40687, CANADA’S FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW 11 (2009), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40687_20090626.pdf.  
The report further noted that:  
[I]t can be argued that Canada’s supervisors and regulators can take a more 
conservative approach than their U.S. counterparts as a result of Canada’s 
proximity to the U.S. capital markets. Nevertheless, Canada’s financial 
supervisory system and regulatory structure have proven to be less susceptible 
to the bank failures that have loomed in the United States and Europe and may 
offer some insight for U.S. policymakers. Canada’s reliance at the federal level 
on a unified supervisor and regulator appears to have some merits as compared 
to a more decentralized approach. 
Id. 
 32.  This important distinction will be adjusted for as the variable Å in subsequent 
analyses, particularly in Section III.B. 
 33.  2012 U.S. banking sector assets were $15.07 trillion, compared to $3.58 trillion in 
Canada.  This includes only publically traded banks; however, given the composition of the 
industry, this is not a material oversight.  See JAMES R. BARTH & DANIEL E. NOLLE, 
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF THE BIGGEST BANKS BY THE BIGGEST COUNTRIES: 
CONSENSUS ON PRINCIPLES, VARIATION IN PRACTICES 6 (2014) [hereinafter, SUPERVISION OF 
THE BIGGEST BANKS].  
 34.  See Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, Canadian Banking is Not the Answer, N.Y. 
TIMES ECONOMIX (Mar. 25, 2010, 6:37 AM), economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/ 
canadian-banking-is-not-the-answer/ (“The Canadian government is there to make sure 
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Figure 1. U.S. & Canada Macro Comparison––201235 
 
A. The Financial Crisis 
The Great Recession36 provides a good starting point for analysis.37 
Originating in the U.S. mortgage market,38 the crisis quickly swept across 
asset classes and geographies,39 resulting in “financial shocks that . . . 
 
creditors never lose a cent. With such ready access to taxpayer bailouts, Canadian banks . . . 
can raise money even if they act badly.”).  For a discussion of counterpoints see infra Part 
IV.B. 
 35.  Based on SUPERVISION OF THE BIGGEST BANKS, supra note 33 and FDIC data. See 
Download Data: Financial Data, Assets & Liabilities Report, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 
available at https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/warp_download_all.asp (last visited May 14, 
2015). 
 36.  See Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES 
ECONOMIX (Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-
recession-a-brief-etymology/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1& 
gwh=BF2EA4FE943AA7315ABB7FB0E5817F6E&gwt=pay& (outlining the acceptance of 
the term ‘Great Recession’ to refer to the recent economic crisis).  
 37.  Importantly, there is a distinction between varieties of economic malaise, which 
include, but are not necessarily limited to: banking crises, financial crises, and economic 
crises.  However, largely organic shifts in the global financial system has somewhat blurred 
the distinctions.  The analysis in this Comment focuses on banks and banking crises, but, 
such crises are rarely confined to just the banking sector, which in part drives the ambiguity 
in terminology.  See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 419 (noting 
that the recent “financial crisis cause[d] [the] economic crisis. . . ,” thus a contraction of the 
“real economy.”); see also GARY GORTON & ANDREW METRICK, GETTING UP TO SPEED ON 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A ONE-WEEKEND-READER’S GUIDE 6 (2012) (noting that the recent 
crisis is “often described as being the worst global crisis since the Great Depression, and the 
evidence supports this label.”)  For a discussion of the history of financial crises in their 
various forms see generally CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS 
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009) [hereinafter, THIS TIME IS 
DIFFERENT]. 
 38.  See generally The Financial Crisis: Full Timeline, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline (outlining the financial crisis from 
February, 2007 through April, 2011) (last visited May 14, 2015). 
 39.  See generally MAURO F. GUILLÉN, LAUDER INST. UNIV. PA., THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL CRISIS: A TIMELINE (2011), available at 
http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/class_info/Chronology_Economic_Financial_Cri
GDP Bank Assets
Trillion 
($USD)
% of world 
total
Trillion 
($USD)
% of world 
total
Bank Assets / 
GDP
Canada 1.82 2.5 3.58 3.6 197%
US 15.68 21.9 15.07 15.3 96%
(US/Canada) % 862% 421%
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helped push the global economy into the deepest recession since World 
War II.”40 Intuitively, one would expect two highly intertwined economies 
and banking systems to be similarly affected by the global shock. 
America’s private-sector financial infrastructure was decimated in 
September 2008,41 starting with the effective nationalization of the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) on September 7th,42 Bank of 
America’s emergency acquisition of Merrill Lynch on the 14th, Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy on the 15th,43 and American International Group’s 
$85 billion rescue on the 16th.44 
To prevent all-out economic collapse, the U.S. government—acting 
largely through the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the 
Federal Reserve (Fed)—had to risk astounding sums.45  In October 2008, 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act authorized the Treasury 
Department’s $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)46— 
 
sis.pdf; The Origins of The Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2013, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21584534/print. 
 40.  Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bd. 
of Governors).  
 41.  While “[c]onventional wisdom is that the failure of Lehman Brothers triggered the 
financial panic . . . [t]he focus on Lehman’s failure is too narrow. The events of September 
2008 were a chain of one firm failure after another.”  FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 435. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Carrick Mollenkamp, Susanne Craig, Serena Ng & Aaron Lucchetti, Crisis On 
Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill is Sold, AIG Seeks to Raise Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
15, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122139688846233147 (“The American 
financial system was shaken to its core on Sunday [September 14, 2008]. Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. faced the prospect of liquidation, and Merrill Lynch & Co. agreed to be sold 
to Bank of America Corp. The U.S. government . . . bailed out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
a week ago and orchestrated the sale of Bear Stearns Cos. to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. in 
March . . . .”).  
 44.  Susanne Craig, Jeffrey McCracken, Jon Hilsenrath & Deborah Solomon, AIG, 
Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122152314746339697. 
 45.  See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 466 (2009) (noting that the 
emergency measures for financial institutions “were largely coordinated by the Treasury 
Department and the Federal Reserve—regulators who did not manage these institutions. 
These government agencies acted because they had the resources and the flexible legal 
authority to do so, while they concluded that the primary supervisors of the collapsing 
institutions were at best unnecessary and at worst helpless in the face of the looming 
crisis.”). 
 46.  See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. §2(1) (2008).  
For more information about the TARP program, see About TARP, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, 
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which ultimately spent $313 billion to recapitalize much of the banking 
system, and is expected to lose taxpayers $39 billion.47 At the same time, 
through unconventional monetary policies such as quantitative easing,48 the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has swelled to over $4.5 trillion,49 which 
some commentators and academics fear could prove difficult to unwind, 
resulting in large future losses.50 
The total costs of the financial crisis are nearly immeasurable.  The 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas estimates that along with government 
support of $12-13 trillion, the Great Recession inflicted direct output losses 
of $6-14 trillion and up to $14 trillion through what it describes as 
“national trauma and lost opportunity.”51 
As would be expected given a crisis of this magnitude, Canada’s 
economy dropped “into a sharp recession in the final months of 2008.”52 
However, Canada’s banks remained problem-free, requiring exactly $0 in 
bailout funds.53 As this Comment will illustrate, Canadian banks have 
 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about-tarp/Pages/default.aspx (last 
updated Feb. 10, 2015). 
 47.  Although a figure of $431 billion is often stated for the total TARP investment, see 
FRAGILE BY DESIGN, infra note 58, it is the author’s understanding that this amount includes 
TARP investment channeled to General Motors and Chrysler, along with their financing 
subsidiaries. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 
(2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/TARP10-2012_0.pdf. The bulk 
of the recapitalization occurred through the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which 
invested $245 billion in 707 banks across forty-eight states.  See Program Purpose & 
Overview, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx (last updated 
Feb. 10, 2015). For a thorough discussion of the broader implications of the unprecedented 
U.S. government intervention, see generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the 
Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (2011). 
 48.  Michael J. Fleming, Federal Reserve Liquidity Provision during the Financial 
Crisis of 2007-2009, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 161, 161-77 (2012)  
 49.  Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. 
SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (last updated Feb. 
20, 2015); see also Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors, 
Remarks at Carlton University: The Federal Reserve’s Policy Actions during the Financial 
Crisis and Lessons for the Future (May 13, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/kohn20100513a.pdf.  
 50.  William D. Cohan, Fed’s Balance Sheet Punctuated by a Big Question Mark, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (June 27, 2014, 10:57 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/ 
feds-balance-sheet-punctuated-by-a-big-question-mark/?_r=0. 
 51.  David Luttrell, Tyler Atkinson & Harvey Rosenblum, Assessing the Costs and 
Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath, ECON. LETTER (Fed. Res. 
Bank of Dallas, Dallas, Tex.), Sept. 2013,  at 1-2; see also Brett W. Fawley & Christopher J. 
Neely, Four Stories of Quantitative Easing, 95 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 51 (2013) 
(discussing the operation and impact of quantitative easing in the US, EU, UK, and Japan). 
 52.  The World Factbook, supra note 23. 
 53.  While “several large American banks collapsed or were teetering on the brink of 
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consistently outperformed American institutions because they are better 
regulated—and effective financial regulation is essential for successful 
banks and a stable economy. 
B. Banking Sector Comparison 
Canada’s banks have reliably been among the strongest—if not the 
strongest—in the world, anchoring Canada’s economy and ensuring the 
availability of credit.  This section will analyze the U.S. and Canadian 
banking sectors through three measures.54 First, it will illustrate the superior 
performance of Canadian banks based on historical equity (e.g., stock) 
returns.  Second, it will use credit default swap (CDS) data to show the 
markets’ confidence in the creditworthiness and stability of Canadian 
banks, relative to U.S. rivals.  Finally, it will approach the discussion of the 
U.S. and Canadian banking sectors through a wider lens, focusing on 
public trust and the accessibility of credit. 
 Much of the analysis in this section, and in Part III of this Comment, 
will be based on the data set shown in Figure 2 below.  It is composed of 
two indices, each encompassing the six largest U.S. and Canadian banks as 
of the end of 2012.55 While banking market structure is largely beyond the 
scope of this analysis, a few salient aspects are important to highlight.  
First, while Canada’s large banks are similar in size to Goldman Sachs and 
 
bankruptcy, most of the largest Canadian banks turned a profit and not a single Canadian 
bank received a government bailout.”  Virginia Torrie, Weathering the Global Financial 
Crisis: An Overview of the Canadian Experience, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 25, 27 (2010).  
While some have alleged a ‘secret bailout’ of Canadian banks, I believe that this position 
simply mischaracterizes discount window lending and quantitative easing — conducted 
largely by the U.S. Federal Reserve.  These actions were aimed at stabilizing markets as a 
whole, benefitting institutions as a consequence, rather than direct intention.  See DAVID 
MACDONALD, CAN. CENTRE FOR POL’Y ALTERNATIVES, THE BIG BANKS’ BIG SECRET: 
ESTIMATING GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR CANADIAN BANKS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 6 
(2012), available at https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/ 
publications/National%20Office/2012/04/Big%20Banks%20Big%20Secret.pdf (noting 
“[b]oth the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada offered short-term collateralized 
loans which peaked at $33 billion and $41 billion Canadian dollars respectively . . . .”). 
 54.  Analysis of credit ratings through Moody’s Investor Service’s Global Bank Credit 
Rating Database (on file with author) shows that credit ratings for Canadian banks are 
among the highest in the world.  A thorough discussion of credit ratings is omitted from this 
Comment for the sake of concision, but illustrates essentially the same findings. Further, 
some scholars have advocated utilizing CDS spreads in lieu of credit ratings, as they are 
often perceived to incorporate market information better and faster.  See generally Mark J. 
Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable 
Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2010). 
 55.  See infra app. tbl. 1 for discussion of bank index selection. 
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Morgan Stanley, as universal banks,56 their business model is more akin to 
the four largest U.S. lenders—JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, 
Citigroup, and Wells Fargo.57 Second, as Professors Calomiris and Haber 
illustrate, due to complex historical and socio-political factors,58 the U.S. 
banking industry is substantially more fragmented than Canada’s— 
although, as will be discussed in Part III, it has been rapidly consolidating.  
Because of this, the U.S. index includes a smaller proportion of total 
banking system assets—63.6%, relative to 95.0% for the Canadian index; 
however, it includes a larger amount of gross assets—$9.6 trillion, 
compared to $3.4 trillion.  Nevertheless, the indices provide a good proxy 
for the sector’s performance; further, as discussed below, using a larger 
U.S. sample does not diminish the results. 
 
Figure 2. U.S. and Canada––Comparison of 6 Largest Banks59 
U.S. Canada
Bank (ticker)
Total Assets 
($Bn)
Global 
Rank Bank (ticker)
Total Assets 
($Bn)
Global 
Rank
JPMorgan (JPM) 2,360 7 Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) 825 32
Bank of America (BAC) 2,210 10 Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) 811 33
Citigroup (C) 1,870 14 Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) 668 40
Wells Fargo (WF) 1,420 21 Bank of Montreal (BMO) 526 45
Goldman Sachs & Co. (GS) 939 25
Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce (CIBC) 394 58
Morgan Stanley (MS) 781 35 National Bank of Canada (NBC) 178 94
Total: 9,580 Total: 3,402
As % of Banking System Total 63.6% As % of Banking System Total 95.0%  
 
Importantly, this analysis understates the relative outperformance of 
Canada’s banks because the American sample benefits from both the 
unprecedented government assistance described above, and survivor bias 
—artificial improvement of a statistical sample from the exclusion of 
 
 56.  A universal bank is an institution providing commercial banking and securities 
underwriting.   
 57.  Unlike Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, no Canadian bank has been 
designated a global “systemically significant financial institution,” highlighting their 
tendency to limit direct balance sheet exposures to complex products — a feature of the 
Canadian system, not a bug.  Caroline Van Hasselt, All of Canada’s Big Banks Are 
Systemically Important, Domestically at Least, WALL ST. J. CAN. REAL TIME (Mar 26, 2013, 
12:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/canadarealtime/2013/03/26/all-of-canadas-big-banks-are-
systemically-important-domestically-at-least/. 
 58.  See generally CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: 
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT 153-202 (2014) 
[hereinafter, FRAGILE BY DESIGN]. 
 59.  Based on figures as of the end of 2012, obtained from SUPERVISION OF THE BIGGEST 
BANKS, supra note 33.  
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weaker performers.  Because the U.S. sample is based on the contemporary 
banking system, it excludes the worst performing institutions—Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch—which collapsed, or were 
acquired in distressed transactions during the crisis.60  Adding them into the 
sample amplifies the results, but also creates a more disjointed analysis that 
is unnecessary to illustrate the point. 
C. Performance: Equity Returns 
While far from the only way of assessing an enterprise, equity returns 
offer an objective and commonly used measure of performance over time.  
As shown by the first set of analyses below, between 2000 and 2014, 
Canadian banks generated cumulative returns of 125%, compared to a loss 
of 25% for U.S. banks—which also had significantly higher volatility. 
Analysis of total returns—arguably a better measure of bank 
performance—is even more striking: between 2000 and 2014, Canadian 
banks gained nearly 525% while U.S. banks lost 23%. 
 Figure 3 below compares the cumulative, non-adjusted equity log 
returns61 for the six largest U.S. and Canadian banks between 2000 and 
2014. Despite the aforementioned survivor bias and government assistance, 
the U.S. bank sample lost almost 25% of its value, compared to a gain of 
over 125% for the Canadian sample within the same time period.  Although 
Canadian banks also experienced significant losses during the crisis, unlike 
American banks, they rapidly recovered.62  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60.  Mollenkamp, Craig, Ng & Lucchetti, supra note 43.   
 61.  Cumulative returns are simply the aggregate sum of daily log returns.  In this chart, 
returns are not adjusted for dividends or splits.  A log scale is used to show relative returns 
while holding constant other factors, including currency and relative price. 
 62.  JACKSON, supra note 31, at 1 (“Canada’s financial system, in particular, is 
garnering attention because it seems to be more resistant during the crisis to the failures and 
bailouts that have marked banks in the United States and Europe.”). 
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Figure 3. Cumulative Equity Log Returns: 2000 – 201463 
 
 
   
 At the same time, as shown in Figure 4 below, the U.S. banking 
sample (in gray) has been much more volatile; their stock prices gyrated as 
much as 25% each day during the crisis.  Canadian banks (black), in 
contrast, rarely moved more than 10%. As a consequence, the standard 
deviation of daily returns over the period is twice as high for the U.S. banks 
relative to Canada’s; σUS = 2.51%, σCAN = 1.27%.  Furthermore, a portion of 
the volatility of Canadian banks is likely attributable to the significant 
baseline correlation between the American and Canadian equity markets.64  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 63.  Chart based on data obtained through Bloomberg, downloaded using the term 
“PX_LAST” for the equity ticker of each bank listed in Figure 2. 
 64. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. This trend also bears out for the bank 
indices themselves; based on the author’s computations, for the daily returns between the 
two indices, the correlation coefficient, ρ = .613. 
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Figure 4. Daily Equity Log Returns: 2000–2014 
 
Analysis of total return indices,65 which reinvest dividends—and 
arguably provide a better gauge of bank performance—further 
demonstrates the strength of the Canadian banking sector.66 As shown by 
Figure 5 below, from 2002 until February 4th, 2014, the TXDE Total 
Return Index of Canadian banks67 increased almost 525%—an annualized 
return of nearly 15%.  In contrast, the BXK total return index of U.S. 
banks68—a broader sample than the analysis in Figures 3 and 4 above—
 
 65.  A total return index—in this case, also on a logarithmic scale—represents “the total 
return earned in a portfolio that tracks the underlying price index and reinvests dividend 
income in the overall index, not in the specific stock paying the dividend.”  See MCGRAW 
HILL FIN., S&P DOW JONES INDICES: INDEX MATHEMATICS METHODOLOGY 31 (2015), 
available at http://www.spindices.com/documents/index-policies/methodology-index-
math.pdf (discussing index computations and relevant adjustments). 
 66.  Although variations of the Discounted Cash Flow model are typically applied for 
corporate valuation, banks and other financial institutions “are particularly good candidates 
for [Discounted Dividend Model] DDM valuations because (1) they tend to have long 
histories of paying dividends, (2) their payout ratios tend to be relatively stable over time, 
and (3) their long-term growth rates (that is, long long-term growth rates) are modest and . . 
. can be estimated . . . .”  DAVID B. MOORE, VALUING COMMUNITY BANK STOCKS 9 (2009), 
available at http://www.mch-inc.com/pdf/AFG%20Res%20Comp%20-%20Valuing%20 
Community%20Bank%20Stocks%20-%20DBMoore.pdf.  
 67.  The TXDE Total Return Index is the Bloomberg symbol for the S&P/TSX Equal 
Weight Diversified Bank Index, which is made up of an equal weighting of the six Canadian 
banks displayed in Figure 2.  
 68.  The BXK Total Return Index is the Bloomberg symbol for the Keefe, Bruyette & 
Woods (KBW) Bank Index — a widely used benchmark for practitioners. The index is 
made up of twenty-four large U.S. commercial banks and rebalanced quarterly. Notably, it 
excludes Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.  KBW Bank Index (BKX): Index Holdings & 
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actually decreased by 23%.69  Notably, Canadian banks significantly 
outperformed even in the “boom” years between 2004 and 2007, which 
largely undercuts the potential case for US banks providing superior 
shareholder value during the growth phase of the business cycle. 
 
Figure 5. Total Return TXDEAR (CAN) v. BXK (US): 2002–2014 
 
D. Stability: CDS Prices 
The analysis of credit default swap (CDS)70 data builds on the prior 
analysis of equity returns to highlight the markets’ unwavering belief in the 
 
Details, KEEFE, BRUYETTE & WOODS, http://www.kbw.com/content/research-
reports/BKX.pdf (last updated Feb. 25, 2015) (listing current index constituents and 
weights).  See infra app. tbl. 1 for full listing of index constituents and weights used for the 
analysis. 
 69. The BKX is not available as a total return index; however, the chart data for Figure 
5 is calibrated and normalized to mirror the underlying performance of an analogous total 
return index for the BKX constituents. 
 70.  CDS are essentially a type of insurance on Reference Obligations (bonds and other 
fixed income instruments) issued by a Reference Entity, which is usually a company or 
sovereign. The CDS seller (long position) agrees to make the buyer (short position) whole in 
the event of a credit event, as defined by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA).  For current standard CDS contract terms, see INT’L SWAPS AND 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2014 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS (2014), available at,  
http://www.isda.org/publications/isdacredit-deri-def-sup-comm.aspx#isdacrd. For a 
discussion of the policy issues surrounding CDS, see John Kiff, Jennifer Elliott, Elias 
Kazarian, Jodi Scarlata & Carolyne Spackman, Credit Derivatives: Systemic Risks and 
Policy Options 1-35 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 254, 2009).  For a thorough 
study of CDS valuation, see John C. Hull & Alan White, Valuing credit default swaps I: No 
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stability and creditworthiness of Canada’s financial sector.  CDS, which are 
quoted in basis points,71 show the price of ensuring against the default of a 
reference entity for one year; a higher value means that the market 
perceives a higher level of risk.  Importantly, unlike credit ratings, which 
are largely based on historical trends, CDS directly measure how much 
contemporary market participants require in return for assuming the risk of 
a default.72 
Canada’s CDS market is generally robust and liquid,73 especially for 
the energy and transportation sectors.74 Yet, while CDS contracts 
referencing financial institutions are often the most highly traded,75 
Bloomberg could not even find records of CDS contracts existing—let 
alone trading—for many of Canada’s largest banks.76 
During the financial crisis, CDS spreads for U.S. banks skyrocketed, 
reaching 1,360 basis points for Morgan Stanley and nearly 550 points for 
Goldman Sachs, based on unsecured senior debt in the five-year tenor.77 In 
other words, insuring $10 million of Morgan Stanley’s and Goldman 
Sachs’ debt would have cost $1.36 million and $550,000, respectively, per 
year for five years.  Yet, the perceived risk of Canadian banks defaulting 
 
Counterparty Default Risk, 8 J. DERIVATIVES 29 (2000) and John C. Hull & Alan White, 
Valuing credit default swaps II: Modeling default correlations, 8 J. DERIVATIVES 12 (2001) 
(relaxing model assumptions, including incorporating counterparty risk, to allow more 
robust valuation). 
 71. A basis point is one-hundredth of a percent; 0.01%.  As a general rule of thumb, the 
cost of insuring $10 million of underlying debt is $1,000 annually, per basis point. 
 72. “Since the CDS market is the preserve of sophisticated players, many analysts 
regard it as a better gauge than, say, the stock market.”  John Greenwood, Swap market says 
Canadian banks super safe, FIN. POST (Aug. 19, 2011, 4:40 PM), 
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/08/19/swap-market-says-canadian-banks-super-safe/. 
 73.  As early as 2004, “[q]uotations for CDSs [were] available for as many as 160 
Canadian-based reference entities.”  Christopher Reid, Credit Default Swaps and the 
Canadian Context, in BANK OF CAN. FIN. SYS. REV. 45, 50 (2005).  
 74.  Some Canadian companies are among the most highly traded CDS contracts.  Last 
Quote for the Most Liquid Credit Default Swaps Pricing Report, MARKIT (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.markit.com/cds/most_liquid/markit_liquid.shtml.  
 75.  CDS referencing financial institutions are commonly used by capital market 
participants to hedge against counterparty risk. 
 76.  The Bloomberg Help Desk confirmed that Bank of Montreal, “does not have an 
actively traded 5 year CDS contract,” while the five-year referencing Royal Bank of Canada 
“is not a very liquid contract,” with only three confirmed trades in May 2013 for the entire 
period between 2000 and 2014.  Notably, there are no legal restrictions on trading CDS 
referencing Canadian banks; the products have existed since as early as 2004 for at least the 
three largest Canadian banks. See Reid, supra note 73, at 48-49.  
 77. CDS tenor refers to the duration of the contract; the five-year is generally most 
liquid. Based on Bloomberg historical data, downloaded using the ticker CMWD1U5 for 
Morgan Stanley and CGS1U5 for Goldman Sachs.  
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was essentially immaterial,78 even though the sector was twice Canada’s 
GDP and potentially ‘too large to rescue’ by government intervention.79 
Importantly, Canadian banks were “slower to embrace credit 
derivatives than their international counterparts” because of their 
diversified base of low-cost funding from retail deposits.80 However, “the 
major Canadian banks are increasingly active in all aspects of the credit-
risk-transfer market,”81 demonstrating their ability to meet the needs of 
sophisticated institutional clients while retaining a firm grasp of risk 
management.  Further, Canadian banks were able to build and replenish 
reserves without diluting existing shareholders, because, according to 
Moody’s: “[t]he majority of the capital increase came from earnings, 
reflecting the Canadian banks’ superior performance in the crisis when 
compared with their [U.S.] and European peers.”82 
E. Credit Availability & Public Trust 
Perhaps no aspect of the Canadian banking system is more remarkable 
than the fact that Canadians generally like and trust their banks.  An 
impressive 81% of Canadians have a favorable impression of banks in 
general, while 90% have a favorable impression of their personal banks.83  
 
 78.  Unlike stocks, the CDS market is largely over-the-counter (OTC); as a result, there 
are few publically available sources of pricing data.  However, thorough research through 
Bloomberg, Thomson ONE, FactSet, Capital IQ, and DataStream along with consultation 
with the providers’ data specialists yielded only a handful of active trades for any Canadian 
bank for the period between 2000 and 2014 (in all tenors and debt types). Indicative (i.e. 
estimated) prices based on CMA and Bloomberg’s internal models are available for 
additional trading days, but excluded from this analysis as they do not represent actual 
transactions.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Given the ease of obtaining CDS 
data for American banks, I believe it is fair to say that default by Canadian banks has not 
been a material concern for the capital markets.  
 79.  Although there is no precise ratio of banking assets to GDP that makes banks ‘too 
large to rescue,’ the clear implication is that rescue becomes harder as this ratio increases.  
See generally Jonathan Rosenthal, Twilight of the Gods, ECONOMIST, (May 11, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21577189-investment-banking-faces-leaner-
humbler-future-says-jonathan-rosenthal-though; Nelson D. Schwartz, For Swiss Banks, an 
Uncomfortable Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
03/05/business/worldbusiness/05swiss.html?fta=y&_r=0.  
 80.  John Kiff & Ron Morrow, Credit Derivatives, BANK OF CAN. REV., 3, 6 (2000).   
 81.  Reid, supra note 73, at 49.  Additionally, unlike their American counterparts, 
Canadian insurers also took an arguably more disciplined approach to embracing CDS.  Id. 
at 49-50. 
 82.  Banking System Outlook: Canada, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, Aug. 8, 2013, at 
13.  
 83.  What Canadians Think, supra note 11.  Notably, the survey was conducted by the 
Canadian Bankers Association, which is hardly an impartial observer. However, there is no 
evidence, to suggest methodological flaws.  Further, the survey’s results are consistent, 
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In contrast, just 21% of Americans have confidence in banks,84 a figure 
exceeding only that of Congress and HMOs.85  JPMorgan’s short-lived 
#AskJPM twitter account provides a topical example.86 
Canadians also appear largely satisfied with the banking market 
structure; 90% believe that Canadian banks offer “enough choice[s] to meet 
their needs,”87 while “76 percent say that they get good value from their 
banking service fees.”88  Notably, Canadian satisfaction with banks was 
higher than with other industries—such as life, health, property and car 
insurance, internet providers, electricity, and public transit—highlighting 
that consumer discontent need not be inherent to banking services. 
The data further show that Canadians enjoy comparable access to 
credit at similar cost as Americans.  The IMF found that “[p]rime Canadian 
homeowners are well served by their mortgage finance system, with 
accessibility and costs roughly in line with those in the United States.”89 
Though the IMF paper did not address subprime borrowers, the fact that 
“homeownership . . . is virtually identical at about 68 percent of all 
households” suggests they are not faring materially worse.90  In fact, 
according to Housing Finance International, homeownership rates in the 
 
albeit accentuated, relative to the findings of a similar OECD survey. See ORGANISATION 
FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., GOVERNMENT AT A GLACE 2013 (2013), available at 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4213201e.pdf?expires=14281 
73633&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=23B88A3F8964C7871E8C65C9111421A2 
[hereinafter, OECD REPORT 2013]. 
 84.  Jacobe, supra note 11.  Although ‘favorable impression’ and ‘confidence’ are not 
precisely the same, I believe that especially in the context of banks, they are similar enough 
to provide an accurate representation of how consumers feel about the respective firms.  
 85.  Id.  (“Confidence in banks is higher than only two of the other institutions tested in 
this year’s poll — Congress (13%) and Health Maintenance Organizations (19%). Tied with 
banks are television news, organized labor, and big business—all at 21% and third from the 
bottom out of the 16 U.S. institutions rated.”). Notably, while Americans’ confidence in 
banks has generally decreased over time, based on Gallup data going back to 1979, the 
percentage of the population expressing a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence never 
exceeded 60%.   
 86.  JPMorgan Chase set up a twitter Q&A for interested candidates to converse with a 
senior executive. However, “[a]t least two-thirds of 80,000 tweets sent using the hashtag 
#AskJPM were negative,” leading JP Morgan to cancel the program.  Daniel Johnson, 
JPMorgan Cancels Twitter Q&A after Tirade of Abuse, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 14, 2013, 9:35 
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/10448715/JPMorgan-cancels-Twitter-
QandA-after-tirade-of-abuse.html.    
 87.  What Canadians Think, supra note 11. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  John Kiff, Canadian Residential Mortgage Markets: Boring But Effective? 8-9 
(IMF, Working Paper No. 09/130, 2009) (finding that “fixed-term rates on prime mortgage 
loans are quite competitive with their U.S. counterparts . . . effective prepayment 
penalties . . . seem to be comparable,” and that “the ultimate cost of the two [mortgage] 
insurance regimes . . . are probably comparable.”).  
 90.  Id. at 12. 
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U.S. and Canada have been very similar since 1910; after the recent crisis, 
Canadian homeownership has actually been slightly higher.91  Furthermore, 
numerous studies have found that “interest rates charged on loans were the 
same in the two countries,”92 while Canadian banks actually paid higher 
rates on deposits.  In addition, data from the World Bank shows Canadians 
have similar ATM and bank access as Americans.93 
A study by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development found a high correlation between trust in government and 
trust in banks.94  Yet, Canadians have bucked that trend, reporting little 
trust in government, but significantly higher levels of trust in banks than 
Americans.95  Canadians take “increasing comfort in the fact that Canada’s 
banks are well run and properly regulated”96; the evidence suggests that 
Americans do not.97 
As this section has illustrated, Canadian banks have significantly 
outperformed their American peers in terms of stability, performance, and 
public trust.  Further, the aforementioned similarities between Canada and 
the U.S. hold most key social and economic variables constant, allowing 
the analysis to focus on their major difference: the nations’ regulatory 
systems. 
 
 91.  Housing Finance International noted: 
Canada reaches 69% in 2006, as the U.S. did in 2004. But then the histories 
diverge. Canada had a housing price correction in 2008-2009, but not a housing 
bust. It did not have a housing finance collapse. Its house prices recovered, and 
then have gone marching upward to ever higher levels up to now. 
  Alex J Pollack, Long-term home ownership trends: The US, England, and Canada, 
HOUSING FIN. INT’L, (Mar. 26, 2014, 3:30 PM), https://www.aei.org/publication/long-term-
home-ownership-trends-the-us-england-and-canada/.   
 92.  FRAGILE BY DESIGN, supra note 58, at 318-19. 
 93.  World DataBank, THE WORLD BANK, available at http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
Data/Views/VariableSelection/SelectVariables.aspx?source=1228#s_s (last visited May 14, 
2015). 
 94.  OECD REPORT 2013, supra note 83. 
 95.  See, e.g., Mark Glassman, Correlations: Trust in Government, Trust in Banks, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-
03/correlations-trust-in-government-trust-in-banks (“Public trust in governments and 
confidence in banks, which took a hit during the global financial crisis, tend to move in 
tandem.”). 
 96.  What Canadians Think, supra note 11. 
 97.  As one commentator noted, although “[t]he reality is that U.S. banks are much 
stronger now than they were during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009,” Americans’ faith 
in the banking system has not recovered to nearly the same extent. Jacobe, supra note 11.   
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II. REGULATING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
“Canada has shown itself to be a pretty good manager of the financial 
system in ways that we haven’t always been here in the United 
States. . . .”98 
- President Barack Obama 
 
In simplest terms, the financial system is a framework to optimize 
capital allocation through commercial interactions between borrowers, 
lenders, and intermediaries.99 The creation and transfer of risk is essential 
and integral to this process.100 As a consequence, “a major purpose of 
regulation and supervision is the prevention of excessive risk taking which 
can result in extraordinary harm to society.”101 
The financial sector is built upon “four separate pillars . . . banking, 
trust companies, insurers, and securities dealers.”102 However, “[t]he 
 
 98.  Christopher Mason & Bernard Simon, Canada Banks Prove Envy of the World, 
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55654d74-fec3-11dd-b19a-
000077b07658.html#axzz3SvdH1fcA. 
 99.  This is, of course, a necessary oversimplification.  Capital allocation is a 
multidimensional process that occurs in both the ‘real economy,’ through traditional loans 
and banking products, and in capital markets, through the issuance and trade of securities.  
For the sake of clarity, however, in this analysis the distinction is relaxed unless explicitly 
stated.  For a thorough discussion of capital allocation and financial sector structure, see 
generally Anjan V. Thakor, The design of financial systems: An overview, 20 J. BANKING & 
FIN. 917 (1996) (providing background on financial system macrostructure); Arnold W.A. 
Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Financial System Architecture, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 693 (1997) 
(outlining a structural framework for the financial sector); Franklin Allen, The Market for 
Information and the Origin of Financial Intermediation, 1 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 3 (1990) 
(describing the intermediation function in contemporary financial systems). 
 100.  Jonathan R. Macey noted: 
Every issue in banking law, whether it be bank failure policy, entry restrictions, 
geographic restrictions on the location of branches, product market restrictions 
on the scope of bank activities, minimum capital requirements or lending limits, 
was, at least ostensibly, promulgated in order to mitigate the problem of 
excessive risk-taking by banks. 
Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1277, 
1277 (1989). 
 101.  John B. Taylor & Frank A. Wolak, A Comparison of Government Regulation of 
Risk in the Financial Services and Nuclear Power Industries 1 (Hoover Inst. Working Grp. 
On Econ. Policy Paper WP 58, 2012); see also Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost 
Paradigms in Financial Regulation, 3 (Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 
660, 2013).  
 102.  Poonam Puri, Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada, 2009 BYU L. REV. 
1671, 1686.  Traditionally, banks and trust companies lend directly to the real economy—
businesses and individuals.  Securities dealers (i.e. broker-dealers) underwrite and trade 
financial assets in the capital markets. Insurers offer various forms of risk protection — life, 
health, property and casualty, etc.— and through investing their premiums are, along with 
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traditional demarcations among [them] have substantially blurred.”103  A 
case in point is that all of the institutions in Figure 2 essentially engage in 
all four activities.  Thus, a key underlying idea is that industry changes and 
the increasingly systemic nature of cross-product risks have made 
distinctions among financial products and institutions less relevant.  
Recognizing this, Canada developed one regulator for the entire financial 
sector: OSFI.  In contrast, the U.S. retains an outdated model in which each 
institution is overseen by dozens, if not hundreds, of agencies at various 
levels in piecemeal fashion. 
This Comment focuses, at least nominally, on banks for two main 
reasons.104  First, they are “absolutely central” to the credit, monetary, and 
payment systems; thus, “the spillovers (‘negative externalities’) that flow 
from bank failure” often impact “the economy more widely.”105  Second, 
banks have unique risks.106  They “are leveraged; they run maturity 
mismatches; and their net worth is often uncertain. So they are exposed to 
runs.”107  As a consequence, banks’ continued survival depends on 
collective confidence in their ability to survive;108 if that confidence 
 
asset management firms, major providers of capital.  At the same time, the financial sector is 
an increasingly complex web with  myriad roles and participants.  This Comment does not 
seek to capture or assess all of them; instead, it focuses on the most visible and regulated 
aspects of the financial system to the unfortunate, but inevitable, exclusion of others.  
 103.  GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND 
CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 19 (2008) [hereinafter, STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION] (outlining the regulatory frameworks applied by seventeen developed 
economies and contrasting their relative experiences and successes). 
 104.  Credit Unions, which are cooperatively owned banks, are largely excluded to limit 
the scope of this analysis.  However, Canadian credit unions are also indirectly overseen by 
OSFI, the same integrated prudential regulator responsible for all other financial institutions.  
See infra note 187 and accompanying text.  
 105.  Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability, Bank of England, Remarks 
at the Bernie Gerald Cantor (BCG) Partners Seminar; Shadow Banking, Financing Markets, 
and Financial Stability 1 (Jan. 21 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/review/ 
r100126d.pdf [hereinafter, Remarks by Paul Tucker]. Further, as the Bank of England has 
noted: “[m]ost of the money in circulation is created, not by the printing presses of the Bank 
of England, but by the commercial banks themselves: banks create money whenever they 
lend to someone in the economy or buy an asset from consumers.” See MICHAEL MCLEAY, 
AMAR RADIA & RYLAND THOMAS, BANK OF ENGLAND, MONEY CREATION IN THE MODERN 
ECONOMY 12 (2014).   
 106.  For individual institutions, these risks are in part a byproduct of fractional reserve 
banking.  For a thorough discussion, see ANDREW B. ABEL, BEN S. BERNANKE, DEAN 
CROUSHORE, MACROECONOMICS 535-37 (8th ed, 2014) (explaining fractional reserve 
banking and a simplified bank balance sheet).  
 107.  Remarks by Paul Tucker, supra note 105.  
 108.  “‘Every banker knows that if he has to prove that he is worthy of credit, however 
good may be his arguments, in fact his credit is gone.’”- Walter Bagehot, ‘Lombard Street,’ 
published in 1873.”  Floyd Norris, Proclaiming Integrity, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX (July 15, 
2011, 8:30 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/15/proclaiming-integrity/ 
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disappears, the business model leaves banks in the untenable position of 
funding long-term exposures with short-term assets.109  
In a traditional bank run, depositors flee an institution because of 
concerns regarding its solvency; in other words, they want their money 
back now, in case it will not be there later. This risk has long been well-
known, and largely mitigated through deposit insurance.110 As Professors 
Calomiris and Haber point out, banking systems “collapse only when two 
conditions are met in combination:” banks take significant risks and lack 
sufficient capital to absorb the losses.111 As will be discussed below, 
prudential (e.g., “safety and soundness”) regulation of individual 
institutions – termed micro-prudential supervision—is meant to ensure that 
they have sufficient capital relative to their exposures.  However, as will be 
illustrated in Part III.B.3, the devil is in the details with respect to bank 
capital. 
Structural changes to the financial industry, including the rise of 
“shadow banking,”112 have resulted in an increasing emphasis on systemic 
risks—“developments that threaten the stability of the financial system as a 
 
(internal citation omitted). 
 109.  This has been referred to as the ‘bank structure’ aspect of the economic theories of 
banking crises.  Professors Calomiris and Haber noted:  
Theories of banking crises posit three aspects of banking, some combination of 
which are presumed to explain the origins of crises: bank structure, interbank 
connections, and human nature. Bank structure refers to the maturity and 
liquidity mismatch between banks’ relatively illiquid and long-lived loans and 
their relatively liquid and short-lived liabilities. Structural theories regard 
banking crises as the result of the inherent exposure of banks to “liquidity risk” 
arising from this mismatch. 
Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen Haber, The Political Foundations of Scarce and Unstable 
Credit 2 (Colum. Univ., Working Paper, 2013). 
 110.  See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 401-19 (1983) (describing the dynamics of bank runs and 
how they can be mitigated through deposit insurance). 
 111.  FRAGILE BY DESIGN, supra note 58, at 206-07. 
 112.  The “shadow banking system” has become an important liquidity provider.  
Although a sufficient discussion of this complex topic is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
the author largely agrees with Professor Schwarcz’s position that “the fact that shadow 
banks tend to be less regulated than traditional banks inevitably means that regulatory 
arbitrage drives the demand for shadow banking to some extent. Therefore, increasing bank 
regulation will almost certainly increase shadow banking demand.”  Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Regulating Shadow Banking: Inaugural Address for the Inaugural Symposium of the Review 
of Banking & Financial Law, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 624 (2012). For a thorough 
discussion of the literature regarding shadow banking, see TOBIAS ADRIAN & ADAM B. 
ASHCRAFT, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. SHADOW BANKING: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, 
STAFF REPORT NO. 580 (2012), available at http://www.nyfedeconomists.org/research/ 
staff_reports/sr580.pdf.  For a discussion of potential regulatory implications, see Morgan 
Ricks, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation, 1-58 (Colum. L. & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 370, 2010).  
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whole and consequently the broader economy, not just that of one or two 
institutions.”113  The dangers posed by systemic risk have led to a relative 
academic consensus regarding the need for macroprudential supervision,114 
which aims “to safeguard the financial system as a whole.”115  In other 
words, macroprudential supervision protects against both institution-
specific and systemic risk. 
Systemic risk innately increases the likelihood and magnitude of 
banking crises.116 While a thorough discussion of these dynamics is beyond 
the scope of this Comment,117 the important point is that “[w]hen the 
bubble crashes, banks make large losses and inflict a credit crunch on the 
rest of the economy.”118 
As former Federal Reserve Chair Benjamin Bernanke’s research has 
shown, during a crisis, it becomes imperative to rescue the banking system; 
otherwise, the monetary policy transmission mechanism breaks down.119 
 
 113.  Corey Boles, Bernanke Offers Broad Definition of Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J. REAL 
TIME ECON. (Nov. 18, 2009, 12:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/ 
2009/11/18/bernanke-offers-broad-definition-of-systemic-risk/. 
 114.  See Stanley Fischer, Governor of the Bank of Isr., Dinner Lecture at the Bank of 
Israel Conference: Central bank lessons from the global crisis 5 (Mar. 31, 2011) (describing 
“the need for macroprudential supervision” as a key lesson from the financial crisis, while 
noting that despite the lack of a universal definition, macroprudential supervision “involves 
two elements: that the supervision relates to the entire financial system; and that it involves 
systemic interactions.”). 
 115.  See Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential 
Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 7 (2011) (“In the aftermath of the 
crisis, there seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers that financial 
regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction.”). 
 116.  Professors Reinhart and Rogoff “mark a banking crisis by two types of events.” 
The first, more severe variety, is termed “systemic,” and is characterized by “bank runs that 
lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial 
institutions.” The second, milder form, is termed “financial distress,” and occurs “if there 
are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an 
important financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of 
similar outcomes for other financial institutions.”  See THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT, supra note 
37, at 10-11. 
 117.  See generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 
2007 (2010) for a discussion analyzing the financial crisis through the framework of a 
banking panic and considering its effects and causes; MICHAEL LEWIS, PANIC: THE STORY OF 
MODERN FINANCIAL INSANITY (2008) (analyzing how the underpricing of risk has led to five 
illustrative crises in recent financial history). 
 118.  Kosuke Aoki & Kalin Nikolov, Bubbles, Banks, and Financial Stability 7 
(Macroprudential Research Network, Working Paper No.1495, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176147. 
 119.  One of Bernanke’s insights was that “the real service performed by the banking 
system is the differentiation between good and bad borrowers“ — a crucial information 
gathering function with respect to the allocation of credit.  Benjamin Bernanke, 
Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression, in 
ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 50 (2000). But see Amir Sufi, Bernanke’s failed 
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This insight was, in many ways, the intellectual foundation behind 
‘bailouts’ through the TARP program, which remain deeply unpopular with 
the public.  Thus, a banking crisis is best prevented through effective 
regulation ex ante, rather than intervention ex post, when ‘punishing’ banks 
may mean damaging the rest of the economy.120 
Because of banks’ central importance and unique risks, they “have 
long functioned within the terms of an established social contract with the 
authorities.”121 This contract grants “certain privileges that are unavailable 
to other firms,” but also imposes uniquely wide-ranging oversight.122 
A. The Architecture of Financial Regulation 
Regulating the financial sector necessitates a robust regulatory 
architecture123 that fulfills numerous distinct functions.  Due to underlying 
distinctions in their economies, different countries apply significantly 
differing frameworks.  This Comment’s approach is based largely on 
Canada’s system,124 and is notably similar to that presented in the Treasury 
 
mortgage application exposes the flaw in banking, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014, 3:34 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b02a24c2-4d60-11e4-bf60-00144feab7de.html#axzz3IX3 
RAGIM (arguing that “the modern banking system does very little of the information 
gathering that many economic models have in mind.”). 
 120.  Broadly speaking, the objectives of financial regulation are: “(a) safety and 
soundness of financial institutions, (b) mitigation of systemic risk, (c) fairness and 
efficiency of markets, and (d) the protection of customers and investors.” STRUCTURE OF 
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 21-22. 
 121.  Remarks by Paul Tucker, supra note 105, at 1. 
 122.  Morgan Ricks, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation 3 (Columbia Law Sch. 
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 370, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571290.  
 123.  Regulatory architecture is defined as the “organization of the agencies that regulate 
a particular policy sphere.” EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43087, WHO 
REGULATES WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR 
BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS 10 (2013) [hereinafter, WHO REGULATES WHOM?]. 
 124.  This taxonomy is a synthesis of the following: i) the Canadian regulatory 
architecture, ii) the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Blueprint for a Modern Financial 
Regulatory Structure, and iii) a review of the regulatory structures used in the seventeen 
nations described in the Group of Thirty’s Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches 
and Challenges in a Global Marketplace.  See TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT supra note 5, at 14 
(finding that “[i]n the optimal structure three distinct regulators would focus exclusively on 
financial institutions: a market stability regulator, a prudential financial regulator, and a 
business conduct regulator.”); STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 12 
(reviewing the financial regulatory approaches of seventeen jurisdictions to “illustrate the 
implications of adopting one or another of the. . .principle models of supervisory 
oversight.”). 
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Department’s 2008 Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory 
Structure.125 
The taxonomy adopted by this Comment posits that the operation of 
effective financial regulatory architecture necessitates four distinct roles:126 
1. Prudential supervisor; 
2. Central bank; 
3. Deposit insurer; and 
4. Business conduct regulator. 
Additionally, both the U.S. and Canadian frameworks employ a 
housing finance agency, a crime prevention agency, and a coordinating 
forum for the financial regulators.  Figure 6 below summarizes the 
financial regulatory architecture for the U.S. and Canada. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 125.  As will be discussed at greater length in Part V, this approach was, in the author’s 
view, unfortunately largely cast aside in March 2009, when the Treasury Department 
pivoted towards a new framework titled “Rules for the Regulatory Road,” which was 
elaborated on in a subsequent white paper.  As Professor Skeel points out, this white paper 
“would provide the template for all of the major parts of the legislation that eventually 
passed.”  DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK 
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 3 (2011). 
 126.  In keeping with the emphasis on banking institutions, this Comment’s taxonomy 
largely puts to the side the regulation of securities, derivatives, and capital markets.  This is 
not because these matters are not important; in fact, it is because the area is so complex that 
it is not possible to do it justice in this Comment.  As will be discussed in Part V.B infra, 
however, this Comment posits that banks’ broker-dealer units also be subject to prudential 
oversight, as is the case in Canada’s framework.  Notably, relative to the U.S., Canada 
retains a relatively fragmented model for securities regulation.  See supra notes 153-154 and 
accompanying text. As a matter of qualitative observation, the U.S. also has more robust 
capital markets, potentially making this secondary level of distinction between the U.S. and 
Canada a worthwhile area for future research.  
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Figure 6. Summary of US and Canadian Regulatory Architecture127 
 
US Canada
1) Prudential Supervision
Banks
OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC,                    
NCUA, 50 state regulators
   Broker-Dealer Subsidiaries  SEC, CFTC
Insurance
50 State Insurance regulators,            
Federal Insurance Office
Private Pensions
Department of Labor,                             
Department of the Treasury
Housing Finance
Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA): oversees Fannie, Freddie, and 
the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks
2) Market Stability Federal Reserve Bank of Canada
3) Business Conduct
CFPB, (also DOJ, FTC, SEC,                   
CFTC, and HUD) CCFA
4) Deposit insurance FDIC CDIC
5) Crime prevention FinCEN,  OFAC FinTRAC
6) Coordinating Forum
Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC), Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC),                   
and the President's Working Group on 
Capital Markets (PWG)
Financial Institutions 
Supervisory 
Committee 
* As of 2012, OSFI oversees the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation
OSFI*
 
As this section will illustrate, Canada’s streamlined regulatory 
architecture facilitates effective financial regulation.128  Put simply, 
Canada’s success is a function of having a regulatory system suited for a 
modern financial sector.  Canada’s approach has two fundamental 
advantages over America’s relatively balkanized framework. First, and 
most importantly, OSFI’s broad jurisdiction over financial institutions 
allows for macroprudential oversight over the entire financial sector— 
mitigating systemic and cross-product risks.  Second, Canada’s structure 
minimizes jurisdictional conflict and enhances inter-agency coordination 
through clear regulatory domains based on the requisite roles in financial 
regulation. 
 
 127.  See infra Part III.B-C. 
 128.  Please note that readers familiar with the structure of financial regulation can feel 
free to move forward to the discussion in Part III. 
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1. Required Functions 
Prudential supervision refers to the direct oversight of financial 
institutions.  It is composed of two distinct roles: regulation (the 
development, promulgation, and enforcement of legislative and 
administrative directives) and prudential review (assessment of capital 
quality for financial institutions).129 Traditionally, prudential supervision 
has concentrated on ensuring individual institutions hold sufficient capital 
relative to their risk.  This innately requires evaluating both their risk 
profile and capital structure—an approach that has been termed micro-
prudential supervision.130 However, as discussed above, the contemporary 
post-crisis emphasis has evolved towards assessing systemic risks through 
macroprudential supervision. 
In simplified terms, having ‘sufficient capital’ essentially means that, 
all things being equal, a bank must hold more capital if it makes riskier 
loans.  To put it differently, if two banks are the same size and have the 
same capital requirements, the bank that makes riskier loans must make 
fewer of them.  The capital structure of banks is complex and somewhat 
outside the scope of this Comment, but includes not only equity but also 
preferred stock and contingent securities—debt that transforms into equity 
if a bank’s regulatory capital falls too low.131 As will be discussed in Part 
III.B, equity is the most stable type of bank capital because its 
straightforward structure is largely ‘tamper-proof’ through regulatory 
arbitrage. 
The central bank, sometimes referred to as the market stability 
regulator, is responsible for “the implementation of monetary policy132 and 
the provision of liquidity133 to the financial system.”134  The U.S. Central 
 
 129.  This description is based on the OSFI’s website.  OFSI Structure and Operations, 
OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INST., http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/Pages/so-
sf.aspx (last updated Feb. 2, 2014).   
 130.  Andrew Crockett, Gen. Manager of the Bank for Int’l Settlements and Chairman of 
the Fin. Stability Forum, before the Eleventh International Conference of Banking: 
Marrying the Micro-and Macro-prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability (Sept. 20-21, 
2000). 
 131.  For a thorough discussion of bank capital, and a cogent (albeit, complex) argument 
for banks’ holding significantly more equity, see Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, 
Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the 
Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive (Rock Ctr. for 
Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 161, 2013). 
 132.  Monetary policy “refers to the actions undertaken by a central bank . . . to influence 
the availability and cost of money and credit to help promote national economic goals.” 
Federal Open Market Committee, BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 2015). 
 133.  Provision of liquidity includes discount window lending and programs such as 
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Bank, the Federal Reserve (“Fed”), has a dual mandate: to maximize 
employment and maintain stable prices. The Fed makes its objectives 
operable through control of the Federal Funds Rate.135  In contrast, the 
Bank of Canada has a sole mandate: “low, stable, and predictable” 
inflation.136 
There is an innate, but often overlooked, link between monetary 
policy and prudential supervision.137  In fact, because of the central bank’s 
market knowledge, effective macroprudential supervision of the financial 
system requires close coordination between the central bank and prudential 
supervisor. 
Because of this, “[a] threshold question arises whether the central 
bank should be a supervisor of financial services or whether that role is best 
performed by another agency.”138  While neither the U.S. nor Canada 
utilize this approach, prudential supervision and market stability are under 
the purview of the Central Bank in some smaller advanced economies, 
notably Singapore and Israel.139  The European Union recently transitioned 
towards such a structure through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
under the auspices of the European Central Bank,140 and the SSM’s 
 
quantitative easing that aim to improve aggregate market conditions.  
 134.  TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 15. 
 135.  The Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI., 
https://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/speeches/our_dual_mandate_backgroun
d.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 136.  The Objective, Monetary Policy, BANK OF CAN., http://www.bankofcanada.ca/core-
functions/monetary-policy/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 137.  For example, John Taylor, a highly regarded Stanford economist, has posited that 
excessively low rates set by the Federal Reserve pre-crisis were the causal factor in the 
subsequent collapse. In academic articles and his book, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW 
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009), Taylor argues that had the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy not 
deviated from the federal funds rate implied by the Taylor Rule, the financial crisis could 
have been mitigated or even avoided, especially with respect to the housing markets.  See 
John B. Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, 195-214 (Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 1993). 
 138.  STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 39 (noting that central 
banks have an important, value-added role in any effective regulatory regime, due to 
“superior knowledge of market conditions and the depth of their staffs’ expertise.”).   
 139.  For discussion of Singapore’s financial regulatory structure, see Id. at 161-69.  
Some of the Bank of Israel’s functions are “(1) managing monetary policy . . . (7) 
supervising and regulating the banking system.”  BANK OF ISRAEL LAW, 5770-2010 4-5 
(2010) (Isr.), available at http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/pikuah/bank_hakika/ 
eng/new_law_2010_eng.pdf. 
 140.  See Jeff Black, ECB Skips Celebration for Day One of Role as Supervisor, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 2, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-
03/ecb-skips-fireworks-for-day-one-of-new-role-as-supervisor.html (detailing the initiation 
of the European Central Bank’s Single Supervisory Mechanism). 
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performance could prove to be an important test case.  As will be discussed 
in Part V, while combining the central bank and prudential supervisor is an 
intriguing idea, given the inherent tensions between the central bank and 
prudential supervisor, retaining formal separation, but close cooperation, 
between the two entities may be best. 
Business conduct regulation is closely linked to consumer protection 
and includes oversight of “disclosures, business practices, and chartering 
and licensing of certain types of financial firms” and products.141  This is an 
essential function of a modern regulatory system because it enables fair and 
competitive markets, which are critical to long-term growth and stability.  
At the same time, strong consumer protection maintains the public’s 
confidence in both the regulatory framework and financial system. 
Depositor insurance reimburses account holders of failed banks and 
“can play a critical role in avoiding bank panics and thus may contribute to 
financial stability.”142  As previously discussed, deposit insurance is crucial 
to preventing institution-specific bank runs and, although less effective 
against systemic risk, it continues to be an important means of instilling 
confidence in the banking system for consumers. 
2.  Additional Roles 
While not strictly necessary for the day-to-day operation of the 
financial system, housing finance and crime prevention play an important 
role in modern financial systems.  Housing finance facilitates access to 
mortgage credit through a system of government-supported or guaranteed 
lending.  Especially in the U.S., it has taken on an increasingly significant 
role through the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, which securitize and guarantee approved ‘agency’ 
mortgages that meet their requirements.143 Notably, as will be discussed 
below, while the Canadian government also helps facilitate mortgage 
finance, it has taken on a much more limited role in the market. 
The increasing securitization of mortgages also cements the links 
between housing finance and the capital markets.  Figure 7 below provides 
an overview of mortgage-backed security (MBS) and collateralized 
mortgage obligation (CMO) markets in the U.S. based on data from 
 
 141.  Treasury’s Summary of Regulatory Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/business/29regulate-text.html?pagewanted=all. 
 142.  STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 42 (noting that “[a]ny 
regime must be structured to ensure that depositors’ funds can be accessed promptly.”).  
 143. For an overview of government-sponsored enterprises, including the structure of 
their relationship with government agencies and the opportunities and challenges they 
present, see KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21663, GOVERNMENT SPONSORED 
ENTERPRISES (GSES): AN INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW, CRS REPORT (2007). 
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SIFMA.144 There are two important takeaways.  First, the U.S. housing 
market is extremely large, with over $7 trillion in securities outstanding as 
of 2013.  Second, the market is highly dependent upon, and dominated by 
the GSEs, which guarantee the majority of mortgage securitizations. 
 
Figure 7. U.S. MBS & CMO Market Composition: 2002–2013 
 
The crime prevention agency reflects the realities of a post-9/11 
world, and actively works with law enforcement to impede money 
laundering, terrorism financing, and other forms of financial crime.  While 
important to the broader system, this role will not be a focus of subsequent 
analyses. 
Finally, the coordinating forum is generally a “committee tasked with 
ensuring information exchange and coordination between the leadership of 
the central bank and other supervisory agencies.”145 As will be discussed in 
Parts II.C-D below, while Canada relies on a forum only for coordination 
among regulators, in the U.S., the Financial Stability Council (FSOC), a 
multi-agency structure, serves as the macroprudential regulator. 
The next subsection will first briefly outline the historical background 
and development of the U.S. and Canadian regulatory frameworks.  Then, 
 
 144.  Structured Finance: US Mortgage-Related Issuance and Outstanding, Sec. Indus. 
& Fin.Mkts. Ass’n., http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (last visited May 14, 
2015). 
 145.  STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 44. 
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the two subsequent subsections will provide an in-depth analysis and 
comparison of the Canadian and American regulatory architectures. 
B.  Historical Context 
The historical background helps shed some insight onto the evolution 
and contemporary structure of financial regulation in the U.S. and Canada.  
Two key differences emerge.  First, America’s regulatory fragmentation is 
rooted in traditional concerns regarding excessive concentrations of power.  
Second, when the U.S. has made reforms, they have been directly in 
response to the past crisis, but rarely forward-looking.146 
Although both the U.S. and Canada were originally European 
colonies,147 the U.S. gained its independence in the 1770s and as a result, 
developed a distinct governance structure.  In contrast, “Canada’s 
constitution evolved within the British Empire.”148 As a consequence, the 
two nations followed sharply divergent approaches with respect to the 
allocation of power between the states and federal government.  Under 
Canada’s 1867 Constitution Act,149 “[a]ny power not specifically delegated 
to the provinces was left to the central government, making it the polar 
opposite of the U.S. system, in which non-enumerated rights are reserved 
for the states.”150 
As a result, Canada’s current “legislative and regulatory framework 
for banks is entirely federal,”151 while in the U.S., “banking and securities 
activities are regulated at both the state and federal levels by multiple 
regulators.”152  One notable exception is that the “regulation of the 
Canadian securities industry is carried out by the provinces,” rather than 
the federal government.153  However, Canada is attempting to develop a 
 
 146.  One prominent scholar termed this approach “regulating in the dark.” See Roberta 
Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE 
IN U.S. REGULATION 87 (Cary Coglianese, ed., 2012). 
 147.  The U.S. and Canada were primarily controlled by Britain and France, respectively.  
See Political Foundations of Credit, supra note 9, at 23. 
 148.  Id.  Notably, because of Canada’s past as both a French and British colony, it is a 
unique Constitutional hybrid with common law at the federal level and civil law in the large 
province of Quebec.  See, e.g., Poonam Puri, Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and 
Canada, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1671.  
 149.  The Act is formally known as the British North America Act of 1867 and it 
“became the basis for the modern nation of Canada.” Political Foundations of Credit, supra 
note 9, at 41. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 126. 
 152.  Id. at 32. 
 153.  Id. at 127. 
ARTICLE 6 (BREYDO).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:25 AM 
1010 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
federal framework, and in the interim, the thirteen provincial regulators are 
actively coordinating their policies to maximize consistency.154 
In response to the Great Depression, the Bank of Canada was created 
in 1934 and in 1938 restructured as a Crown corporation.155  In 1985, the 
failure of two small banks and a number of trust companies created the 
impetus for an integrated regulator.156  Through a forward-looking 
approach, the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act of 1987157 
merged the Department of Insurance and the Office of the Inspector 
General of Banks to create OSFI, and also established the Financial 
Institutions Supervisory Committee (FISC) for coordination among 
regulators.158 
In contrast to Canada, U.S. banking regulation “reflects the competing 
priorities and personalities that shaped American history, rather than any 
overarching rationale in its design.”159  Early efforts to create a national 
banking system160 were stymied by populist opposition161 until the National 
Bank Act of 1863.162  The Act allowed national charters163 and established 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to oversee national banks,164 
creating America’s unique dual-banking system.165 
 
 154.  See Anita I. Anand & Andrew J. Green, Why Is This Taking So Long? The Move 
Toward a National Securities Regulator, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 663, 663-86 (2010) (analyzing 
the delay in Canada’s introduction of a national securities regulator). 
 155.  See STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 127 for a 
description of Crown corporations and how they belong to the federal government. 
 156.  See How OSFI Came to be, Our History, OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INST., 
http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/Pages/hst.aspx  (last updated June 14, 2013) (noting 
that the two banks to fail were Canadian Commercial Bank and the Northland Bank). 
 157.  Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.18 (Can.), 
available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/O-2.7.pdf. 
 158.  Previously, the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) also had 
responsibilities for prudential supervision, but its focus was reoriented to only deposit 
insurance.  See STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 127-29 
(discussing the history of the development of the Canadian financial regulatory structure in 
the 1980s). 
 159.  TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 33. 
 160.  The first national bank was chartered in 1791 but ceased operations when its 
charter expired and was not renewed in 1811. Political Foundations of Credit, supra note 9, 
at 27.   
 161.  Id. at 25. 
 162.  TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 33. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 210. 
 165.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal 
Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1133, 1152 (1990). 
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Due to “financial panics and instability around the turn of the 
century,”166 the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the Federal Reserve 
System,167 composed of the Board of Governors in D.C., twelve regional 
Federal Reserve Banks, and the Federal Open Market Committee.168 
Subsequently, “much of the remaining structure for bank and securities 
regulation was created as the result of the Great Depression.”169 The 
Securities Act of 1933 set disclosure and registration requirements for 
securities, while the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).170  The Banking Act of 1933 founded 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC)171 and also separated 
commercial and investment banking through its first four sections, which 
are commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act.172 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999173 (GLB Act) effectively 
repealed the Glass-Steagall restrictions by “allowing qualifying institutions 
to participate in commercial banking, full-scale securities underwriting and 
dealing, insurance underwriting, and merchant banking all under one 
holding company.”174  This change directly led to the development of U.S. 
universal banks, which some have criticized for contributing to the severity 
of the recent crisis.175 
 
 166.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-1049T, FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
RECENT CRISIS REAFFIRMS THE NEED TO OVERHAUL THE U.S. REGULATORY SYSTEM 4 (2009) 
[hereinafter, NEED TO OVERHAUL]. 
 167.  For a description of the Federal Reserve System and operation of monetary policy, 
see ANDREW B. ABEL, BEN S. BERNANKE, DEAN CROUSHORE, MACROECONOMICS 538-50 
(7th ed., 2011). 
 168.  TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 34; STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 210. 
 169.  NEED TO OVERHAUL, supra note 166, at 7; TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 
34; STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 210-12. 
 170.  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 formed the “basis for regulation of financial 
markets and their participants.” STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 
211. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 34. 
 173.  For the sake of brevity, this Comment skims over a number of additional important 
reforms, such as the Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq.), The Savings and Loan Holding Company Act of 
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a), and the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 
(1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811).  For more information, see STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 210-30 (listing additional financial reforms and their effect 
on monetary functions). 
 174.  TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 37. 
 175.  Richard Parsons, a former Board member at Citigroup—the institution most 
associated with lobbying to repeal Glass-Steagall—commented that, “[t]o some extent what 
we saw in the 2007, 2008 crash was the result of the throwing off of Glass-Steagall . . . . 
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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (Dodd-Frank)176 made a number of structural changes to the U.S. 
regulatory framework.  While a full discussion is beyond the scope of this 
analysis, the most relevant changes include: i) merging the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) into the OCC, ii) creating the Office of Financial 
Research (OFR) and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the treasury 
department,177 iii) establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) for macroprudential supervision, and iv) the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB),178 an independent agency focused on consumer 
protection.  As will be discussed, although some changes—such as merging 
the OTS and OCC—are net positive, it remains unclear whether they 
address the fundamental underlying issues in the U.S. regulatory system.  
C.   Structure of the Canadian System 
Canada’s regulatory architecture, illustrated in Figure 8 below, closely 
maps along the required functions for financial regulation.179 The primary 
functions are performed by: i) Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions (OSFI), ii) the Bank of Canada, iii) Financial Consumer 
Agency of Canada (FCAC), and iv) the Canadian Depository Insurance 
Corporation (CIDC).  Additionally, the Canadian Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (CMHC), which is responsible for housing finance, is also 
overseen by OSFI as of 2012.  The Financial Transactions and Reports 
Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) oversees crime prevention.180 
Finally, inter-agency coordination is facilitated through the quarterly 
Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee, which is joined by the 
 
Have we gotten our arms around it yet? I don’t think so because the financial - services 
sector moves so fast.”  Kim Chipman and Christine Harper, Parsons Blames Glass-Steagall 
Repeal For Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUS. (April 19, 2012, 8:48 PM) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-19/parsons-blames-glass-steagall-repeal-for-
crisis.html.  
 176.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at various sections of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter, 
Dodd-Frank].  Dodd-Frank “has two very clear objectives. Its first objective is to limit the 
risk of contemporary finance—what critics often call the shadow banking system; and the 
second is to limit the damage caused by the failure of a large financial institution.”  SKEEL, 
supra note 125, at 4.  
 177.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5342 (West).  
 178.  See Dodd-Frank §§ 1011, 1021, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5511.  
 179.  Diagram taken from OSFI’s site. See OFSI Structure and Operations, OFFICE 
SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INST., http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/Pages/so-sf.aspx 
(last updated Feb. 2, 2014).  
 180.  See Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act 
(PCMLTFA), S.C. 2000, c. 17, pt. 3, §§ 40-41 (Can.), available at http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P-24.501.pdf. 
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Department of Finance and chaired by OSFI.  The Minister of Finance, a 
Cabinet member reporting to Canada’s Parliament, chairs the regulatory 
architecture—serving as head of the Department of Finance181 while 
indirectly overseeing the other agencies.182 
 
Figure 8. Structure of the Canadian Regulatory Framework 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 Canada’s framework emphasizes regulatory autonomy and 
independence from politics.  OSFI operates at “arm’s length” from the 
Minister of Finance, insulating it from the political process.183 Similarly, 
The Bank of Canada, Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), and 
the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) are Crown 
 
 181.  The Canadian Department of Finance oversees all “economic, fiscal, tax . . . and 
financial sector policies and programs,” a role most analogous to the U.S. Treasury 
Department.  The Department of Finance is also responsible for preparing and presenting 
the annual budget, and in this regard, assumes some of the functions of the U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). See About Finance Canada, DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/afc/index-eng.asp (last updated Oct. 10, 2010); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/2012-IntroToCBO.pdf 
(summarizing the functions of the U.S. CBO).  
 182.  The minister is responsible for the “control and direction of all matters relating to 
the financial affairs of Canada.”  See Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-10, 
s.8-9 (Can.), available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/F-11.pdf (establishing the 
Department of Finance and enumerating the role and responsibilities of the Minister of 
Finance). 
 183.  See OFSI Structure and Operations, supra note 179 (detailing the framework of 
accountability within OSFI). 
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corporations—“hybrid entities”184 operating “at arm’s length from the 
government [but] as public institutions . . . ultimately accountable to” it.185  
Structurally, the most important advantage of Canada’s regulatory 
architecture is that OSFI—which notably has broader statutory powers than 
its numerous American counterparts186—has consolidated macroprudential 
supervision of the entire financial sector.187 OSFI’s broad purview includes: 
banks (along with broker-dealers and finance companies), insurance 
companies, private pension plans, and, more recently, the CMHC.188  
OSFI’s oversight of the CMHC is essential; along with monitoring a 
large part of the financial industry, it integrates information regarding the 
housing market into broader macroprudential supervision.  At the same 
time, relative to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the CMHC has greater 
discretion over risk management, because “Canada, unlike the U.S., does 
not have a policy goal of increasing the rate of homeownership.”189 Further, 
 
 184.  Kazi Stastna, What Are Crown Corporations and Why Do They Exist? CBC NEWS 
(Apr. 1, 2012, 4:39 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/what-are-crown-corporations-and-
why-do-they-exist-1.1135699. 
 185.  MEETING THE EXPECTATIONS OF CANADIANS, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK FOR CANADA’S CROWN CORPORATIONS, TREATY BOARD OF CANADA 
SECRETARIAT 11 (2005), available at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/rev-exa/gfcc-cgse-
eng.pdf.  Unlike government agencies, Crown corporations are able to retain significant 
autonomy, “in terms of independence and credibility as non-partisan, non-political providers 
of services. . . [and] in terms of day-to-day operations.” Id. at 10-11.  
 186.  For example, OSFI can remove bank executives and directors.  JOHN C. COURTNEY 
& PIETRO S. NIVOLA, BROOKINGS INST., KNOW THY NEIGHBOR: WHAT CANADA CAN TELL US 
ABOUT FINANCIAL REGULATIONS 2 (2009).  While the U.S. Treasury technically has similar 
authority the extent to which it can be utilized is unclear.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(West 
2009) (stating “the appropriate Federal banking agency for the depository institution may 
serve upon such party a written notice of the agency’s intention to remove such party . . .” 
for various violations).   
 187.  OSFI indirectly oversees credit unions by ensuring that the Cooperative Credit 
Associations (CCA), which are owned by and provide liquidity to member credit unions, 
can “fulfill their statutory roles of providing sources of liquidity to, and assuming excess 
liquidity from, their . . . members . . . .” See Who We Regulate: Cooperative Credit 
Associations, OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INSTITUTIONS, http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/eng/wt-ow/Pages/wwr-er.aspx?sc=1&gc=4 (last updated Oct. 23, 2014). 
 188.  Per the June 2012 amendments to the National Housing Act, OSFI: 
is required, at least once in each calendar year, to make . . . examination or 
inquiry that the Superintendent considers to be necessary or expedient to 
determine if [CMHC] is carrying on any or all of its commercial activities in a 
safe and sound manner with due regard to its exposure to loss.  
CAN. MORTG. AND HOUS. CORP., QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT: THIRD QUARTER 4 (2013), 
available at https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/corp/about/core/upload/2013_Q3_ 
QFR_Publication_English_Final.pdf. 
 189.  Comparing Canada and U.S. Housing Finance Systems, CAN. MORTG. AND HOUS.  
CORP., http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/corp/nero/jufa/jufa_018.cfm (last updated Nov. 28, 
2014). 
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as a Crown corporation, the CMHC is arguably better able to balance its 
policy objectives and responsibilities to taxpayers, because unlike 
publically-traded Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,190 the “CMHC does not 
seek to maximize profit through its commercial activities.”191 
Canada’s Central Bank, The Bank of Canada, serves as the market 
stability regulator, primarily through conducting monetary policy.  In that 
sense, it is analogous to the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed); however, the Fed 
also serves as a prudential regulator.192 Similarly, the CDIC is solely 
focused on deposit insurance, unlike the FDIC, which like the Fed also 
serves as a prudential supervisor. 
The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) and the Financial 
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)193 are 
both independent agencies reporting to the Minister of Finance.194 FCAC is 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing financial institutions’ compliance 
with consumer protection regulations.195 Compared to the U.S. CFPB, 
Canada’s FCAC arguably has more robust tools at its disposal, including 
the ability to impose criminal sanctions on non-compliant financial 
institutions.196  FINTRAC is “responsible for anti-money laundering and 
anti-terrorist financing,”197 which, in the case of federal financial 
institutions, it has delegated to OSFI, further streamlining the regulatory 
structure. 
 
 190.  Notably, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are in ongoing litigation with shareholders 
over an aspect of their 2008 rescue package described as ensuring that “existing Fannie and 
Freddie common equity holders will never receive any future positive earnings.”  Gretchen 
Morgenson, The Untouchable Profits Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/business/the-untouchable-profits-of-fannie-
mae-and-freddie-mac.html?ref=business&_r=2. 
 191.  CAN. MORTG. AND HOUS. CORP., supra note 189.  The CMHC further stated, 
“[r]ather, we [Canada] encourage the availability of housing across a variety of tenure 
types—homeownership, rental housing, supportive housing and transitional housing.  The 
housing needs of low-income Canadians are addressed through government assistance 
programs.” Id. 
 192.  BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & 
FUNCTIONS 8 (9th ed. 2005). 
 193.   FINTRAC was created by the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and 
Terrorist Act.  Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act 
(PCMLTFA), S.C. 2000, c. 17 (Can.), available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P-
24.501.pdf. 
 194.  Who We Are, FIN. TRANSACTIONS AND REP. ANALYSIS CTR. OF CAN., 
http://www.fintrac.gc.ca/fintrac-canafe/1-eng.asp (last updated May 20, 2014).  
 195.  Our Mandate, FIN. CONSUMER AGENCY OF CAN., http://www.fcac-
acfc.gc.ca/Eng/about/Pages/OurManda-Notreman.aspx (last updated May 15, 2014).  
 196.  Id.  
 197.  Who We Are, supra note 194. 
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D.  Structure of the U.S. System 
The American financial regulatory architecture is a Rube Goldberg198 
machine that “no one building a system anew would want to duplicate.”199  
Its two fundamental weaknesses are a bewildering fragmentation of 
prudential supervision and the misalignment of regulatory mandates from 
the required functions of financial regulation. 
Yet, despite failing to keep “pace with major developments in 
financial markets and products in recent decades,”200 the system has 
remained largely unchanged.  As a result, “almost a dozen federal 
regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds 
of state financial regulatory agencies share responsibility for overseeing the 
financial services industry”201—a function performed by just OSFI in 
Canada.  As Figure 9 below shows, for a constituent institution, this 
structure results in convoluted reporting and oversight.202 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 198. See Rube Goldberg, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/237465/Rube-Goldberg (last updated Feb. 23, 2014) (referring to “any 
simple process made outlandishly complicated.”). 
 199. Rose Marie Kushmeider, The U.S. Federal Financial Regulatory System: 
Restructuring Federal Bank Regulation, 17 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 4 (2005).  Like no other 
nation, “the United States is a prime example of the role that historical precedent, politics, 
and culture have played in the regulatory structure.”  STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 14. 
 200. NEED TO OVERHAUL, supra note 166, at 2. 
 201. Id. 
 202. The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, at 22. 
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Figure 9. Constituent Institution’s View of U.S. Regulation 
 
1.  Prudential Supervision 
Prudential supervision in the U.S. is fragmented along three 
dimensions—essentially making effective macroprudential oversight 
impossible.  First and most importantly, banks—or to be specific, distinct 
parts of individual banks—are regulated by multiple agencies with 
competing mandates and a poor track record of coordination. Second, there 
is little cross-product regulation, which is “[l]argely incompatible with. . . 
market developments,”203 since “[f]inancial products may have insurance, 
banking, securities, and futures components.”204 Finally, America’s system 
of dual sovereignty creates another layer of complication for both banks 
and other products, as “banking and securities activities are regulated at 
both the state and federal levels by multiple regulators.  Insurance, on the 
other hand, is regulated at the state level and futures principally at the 
federal level.”205 In total, the U.S. has well over 100 distinct agencies to 
fulfill OSFI’s responsibilities.206 
 
 203. TREASURY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 4. 
 204. Id. at 27. 
 205. STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 33. 
 206. These agencies include: the OCC, Fed., FDIC, NCUA, SEC, CFTC, FINRA, 
FHFA, FIO, fifty distinct state banking regulators, nearly fifty state insurance regulators, 
and state-level securities and futures regulators. In addition, OSFI also oversees private 
pensions.  About Us, OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INST. http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Apr. 30, 2014). Although beyond 
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 In simplest terms, U.S. banks have three sets of prudential supervisors: 
federal, state-level, and capital markets.  At the federal level, there are four 
primary prudential regulators:207 
1) Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); 
2) Federal Reserve (Fed); 
3) Federal Depository Insurance Commission (FDIC);  
4) National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). 
At the state level, fifty distinct banking regulators oversee institutions 
chartered or licensed in their respective states in coordination with the 
applicable federal regulators.208  Finally, prudential supervision of banks’ 
broker-dealer units is largely overseen by: 1) the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), 2) the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), and 3) the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), an 
industry self-regulatory agency. 
 Figure 10 below provides a strategic map of regulation for the U.S. 
banking sector.  The x-axis, representing state-level regulation, shows the 
approximate number of state bank regulators overseeing each bank’s 
operations.  The y-axis, representing federal-level regulation, displays the 
agencies responsible for overseeing the banks’ different business lines.  
The size of the bubbles corresponds to each strategic group’s proportion of 
banking sector assets. As will be discussed in depth in Part III.B, this 
 
the scope of this Comment, it is worth noting that in the U.S., regulation of private pensions 
is divided between the Treasury and Labor departments, which some commentators have 
attributed to the fact that neither Department was “prepared to cede jurisdiction over 
pensions in the interest of consolidating pension regulation in a single administrative 
agency.” See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REGULATION AND 
SUPERVISION OF PRIVATE PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/pensions/private-pensions/2081198.pdf (describing the jurisdictions of 
the various Treasury and Labor committees).   
 207.  As early as 1994, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the 
“current structure limits effective regulatory performance.”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-94-106, BANK REGULATION: CONSOLIDATION OF THE REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 1 (1994).  In 2004, another GAO report raised concern that “no one agency or 
mechanism looks at risks that cross markets or industry segments or at the system and its 
risks as a whole.”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61 FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE 2 (2004). 
   208. See generally WHO REGULATES WHOM?, supra note 123. A number of recent cases 
have clarified the demarcations of regulatory authority between federal agencies and state 
banking regulators. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 127 (2007) (holding 
that a nationally charted bank’s mortgage operations are overseen by the bank’s primary 
regulator – the OCC – and not the state banking regulators where the subsidiary operates.); 
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009) (clarifying that state 
Attorney Generals are not preempted from exercising state-specific laws against national 
banks operating in their respective states.). 
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complex structure quickly becomes very expensive for constituent 
institutions. 
 
Figure 10. U.S. Financial Sector: Strategic Map by Regulator 
 
At the federal level, only the OCC and the NCUA focus solely on 
prudential supervision; the Fed and FDIC have dual regulatory mandates.  
The OCC—which recently integrated the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS)—is responsible for nationally chartered banks and federally 
chartered thrifts.209  The NCUA oversees credit unions, which are 
 
 209.  Until 2011, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was a standalone agency 
overseeing saving & loan, and thrift institutions, but, per Dodd-Frank, has been merged with 
the OCC.  See WHO REGULATES WHOM?, supra note 123, at 13. 
Applicable Federal Regulators 2012 U.S. Bank Assets: ~ $15.07 Tr; bubbles approximate size of each strategic group
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historically tame, but growing in size and complexity—suggesting potential 
future concerns.210 
The FDIC is responsible for state chartered banks that are not 
members of the Federal Reserve System.211  At the same time, it serves as 
the sole deposit insurer, which involves determining and charging a fee to 
insured banks.  Also, the FDIC is responsible for managing receiverships 
and conservatorships for failed banking institutions.212  Part IV will discuss 
how the FDIC’s split focus may hinder its performance and endanger its 
insurance fund. 
The Federal Reserve, an “independent entity within government” that 
is “subject to oversight by the Congress”213 arguably has the most difficult 
balance.  Primarily, it serves as the central bank and financial stability 
regulator—conducting monetary policy and providing liquidity to the 
financial sector.  At the same time, it oversees “[b]ank holding companies 
and certain subsidiaries, financial holding companies, securities holding 
companies, savings and loan holding companies, and any firm designated 
as systemically significant by the FSOC,” along with state chartered banks 
that are members of the Federal Reserve System.214 As will be discussed in 
Part V.C., this structure creates an innate tension in the Fed’s 
responsibilities. 
The SEC215 also has substantial prudential oversight functions as “the 
primary regulator for activities conducted in a securities subsidiary of a 
bank or a holding company,”216 including broker-dealers.217 Since 1975, the 
 
 210.  Credit unions have grown significantly in size; “[t]en years ago there were only 70 
credit unions with assets of more than $1 billion.  Now there are 195,” and also experienced 
consolidation similar to banks, as “the number of credit unions has dropped by more than 
half since 1990.” However, “[f]or the ones that remain, growth—in members, loans, and 
deposits—continued almost unabated during the financial crisis.”  Brendan Greeley, Have 
Credit Unions Become Stealth Banks?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 20, 2013, at 14.   
 211.  WHO REGULATES WHOM?, supra note 123, at 13.  
 212.  FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/mission/ (last updated May 4, 2009). 
 213.  See Who Owns the Federal Reserve?, BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_14986.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2013) (outlining 
congressional authority and procedures with respect to review of the Federal Reserve’s 
activities).  
 214.  WHO REGULATES WHOM?, supra note 123, at 13. 
 215.  The SEC has jurisdiction over: “(1) all corporations that sell securities to the public 
and (2) securities broker/dealers and other securities markets intermediaries.”  WHO 
REGULATES WHOM?, supra note 123, at 24.  Notably, “banking regulation is primarily 
designed to prevent systemic risk while securities regulation is primarily for investor 
protection and efficiency enhancement.”  FRANKLIN ALLEN & RICHARD HERRING, BANKING 
REGULATION VERSUS SECURITIES MARKET REGULATION 2 (2001). 
 216.  KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION, AND 
EFFECTS 60 (5th ed. 2000). 
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SEC has enforced a risk-weighted Net Capital Rule for broker dealers,218 
and while “not meant to prevent failures but to minimize the impact on 
customers,”219 enforcing it inherently falls under the purview of prudential 
supervision. 
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act “gave the SEC new responsibilities 
that have aspects of safety and soundness regulation”220 mandating it to set 
capital requirements for “major security-based swap dealers and major 
security-based swap participants.”221 Dodd-Frank also expanded the 
CFTC’s footprint as a prudential regulator, requiring it to set capital 
standards for “swap dealers and major swap participants.”222  In addition, 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)—an industry self-
regulatory group—maintains some functions of prudential oversight.223 
Cross-product prudential supervision is similarly fragmented.  For 
example, oversight of insurance is handled by 50 separate state 
regulators,224 along with the newly-created Federal Insurance Office at the 
 
 217.  From 2004 to 2008, the SEC was the primary regulator for large investment banks 
through its unsuccessful Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (CSEP), which was 
shuttered because “the five participants . . . collapsed or reorganized.”  SEC Ends Program 
To Oversee Investment Banks, REUTERS (Sep. 26, 2008, 12:27 PM) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/26/businesspro-us-sec-investmentbanksbp-
idUSTRE48P6B320080926; see also Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC 
at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 790-96, (2009) (discussing the CSEP program and other critical 
aspects of the SEC’s structure and tenure as a regulator). 
 218.  “The SEC’s net capital rule, set out in 17 CFR § 240.15c3-1, imposes an 
‘Aggregate Indebtedness Standard.’ No broker/dealer shall permit its aggregate 
indebtedness to all other persons to exceed 1500% of its net capital (or 800% of its net 
capital for 12 months after commencing business as a broker or dealer).  The 1500% (or 15-
to-1) ratio of debt to liquid capital, is arithmetically equivalent to a 6[2/3]% capital 
requirement.” See WHO REGULATES WHOM?, supra note 123, at 12.  
 219.  Id. at 19. 
 220.  Id. at 26. 
 221.  Id. at 31. 
 222.  Id. at 30-32.  The CFTC sets requirements for adjusted net Capital, per Regulation 
1.17, “which require that the Company maintain net capital, as defined, equal to 8% of the 
total risk margin requirement for positions carried in customer accounts and 8% of the total 
risk margin requirement for positions carried in noncustomer accounts, as defined.”  RBC 
CAPITAL MARKETS, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AS OF OCTOBER 
31, 2012 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT 21 (2012), available at http://www.rbcwm-
usa.com/legal/rbc-wm/file-689096.pdf.  
 223.  For example, FINRA “may require a member firm to reduce its business if net 
capital is less than 4% of aggregate debits and may prohibit a firm from expanding its 
business if net capital is less than 5% of aggregate debits.” RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, supra 
note 222, at 21. 
 224.  See generally, NAT’L ASS’N OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, STATE INSURANCE 
REGULATION: HISTORY, PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE, available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_state_reg_brief.pdf (last visited May 14, 2015). 
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Treasury Department.225 At the same time, most of the 50 states also 
maintain a stand-alone securities regulatory agency. 
Given the size of the U.S. housing market, housing finance had 
surprisingly minimal oversight prior to the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA).226  Some have argued that this regulatory 
deficit, combined with the GSE’s statutorily mandated low capital 
requirements, largely contributed to their insolvency and need for 
conservatorship.227  HERA consolidated prudential oversight of Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks—which in aggregate 
guarantee or otherwise retain exposures of $6.7 trillion as of 2010228—
under the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).229  To fulfill this 
essential role, the FHFA has “enhanced safety and soundness powers 
resembling those of the federal bank regulators . . . [including] the ability to 
set capital standards.”230 While the FHFA structure is an improvement from 
the disparate oversight previously applied to housing finance, it falls 
outside the scope of the other federal prudential regulators—a potential risk 
given the central role of housing in the recent crisis. 
2. Other Regulatory Functions 
While prudential supervision is the clear weak point in America’s 
regulatory architecture, the other significant structural flaw is the 
misalignment of regulatory mandates with the required functions of 
financial regulation.  While much of this issue has been covered in the 
previous subsection, a number of points are of sufficient importance to 
warrant elaboration. 
 
 225.  Dodd-Frank authorized the initiation of Federal oversight through the Federal 
Insurance Office. Elizabeth F. Brown, Will the Federal Insurance Office Improve Insurance 
Regulation?, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 555 (2013). 
 226.  Housing and Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) 
(codified at various sections of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter, HERA]. 
 227.  The GSEs were required to hold only 2.5% of capital against their loan portfolios, 
and significantly less for MBS.  See generally PETER J. WALLISON, BAD HISTORY, WORSE 
POLICY: HOW A FALSE NARRATIVE ABOUT THE FINANCIAL CRISIS LED TO THE DODD-FRANK 
ACT (2013) (providing background regarding the housing market and positing insufficient 
oversight of the GSEs as a causal factor in the recent crisis.). 
 228.  FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 318-22. (describing the lead 
FHFA examiner’s view that Fannie Mae was “the worst-run financial institution” he had 
seen in his thirty years as a bank regulator.)  
 229.  About Us, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, available at http://www.fhfa.gov/ 
Default.aspx?Page=4 (last visited May 14, 2015); see also HERA § 1101, 12 U.S.C. § 
4511(b)(2) (2008) (establishing the FHFA and continuing oversight over Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks). 
 230.  WHO REGULATES WHOM?, supra note 123, at 32. 
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First, the Federal Reserve and FDIC occupy an uneasy position 
straddling dual-roles as prudential supervisors and also the market stability 
regulator and deposit insurer, respectively.  This structure results in at best 
a clouded focus, and worse, potentially conflicting goals.  Further, while 
coordination amongst agencies with supplementing jurisdictional spheres 
can be effective, it becomes much more difficult when there is the potential 
for jurisdictional friction. 
Second, while the newly created Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) has primary jurisdiction over consumer protection,231 
unlike Canada’s FCAC, the CFPB shares the essential role with numerous 
other regulators.232  For example “[e]ight federal agencies . . . principally 
share oversight and enforcement responsibility for the fair lending laws.”233  
At the same time, consumer protection with respect to securities involves 
shared authority between the CFPB, SEC, CFTC, and FINRA.  Thus, 
despite the aforementioned importance of the consumer protection role, the 
CFPB’s effectiveness may be stymied by familiar sets of issues with 
respect to regulatory fragmentation. 
Third, in contrast to Canada, which gives FINTRAC consolidated 
authority for crime prevention,234 the U.S. unnecessarily splits the task 
between OFAC and FinCEN.235  This division of responsibility is not only 
unnecessarily complex and expensive for constituent institutions, but also 
exposes the crime prevention function to the weaknesses of regulatory 
fragmentation that have plagued prudential supervision.  Further, there is 
significant potential for collateral damage through unintended effects of 
 
 231.  See Dodd-Frank §§ 1011, 1021, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5511 (2010). See also Oren 
Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA L. REV. 1 (2008) (discussing 
the normative foundations underlying the creation of the CFPB). 
 232.  See WHO REGULATES WHOM?, supra note 123, at 28 (noting “the [CFPB]’s 
regulatory authority varies on institution size and type.”). 
 233.  The agencies include: HUD, the FTC, DOJ, FDIC, Fed, NCUA, OCC, and OTS, 
which has since been merged with the OCC.  However, the addition of the CFPB means 
there are still eight agencies involved.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-704, 
FAIR LENDING REPORT: DATA LIMITATIONS AND THE FRAGMENTED U.S. FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE CHALLENGE FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 2 
(2009).  
 234.  Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA), 
S.C. 2000, c. 17 (Can.), available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P-24.501.pdf. 
 235.  Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-
Assets-Control.aspx (last updated Mar. 4, 2015); About FinCEN, What We Do, U.S. DEP’T 
OF TREASURY, http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
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regulation, as shown by banks’ retrenching from remittance businesses that 
are important for developing countries.236 
Finally, per Dodd-Frank, the U.S. relies on a coordinating forum—the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)—for macroprudential 
supervision.237  Figure 11 below, a chart from a report by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), illustrates FSOC’s structure.  FSOC operates 
as “essentially, a mandatory set of processes, best practices, and research 
functions—for the nation’s 15 primary financial regulatory bodies, and is 
organized in a hub-and-spoke model chaired by the Secretary of the 
Treasury.”238  In contrast, Canada’s OSFI is innately structured as a 
macroprudential supervisor with oversight of the entire financial sector; a 
forum is only used to coordinate with other regulators.  As will be 
discussed in Part V, consolidation of regulatory functions would be a more 
effective and cost-efficient approach for the U.S. 
 
Figure 11. Financial Stability Oversight Council Structure239 
 
 
 
 236.  Martin Arnold & Sam Fleming, Regulation: Banks Count the Risks and Rewards, 
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014, 6:47 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9df378a2-66bb-11e4-
91ab-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3JBEOBm8R.  
 237.  Lev Breydo, A Perilous Path to Financial Stability, REGBLOG (Nov. 11 2014, 
12:00 AM), http://www.regblog.org/2014/11/11/breydo-financial-stability/. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-866, NEW COUNCIL AND RESEARCH 
OFFICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF THEIR 
DECISIONS 6 (2012) [hereinafter, NEW COUNCIL AND RESEARCH OFFICE]. 
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III.   WHY CANADA’S FRAMEWORK IS SUPERIOR 
“In the post-crisis world, [Canada’s] reputation for rigorous 
regulation has become a competitive advantage for our financial 
institutions. . .”240 
-Jeremy Rudin, OSFI Superintendent (appointed June, 2014) 
 
In terms of the familiar cost-benefit analysis (CBA), Canada’s 
regulatory architecture produces greater benefits at a lower cost.  In 
contrast, America’s fragmented supervisory framework has left its 
constituents with the worst of both worlds: paying a lot, but receiving very 
little.  With respect to financial regulation, the societal costs of failure— 
economic crises and subdued growth—are extraordinarily high, and thus 
effective regulation is paramount, even if expensive in absolute terms. At 
the same time, efficiency is hardly irrelevant; costs have to be borne by 
someone, and excessive regulatory burdens ultimately diminish the 
aggregate welfare. 
This section will proceed in two parts.  First, it will illustrate the direct 
link between Canada’s regulatory architecture and the performance of its 
financial sector.  Second, it will build upon existing scholarly work to 
develop an enhanced CBA framework, and then compute the costs of U.S. 
regulation as well as estimate excess costs relative to Canada’s system. 
A.  Successful Regulation 
As a threshold matter, the fact that Canada has a different regulatory 
framework and its financial sector performed better does not, in and of 
itself, prove that the former caused the latter; correlation is not causation.  
This subsection addresses this natural concern by illustrating the complex, 
but clear causal mechanism between Canada’s regulatory structure— 
effective macroprudential supervision and clear regulatory domains for 
politically independent agencies—and the success of its financial sector. 
1.  Bank Oversight 
In theory, prudential supervision of financial institutions should be an 
operationally straightforward task. Banks are required to maintain a 
 
 240.  Doug Alexander, Tough Rules Gave Canada Banks Advantage, Says OSFI’s Rudin, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 30, 2014, 3:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2014-09-30/rigorous-rules-gave-canada-s-banks-advantage-says-osfi-s-rudin (noting further 
that superior regulation “pays off for [Canadian banks] in better market access for funding, 
and lower funding costs.”). 
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specified level of capital relative to their assets.241 If a bank breaches the 
lower bound, the FDIC seizes it, or, more precisely, its deposit-holding 
unit.242 Thus, in highly simplified terms, regulators’ task is measuring two 
sets of numbers—a bank’s capital and its assets—to make sure that there is 
enough of one relative to the other.  
However, as JPMorgan’s ‘London Whale’ trading incident illustrates, 
the nature of modern financial services has made this seemingly 
rudimentary function exponentially more complex.  In 2010, JPMorgan’s 
Chief Investment Office (CIO) lost over $6 billion on what turned out to be 
partially unauthorized derivatives trades on credit indices.243 The situation 
bore some eerie parallels to AIG’s now infamous Financial Products 
division.244  Both London-based units used “trading activities . . . span[ing] 
multiple legal entities and regulatory authorities”245 and a highly-rated 
parent company to build up large, leveraged positions in structured and 
synthetic credit.246 
Computing JPMorgan’s exposure to these transactions was not only 
innately complex, but also potentially required a skill set distinct from bank 
examiners’ traditional expertise.247 At some level, assessing home 
 
 241.  See, e.g., Douglas J. Elliott, A Primer On Bank Capital, 2010 BROOKINGS INST. 2, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/1/29-capital-elliott/0129_ 
capital_primer_elliott.pdf.  
 242.  See generally, Overview: The Resolution Handbook at a Glance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/overview.pdf (last updated Apr. 2, 
2003). 
 243.  The details have been well covered in the media. For a particularly entertaining and 
informative discussion, see Matt Levine, The Tale of a Whale of a Fail, DEALBREAKER (May 
11, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2012/05/the-tale-of-a-whale-of-a-fail/. For 
background regarding CDS, see supra, notes 70-82 and accompanying text. 
 244.  Michael J. De La Merced, AIG Unit at Center of Financial Crisis is Wound Down, 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 5, 2011, 7:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/ 
a-i-g-unit-at-center-of-financial-crisis-is-wound-down/?_r=0. 
 245.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU, The Board Should Enhance Its Supervisory Processes as a Result of Lessons 
Learned From the Federal Reserve’s Supervision of JPMorgan Chase & Company’s Chief 
Investment Office 3 (2014), available at http://oig.federalreserve.gov/ reports/2015-0030_-
_Document_To_Release.pdf [hereinafter, SUPERVISION OF JPMORGAN]. 
 246.  One notable difference is that AIG’s FP was known for writing CDS on individual 
issuances of mortgage bonds; in other words, AIG was long, and generally had a one-way 
directional position. See De La Merced, supra note 244. In contrast, JPMorgan’s CIO had 
much more complicated exposure, both with respect to the risk it was holding and the 
structure of its positions.  Lisa Pollack, Too Big to Hedge, FT ALPHAVILLE (May 11, 2012, 
1:06 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/ 2012/05/11/996131/too-big-to-hedge/. 
 247.  Corporate and commercial lending leaves banks like JPMorgan essentially long 
credit. Theoretically, the CIO balances this exposure by buying protection against default, 
i.e. going short.  For reasons beyond the scope of this analysis, however, the CIO ended up 
net long credit.  See Felix Salmon, Bruno Iksil and The Chips Trade, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 
2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/04/17/bruno-iksil-and-the-chips-trade/ 
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mortgages and CDS indices requires a variation on the same basic question: 
‘will these folks pay back their loans?’  In practice, however, valuing CDS 
portfolios involves more science than art. 
As one commentator put it, “[a] bank is a collection of 
probabilities,”248 and between them, JPMorgan’s regulators had the 
capabilities to compute them and ultimately neutralize any legitimate 
problems.249 Even in a post Dodd-Frank world, however, America’s 
familiar regulatory fragmentation proved to be disastrous.250 While the 
OCC is JPMorgan’s primary regulator, the Federal Reserve supervises the 
bank holding company, and to some degree, the CIO’s trading positions, 
per the Edge Act.251 The Fed—which, as will be discussed in Part V, 
employs outstanding economists—detected problems with the CIO’s 
holdings early on, but “did not discuss the risks . . . with the OCC.”252 On 
its own, the OCC—traditionally focused on relatively standard banking 
products—was unable to unearth the issues. 
 
(noting that: “what Iksil is doing here is basically replicating the kind of corporate credit 
exposure that JP Morgan has lots of already. This isn’t in any way a hedge of JP Morgan’s 
existing portfolio; it’s more of a doubling-down on it.”) 
 248.  Matt Levine, Regulators Want Banks to Rescue Themselves Next Time, 
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 11, 2014, 6:57 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/ 
articles/2014-11-11/regulators-want-banks-to-rescue-themselves-next-time. 
 249. The author does not take a position regarding the efficacy of the regulatory 
approach pursued to address this matter. On the one hand, JPMorgan’s trading loss does not 
necessarily concern regulators so long as it does not materially impact JPM’s overall 
solvency, which this did not appear to.  But, on the other, regulators must also be aware of 
banks’ positions, especially in complex instruments, because they can—and have—rapidly 
deteriorated banks’ capital.  
 250.  As Edward Murphy, of the Congressional Research Service, noted:  
 When revelations of the losses became public, and people wanted to know who 
JPMorgan’s regulator was, the answer was that there were many regulators 
related to JPMorgan’s London Whale trades, depending upon which aspect of 
the event a person was interested in. . . As a bank, JPMorgan’s risk 
management was subject to prudential regulation by the OCC at the depository 
level, and by the Federal Reserve on a consolidated basis at the holding 
company level. As a public company, JPMorgan’s disclosures of the trades to 
its stockholders were regulated by the SEC. As a participant in derivatives 
markets, JPMorgan’s transactions were subject to CFTC regulation. As an 
insured depository institution, JPMorgan’s safety and soundness was also 
subject to the FDIC.  
WHO REGULATES WHOM?, supra note 123, at 2-3. 
 251.  The wording of the Fed’s investigation summary report is somewhat vague on this 
point.  The summary report notes “[t]he CIO conducted the synthetic credit derivatives 
trading that resulted in the losses through the London branch of JPMC Bank, N.A., and 
ultimately booked the transactions that resulted in the losses in an Edge Act corporation 
subsidiary.”  SUPERVISION OF JPMORGAN, supra note 245, at 3. 
 252.  Id. at 4. 
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Recognizing the complexity of modern financial services, Canada 
pursued a seemingly simple solution: making one regulator entirely 
responsible for prudential supervision.  This model helps avoid situations 
akin to JPMorgan’s because OSFI has access to all relevant data—from all 
the bank’s units—and sufficient in-house expertise to assess complex 
exposures. 
While certain aspects of Dodd-Frank—such merging the OTS and 
OCC—were unambiguously positive changes to America’s regulatory 
structure, the Act’s approach to macroprudential supervision is flawed.  
FSOC is a manifestation of—not a solution to—the jurisdictional conflict, 
supervisory gaps, and collective action problems that have long stymied 
U.S. regulators.  A set of Government Accountability Office reports 
confirmed this,253 most recently finding that FSOC potentially remains 
uninformed “about critical vulnerabilities in the financial system.”254 
History unfortunately provides little basis for optimism regarding 
FSOC’s regulatory efficacy; the role too closely resembles market 
forecasting.  It places heavy emphasis on regulators’ ability to detect, 
quantify, and transparently communicate concerns that may well go against 
the contemporary market or policy consensus.  While private sector 
forecasting failures abounded in the last crisis, there is little evidence to 
suggest that this was due to insufficient incentives. Some analysts— 
perhaps most notably Meredith Whitney and David Einhorn—correctly 
predicted important developments.255 However, market participants more 
broadly—the ‘invisible hand’—did not figure it out. There is little reason to 
expect a group of regulators to fare better. 
 
 253.  See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-51, FINANCIAL 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: FURTHER ACTIONS COULD IMPROVE THE NONBANK 
DESIGNATION PROCESS (2014); NEW COUNCIL AND RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 239. See 
also Breydo, supra note 237. 
 254.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-873T, FINANCIAL STABILITY 
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: STATUS OF EFFORTS TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, 
AND COLLABORATION 5 (2014).  
 255.  Meredith Whitney first made her name by correctly predicting Citi’s dividend cut.  
Nick Summers, Citigroup Oracle Meredith Whitney on Calling the Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUS. 
(Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-09-12/citigroup-oracle-
meredith-whitney-on-calling-the-crisis.  David Einhorn, founder of Greenlight Capital, was 
among the first to point out Lehman Brothers’ precipitous condition due to material 
deterioration in the value of its holdings.  Louis Story, Lehman Battles an Insurgent 
Investor, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/business/ 
04lehman.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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2.  Allocation of Responsibilities 
As discussed in Part II, the financial sector’s foundational position in 
the economy—and role facilitating various aspects of government policy—
requires multiple, distinct regulatory functions that must operate in concert.  
Generally, these functions are complementary and often require 
collaboration amongst agencies.  For example, assessing potential 
predatory lending may require granular level loan data from a large swath 
of banks, which the prudential supervisor may already have and regularly 
analyze; coordination can safeguard the consumer protection agency from 
having to reinvent the wheel, allowing it to focus on its core task. 
However, there is a corollary.  At potentially important policy 
inflection points, the regulatory functions, and agencies implementing 
them, can also have opposing—even adversarial—interests.256 For instance, 
the central bank may want banks to increase lending to fuel the economy, 
while the prudential supervisor may prefer for financial institutions to 
retain capital in case of a downturn.257 This dynamic is perhaps worst for 
agencies spanning multiple functions.  For instance, as will be discussed in 
Part III.C, after the FDIC rejected banks’ petition to count a complex 
security as capital, the Fed – also a prudential supervisor—allowed it, being 
relatively unexposed to the FDIC’s concerns. 
Canada’s system overcomes these problems by separating the core 
regulatory functions between distinct and independent agencies.  The result 
is a system that gives balanced representation to all essential regulatory 
roles, while facilitating efficient application of regulations.  Further, 
Canada’s approach largely eliminates regulatory arbitrage,258 allowing 
regulators to be more forceful with the industry when needed.  For 
instance, starting in 1999, OSFI mandated higher capital cushions for 
Canadian banks relative to other nations’ regulators—a prescient move that 
was originally opposed by the industry.259 As OSFI’s former 
 
 256.  To a degree, the corollary reflects the competing demands placed on the financial 
sector by its various constituencies, made operable through legislative and regulatory policy. 
 257.  This very scenario has played out in Canada – illustrating the value of separating 
the core regulatory functions.  See Tara Perkins, Nobody’s Saviour, GLOBE & MAIL, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/nobodys-saviour/ 
article4295979/?page=all (last updated Aug. 23, 2012, 10:49 AM) (describing Julie 
Dickson’s pivotal role in Canadian banking).  Other examples of differing priorities between 
regulators could include circumstances where the central bank wants to slow the economy 
and raise rates — thus, reducing lending — which may run counter to consumer protection 
or legislative priorities with respect to mortgage lending.  Alternatively, the central bank 
may want to lower rates, but, from a consumer protection standpoint, a rapid expansion in 
lending may be dangerous.  
 258.  For discussion see infra Part III.B.3. 
 259.  Alexander & Pasternak, supra note 10. 
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superintendent, Julie Dickson, told Bloomberg: “[t]hat’s where having a 
supervisor with a pretty clear mandate allows you to take those unpopular 
decisions.”260 
Clear allocation of authority also facilitates accountability for failure, 
overcoming the collective action problems that can plague U.S. regulators.  
In other words, if something goes wrong in Canada, lawmakers generally 
know the agency to blame.  This is an important mechanism that motivates 
regulators to take potentially unpopular or otherwise difficult actions—
which, in practice, means outmaneuvering lobbyists and opposing 
policymakers.  In contrast, the U.S. employs a regulatory model where 
everyone is technically responsible, thus making it difficult to hold anyone 
accountable.261 
Importantly, Canadian regulators also have more room to maneuver 
due to the relative political insulation provided by the framework.  Studies 
have shown that political independence for the central bank facilitates 
stable inflation and otherwise more successful macroeconomic policies.262 
Echoing this, Senator Chris Dodd stated that he could not “in good 
conscience” go forward with legislation if it meant weakening the Fed’s 
independence from the political process.263 While analysis of political 
independence for the other regulatory functions remains an open area for 
further research, it appears plausible to infer a similar trend, particularly 
with respect to prudential supervision. 
Dodd-Frank also made some progress in this arena, most notably by 
creating the CFPB.  The consumer protection role is essential because it 
protects the system against race-to-the-bottom business practices.  It can 
also serve as a leading indicator of impending problems on banks’ balance 
sheets; underlying every defaulted mortgage-backed security and CDO is a 
homeowner or family in foreclosure.  As will be discussed in Part V, 
however, significant additional changes are still needed to streamline and 
modernize the U.S. framework. 
 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  While one could theoretically posit similar issues manifesting in a consolidated 
regulator through intra-department arbitrage and rivalries, in practice this is unlikely given 
the direct oversight imbedded in the structure, and borne out through OSFI’s experience. 
 262.  See Alex Cukierman, Geoffrey P. Miller & Bilin Neyapti, Central Bank Reform, 
Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies—an International Perspective, 49 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 237 (2002) (providing a comprehensive study of the positive impacts of 
Central Bank independence); Jakob de Haan, Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, Does 
Central Bank Independence Still Matter?, 24 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 717 (2008) (finding 
continued importance of Central Bank independence from government). 
 263.  Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Boston Univ. Ctr. for Fin., Law & 
Policy, Building on 150 Years: The Future of National Banking with Christopher Dodd and 
Barney Frank, YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0G1oKRksNi8 
[hereinafter, Building on 150 Years]. 
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B.  Lower Costs 
Rather than simply minimized, regulatory costs must be optimized— 
an inquiry at the heart of cost-benefit analysis (CBA).264 In other words, 
even if Canada’s approach produces greater benefits, all things being equal, 
does it cost more?  As this subsection will illustrate, Canada’s regulatory 
framework is, in fact, not only more effective, but also much less expensive 
to operate, saving billions each year for taxpayers and the broader 
economy. 
Along with direct outlays, increasing regulatory costs can also put 
pressure on the supervisory framework, exacerbating structural weaknesses 
and creating incentives to shift activities to the ‘shadow banking’ sector.265 
As the cost of complying with a regulation increases, the potential value of 
avoiding it moves likewise. 
Notably, with the exception of the OCC, U.S. federal financial 
regulators “have almost never used formal”266 CBA to assess whether 
individual regulations—let alone the regulatory framework—are an 
optimal, or even net-positive allocation of resources.  This gap is 
particularly troubling because the certainty and stability of effective 
regulation can help banks operate more economically, improving their 
bottom line.  To put it differently, viewing financial regulation as just a cost 
is too simplistic.  For example, one thorough econometric study found “that 
regulations empowering official supervisory power and market discipline 
mechanisms enhance banking efficiency,”267 which, as this section will 
illustrate, is precisely the dynamic in Canada’s banking industry.268 
 
 264.  See generally John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: 
Case Studies and Implications (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 
234, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375396 
(discussing the effects of a cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation). 
 265.  Schwarcz, supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 266.  In 1981, President Reagan required all regulatory agencies to use benefit-cost 
analysis (“BCA”) when promulgating regulations, however:  
[A]ll presidents since Reagan have required only non-financial regulators to 
issue BCAs, possibly because their legal authority to boss around independent 
agencies is ambiguous.  (The one major exception is the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, which is an office in the non-independent 
Treasury.)  In principle, a president can fire the head of the EPA if she refused 
to perform BCAs, while he has no such authority over the chair of the SEC. 
Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation 2 (Coase-
Sandor Inst. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 660 (2d series), 2014). 
 267.  Fotios Pasiouras, Sailesh Tanna & Constantin Zopounidis, The impact of banking 
regulations on banks’ cost and profit efficiency: Cross-country evidence, 18 INT’L REV. OF 
FIN. ANALYSIS 294, 301 (2009).  The study went on to stress “the importance of designing 
an appropriate bank regulatory and supervisory framework that helps maintain the 
efficiency (and hopefully stability) of banks.”  Id;  see also Fotios Pasiouras, International 
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Existing scholarly work has articulated the benefits of applying CBA 
to financial regulation in the U.S.;269 however, little formal academic work 
has been done to estimate regulatory costs.  This Comment seeks to fill the 
void and contribute to the academic literature by estimating the aggregate 
costs of financial regulation in the U.S., and comparing them to regulatory 
costs in Canada.   
The discussion is largely organized around—and expands upon—a 
model for regulatory costs developed by Professors Martin Schüler and 
Friedrich Heinemann.270  The framework, summarized by the formula 
below, posits that the total cost of financial regulation (TCFR) is composed 
of three distinct costs: institutional (I), compliance (C), and structural (S).271 
 
TCFR = I + C + S 
 
Institutional costs refer to the expense of operating the regulatory 
architecture—for example, regulators’ salaries and monitoring technology.  
Compliance costs are essentially the other side of this coin; once a 
regulator makes a request, someone has to fulfill it.  In contrast, rather than 
direct outlays, structural costs refer to distortions from organic market 
equilibria caused by regulation, degrading economic welfare. 
In practice, the three components of TCFR are notoriously difficult to 
calculate with precision.  As will be discussed below, institutional costs can 
be most reasonably estimated, while compliance costs are much harder to 
assess,272 and structural costs remain nearly impossible to objectively 
value.273 
 
evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ technical efficiency: an 
application of two-stage data envelopment analysis 26 (Univ. of Bath School of Mgmt., 
Working Paper Series 2007.01, 2007) (noting that “[i]n several cases, the results provide 
evidence in favour of . . . the development of powerful supervisory agencies, and the 
creation of market disciplining mechanisms.”). 
 268.  One Canadian bank supervisor noted that, “our reputation for rigorous regulation 
has become a competitive advantage for our financial institutions as it helps them be well 
regarded around the world.”  Alexander, supra note 240. 
 269.  See generally Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, The Importance of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in Financial Regulation 11-24 (Ohio St. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 208, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2231314. 
 270.  Martin Schüler & Friedrich Heinemann, The Costs of Supervisory Fragmentation 
in Europe (Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Research, ZEW Discussion Papers No. 05-01, 2005) 
[hereinafter, Costs of Supervisory Fragmentation]. 
 271.  Id. at 2. 
 272.  Compliance costs are difficult to measure because banks do not disaggregate them 
in financial statements, necessitating relatively involved empirical analyses to facilitate 
backwards induction. 
 273.  As Professors Schüler and Heinemann point out, structural costs are “extremely 
hard to measure precisely,” and potentially result from ineffective, rather than overly 
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In 2013, U.S. institutional costs were $6.2 billion at the federal level274 
and over $1.1 billion at the state level;275 Canada’s were just $2.6 billion in 
total,276 after adjusting for banking sector size.277 Thus, total U.S. 
institutional costs exceeded Canada’s—in other words, (IUS – ICN)—by $4.7 
billion.  As will be discussed in Part V, at just the federal level, the U.S. 
could save over $350 billion by becoming as efficient as Canada.  With 
respect to compliance costs, empirical analysis of financial data for the six 
largest banks in the U.S. and Canada—the same groups from Section I— 
suggests that relative compliance inefficiency cost the six largest U.S. 
banks about $25.3 billion in 2013 alone.278 
The TCFR framework can then be applied to estimate the relative 
inefficiency of U.S. financial regulation in dollar terms.  For example, in 
2013, the relative difference in institutional and compliance costs totaled 
about $30 billion in extra spending for the U.S., excluding the impact of 
structural costs.  To put it back in algebraic terms, where Å is the bank size 
adjustment factor described in Part I, for 2013:279 
 
(IUS + CUS)  - [(ICAN * Å) + CCAN] = ∆TCFRUS-CAN = $30 billion 
1.  Institutional Costs 
As discussed above, the institutional costs of financial regulation are 
much higher for the U.S. than Canada.  In fact, despite the widespread 
perception of an American banking industry left to its own devices, the 
U.S. devotes ever-increasing resources to financial regulation.280 
 Figure 12 below illustrates the bewildering array of U.S. financial 
regulatory agencies at the federal level.  For instance, between 2010 and 
2013, total federal level institutional costs were over $21.3 billion, which is 
 
burdensome regulation.  Costs of Supervisory Fragmentation, supra note 270, at 3. 
 274.  See infra fig. 12. See also infra app. tbl. 3 (illustrating a full breakdown of costs). 
 275.  Based on the twenty-six states for which budgets could be obtained.  See infra app. 
tbl. 2 for full summary.  
 276.  See infra app. tbl. 4. 
 277.  For discussion of the adjustment factor, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 278.  As will be discussed infra, Part III.B.2, data limitations prevent computation for the 
full sector. 
 279.  Compliance costs are not multiplied by the banking sector size adjustment factor, 
Å, because they are computed based on relative differences between the U.S. and Canada. 
 280.  This is also illustrated through the Mercatus Center’s REGDATA function, which 
measures the number of times restrictive language is used in regulations with respect to 
various industries. For instance, based on this measure, regulation of credit intermediaries 
increased over 500% between 1997 and 2014.  Mercatus Center, REGDATA, 
http://regdata.org/?type=regulation_index&industry[]=522& regulator[]=0 (last visited Mar. 
4, 2015). 
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likely an underestimate given that many agencies also fund a portion of 
their budgets through industry levies.281 Adjusted for banking sector size, 
over the same period, Canada’s regulatory architecture cost its taxpayers 
only $7.8 billion—63.4% less than U.S. spending.282  When combined with 
state regulatory agencies, the picture becomes even murkier, and the costs 
surely much higher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 281.  Although levies have been successfully applied in Canada, in the U.S., they have 
had a materially worse track record, with competition for constituent institutions at times 
resulting in a race-to-the-bottom, as regulators seek to maximize levies earned.    
 282.  This figure is based on costs for the Bank of Canada and FCAC, the two agencies 
not entirely funded through industry levies.  It significantly overstates the actual cost, as 
FCAC receives some of its budget through the financial industry, and total spending for the 
Bank of Canada includes expenses like printing money, which are borne by the U.S. 
treasury and not included in regulatory costs.  Canada’s actual costs are multiplied by 4.25 
to account for the smaller size of its banking sector. See infra app. tbl. 4 (showing full 
methodology).  
   Canadian institutional costs can be estimated with reasonable precision.  Based on 
the agencies’ annual reports, between 2010 and 2013, approximately $2.0 billion was 
charged in industry levies, through which OSFI and the CDIC self-fund almost entirely.  See 
OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INST., OSFI ANNUAL REPORT 2013-2014. (2013), available 
at http://www.osfi.gc.ca/eng/docs/ar-ra/1314/eng/index-eng.html.  The CDIC actually often 
generates a profit ($180 million in 2012 alone), which is not netted against the $2.0 billion 
estimate of institutional costs and simply excluded from this analysis.  In 2013 OSFI 
borrowed $900,000 from taxpayers, which it intends to repay with interest.  
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Figure 12. Cost of U.S. Federal Level Financial Regulation283 
 
 
 
Figure 13 below shows the average cost of supervising each U.S. bank 
along with the average number of financial regulators per bank.  While a 
broad estimate, the unmistakable inference is that American financial 
regulation appears to be getting less efficient.  Going against the macro 
trends of productivity growth and declining government payrolls between 
1990 and 2013,284 the average cost of regulating each institution increased 
815%, from $99,000 to almost $905,000.285 The number of federal 
regulators per bank climbed 273%—from 1.19 to 3.25.286 
 
 283.  The budgets and number of employees for each regulatory agency come from 
SUSAN DUDLEY & MELINDA WARREN, GROWTH IN REGULATORS’ BUDGET SLOWED BY 
FISCAL STALEMATE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012 AND 2013, 
REGULATORS’ BUDGET REPORT (2012), available at http://regulatorystudies 
.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Regulators
_Budget_2012.pdf. 
 284.  Josh Zumbrun, The Federal Government Now Employs the Fewest People Since 
1996, WALL ST. J. REAL TIME ECON. (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
economics/2014/11/07/the-federal-government-now-employs-the-fewest-people-since-
1966/.  While it is possible that banks have become more complex over this period, thus 
making them more difficult to regulate, this differential is likely more than offset by 
increasing productivity growth ushered in by the Internet and the increasing availability of 
analytical software. 
 285.  The number of banks is computed based on an analysis of data from the FDIC and 
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Figure 13. Number of Regulators & Regulatory Expense per Bank 
 
At the same time, between 1990 and 2013, the number of banks in the 
U.S. has moved in precisely the opposite direction as regulatory costs287— 
declining 55%, from 15,158 to 6,812.288 Although many factors underlie 
consolidation in the U.S. banking industry, the evidence suggests that 
regulatory costs may be an exacerbating factor, particularly for smaller 
lenders.289 
 
 
 
 
 
the U.S. Census.  See infra note 288.  The number of employees comes from the analysis by 
Dudley and Warren.  DUDLEY & WARREN, supra note 283.  
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. September 2014 Statistics, FDIC Historical Trends, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2014sep/fdic.html (last updated Nov. 25, 2014) 
(showing number of banks, institution failures, mergers, and other macro-level activity in 
the sector).  
 289.  For example, the Minneapolis Federal Reserve found that regulatory change will 
render unprofitable 13% of banks with assets under $50 million, and 2% of banks with 
assets between $50 million and $1 billion.  RON J. FELDMAN, KEN HEINECKE & JASON 
SCHMIDT, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, QUANTIFYING THE COSTS OF ADDITIONAL 
REGULATION ON COMMUNITY BANKS 6-8 (2013), available at 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/economic-policy-papers/quantifying-the-costs-of-
additional-regulation-on-community-banks. 
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Figure 14. Total Regulatory Costs v. Number of Banks 
 
The U.S. enjoys a notably robust system of community banks,290 
whose business model makes up for lower economies of scale by 
leveraging ‘soft factors’ to effectively provide credit to areas and 
constituencies often underserved by larger lenders.291 While notably 
different from Canada’s, this market structure is distinctively and 
historically American.292 
However, increasing regulations essentially drive up fixed costs—
more forms, requirements, and assessments necessitate greater resources—
and are better borne by institutions with greater scale.  While the stand-
alone cost of completing a new form may be similar for Citigroup and a 
small bank, in relative terms, for Citigroup the expense is a drop in the 
bucket of its trillion-dollar balance sheet.293 In other words, smaller banks 
 
 290.  “According to the FDIC, in every five-year period since 1991, a lower percentage 
of loans from community banks has gone bad.”  Brendan Greeley, Rural Banks Know 
Something Big Banks Don’t, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 21, 2013, at 17, 18. 
 291.  The advantage appears especially pronounced for small rural banks, as “loans 
originated by rural community banks default substantially less frequently than loans 
originated by urban community banks.  This performance advantage increases for relatively 
smaller rural banks.”  Robert DeYoung, Dennis Glennon, Peter Nigro & Kenneth Spong, 
Small Business Lending and Social Capital: Are Rural Relationships Different? 22 (Kan. 
Univ. Ctr. for Banking Excellence, Paper No. 2012-1, 2012), available at 
https://business.ku.edu/sites/businessdev.drupal.ku.edu/files/docs/CBE%20WP%202012-
1%20DeYoung%20Glennon%20Nigro%20Spong.pdf. 
 292.  See generally FRAGILE BY DESIGN, supra note 58 (discussing the populist traditions 
of American banking in detail).  
 293.  CITIGROUPS’S 2014 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K 30 (2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000083100115000043/c-
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are least able to absorb cost increases from regulation.  As researchers have 
noted: “[i]t does seem like smaller institutions are the hardest hit . . . There 
are economies of scale when dealing with regulation.”294 
2.  Compliance Costs 
As discussed above, compliance costs essentially refer to the 
industry’s expenses required to fulfill regulatory mandates.  They are 
harder to measure than institutional costs,295 but studies have consistently 
found them to be “consequential in banking.”296 Intuitively, compliance 
costs should be significantly higher than institutional costs.  For instance, 
one commentator noted that “[t]here are about as many [Anti Money 
Laundering] employees at JPMorgan as there are all financial regulators at 
Treasury, the OCC and the Fed, combined.”297 
Based on analyses of financial data from U.S. and Canadian banks, 
this section concludes that compliance costs are materially higher for U.S. 
banks.  In effect, this results in a higher cost of doing business and leaves 
U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage.  As a consequence, U.S. 
institutions may pass the costs on to consumers, and may be incentivized to 
 
12312014x10k.htm#s68C4032DE86655E7A9CA45F6FCFF8876. 
 294.  Tracy Alloway, Regulations hit smaller US banks hardest, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 8, 
2015, 4:29 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/70ff7362-aed4-11e4-ba71-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3Rb03pv1k.  This is also well-illustrated by a report from the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors which found that “increased regulatory scrutiny and 
costs . . . and a seeming lack of consistency and certainty of regulations” posed “significant 
challenges for community banks.” One state reported that “its banks are spending 10 percent 
to 15 percent of their net income on compliance costs.”  FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
COMMUNITY BANKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND 
PERSPECTIVES 15 (2012), available at 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/Banking/CBRC-2013/town-hall.pdf.   
 295.  GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS., THE COST OF BANK 
REGULATION: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 23 (1998), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/1990-99/ss171.pdf (noting that despite 
several studies with “[t]he sole objective of . . . estimat[ing] the aggregate total cost of 
regulation in banking. It is doubtful that these studies accomplished this objective.”). 
 296.  Compliance and legal settlement costs are typically aggregated in banks’ financial 
statements.  Id. at 3-9. 
 297.  Matt Levine, JPMorgan is Keeping Busy, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 10, 2014), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-10/jpmorgan-is-keeping-busy.  Levine 
further noted: 
JPMorgan’s 8,000 AML [anti-money laundering] employees [are] . . . there to 
enforce the law, so that law enforcement doesn’t have to.  JPMorgan’s stress-
testers are mostly there to provide data and modeling support to the Fed’s fewer 
and less focused stress-testers, and to implement the Fed’s goal of planning for 
bank stresses.  Most of the regulation of JPMorgan has been outsourced to 
JPMorgan. 
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seek higher returns—and risks—to make up for the cost disadvantages.  For 
instance, in its 2013 shareholder letter, JPMorgan estimated that due to 
regulatory costs, it would have to raise the price of standard banking 
products like trade finance and revolving credit lines.298 
Compliance costs fall into two broad categories: (i) operating costs, 
arising from “requirements that banks perform certain actions,” and (ii) 
opportunity costs, which are the lost earnings from being unable to pursue 
profitable ventures because of regulations.299 For example, between 2012 
and 2014, JPMorgan added over 13,000 employees to support its 
“regulatory, compliance, and control effort”and dedicated 8,000 employees 
solely to its Anti Money Laundering (AML) program—all essentially 
operating costs.300 To comply with the Volcker Rule, banks must exit their 
proprietary trading operations, losing out on future lost profits—an 
opportunity cost.301 Because of their tenuous nature, opportunity costs are 
much harder to estimate, and thus, this analysis is primarily concerned with 
measuring operating costs of compliance, but for ease of reference may 
refer to them as ‘compliance costs’ broadly. 
Existing studies regarding the costs of regulatory compliance also 
have significant limitations.  For instance, Citigroup estimated that money-
laundering compliance will cost U.S. banks $10 billion annually.302 
However, Citigroup is not a neutral observer and the computations are not 
available, making it problematic to base subsequent analyses off its 
estimate.  At the same time, most studies aggregate regulatory costs, which 
is inconsistent with the goal of holding structural and opportunity costs 
 
 298.   The company estimated that the price of revolving credit lines, trade finance, and 
mortgage servicing could increase by 60, 75, and 20 basis points, respectively.  Letter from 
Jamie Dimon, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, JPMorgan Chase & Co., to Shareholders, 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 15 (2013). 
 299.  See ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 295, at 3.  The study further differentiates between 
total costs and incremental costs:  
The total cost of a regulation is the cost of performing all the activities that it 
requires.  The incremental cost of a regulation is the cost of activities that are 
performed only because the law mandates them.  The costs of performing 
activities that are mandated by the law but would be performed anyway in the 
ordinary course of business are part of the total cost of a regulation but are not 
part of the incremental cost. 
Id. 
 300.  This is likely an understatement for the amount of new regulatory staff, as the bank 
has also utilized 500 employees for Fed Stress Tests, 500 for Recovery and Resolution 
plans, 400 for Liquidity, 250 in Model Risk and Development, over 1,000 for Derivatives 
and Volcker rule compliance, and an estimated 500 for Dodd-Frank mortgage rules 
compliance.  Letter from Jamie Dimon, supra note 298, at 12-13. 
 301.  See infra notes 355-356 and accompanying text. 
 302.  Dakin Campbell, Citi Sees $10 Billion in Annual Bank Compliance Costs, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 29, 2014). 
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generally constant to isolate costs specific to the U.S. regulatory 
framework.  For example, Federal Financial Analytics found that all new 
regulatory requirements have cost the six largest U.S. banks $70.2 billion 
between the end of 2007 and the end of 2013,303 while Standard & Poor’s 
estimates that Dodd-Frank compliance alone will cost the eight largest U.S. 
banks between $19.5 and $26 billion annually—an order of magnitude 
higher than U.S. institutional costs.304 
Unfortunately, there is no way to directly assess the operating costs of 
regulatory compliance, as they are not a balance sheet item that is reported 
in banks’ filings.  Instead, such costs are aggregated with many others in an 
accounting category titled Non Interest Expense (NIE), which essentially 
refers to overhead costs of providing credit.305 Thus, as will be described 
below, this analysis works backwards to estimate the costs based on banks’ 
financial statements. 
As a threshold matter, one would expect America’s banks—especially 
the large universal lenders—to be significantly more efficient than their 
Canadian counterparts.  First, empirical evidence has demonstrated that 
larger bank size results in “higher pure technical efficiency under all 
circumstances.”306 A study by the Federal Reserve, for instance, found that 
every additional $1 billion in assets reduces NIE by $1 to $2 million, 
relative to the base case.307 In other words, economies of scale are very 
important in banking, and U.S. banks are larger.  Second, Canada’s labor 
productivity in business services was “about 23 per cent below the U.S. 
 
 303.  Saabira Chaudhuri, The Cost of New Banking Regulations: $70.2 Billion, WALL ST. 
J. MONEYBEAT (July 30, 2014, 11:09 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/ 
2014/07/30/the-cost-of-new-banking-regulation-70-2-billion/. 
 304.  Two Years On, Reassessing the Cost of Dodd-Frank for the Largest U.S. Banks, 
STANDARD & POORS, (Aug. 9, 2012), www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/ 
en/us/?assetID=1245338539029. 
 305.  NIE is composed of three categories: (i) personnel expenses — employee salaries, 
benefits, and training; (ii) occupancy expenses —  rent and depreciation of buildings and 
equipment; and (iii) other operating expenses — general overhead, data processing, and 
administrative costs.  Compliance costs compose a portion of the personnel and other 
operating expenses, which are ultimately aggregated into NIE.  See FED. FINANCIAL INST. 
EXAMINATION, COUNCIL UNIFORM BANK PERFORMANCE REPORT, NONINTEREST INCOME, 
EXPENSES AND YIELDS (2015), available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/cdr402705/public/download/ 
UserGuide/v51/FFIEC%20UBPR%20User%20Guide%20Noninterest%20Income,%20Expe
nses%20and%20Yields—Page%203_2015-05-13.PDF. 
 306.  Pasiouras, International evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision on 
banks’ technical efficiency: an application of two-stage data envelopment analysis, supra 
note 267, at 5.  
 307.  ANNA KOVNER, JAMES VICKERY & LILY ZHOU, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., DO BIG 
BANKS HAVE LOWER OPERATING COSTS? 2 (2014), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/ 
research/epr/2014/1403kovn.html. 
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level,” with particularly large productivity gaps in financial services.308 To 
put it differently, on average, U.S. employees—especially in finance—get 
more work done in the same amount of time.  In combination, U.S. banks’ 
economies of scale and more productive workforce should result in more 
economical enterprises.309 
The analyses below show that this is simply not the case; America’s 
banks are far less efficient than Canada’s—a trend that is worsening.  To 
estimate the costs of regulatory compliance, this section empirically works 
backwards based on banks’ financial data and concludes that these metrics 
are materially lower for U.S. banks than their Canadian counterparts.  
The analyses focus on “the traditional measure for bank 
productivity”310—the efficiency ratio—which essentially gauges “the cost 
required to generate each dollar of revenue.”311 Somewhat counter-
intuitively, a lower ratio shows that a bank is more efficient; a higher ratio 
implies that a bank incurs greater costs to generate that same dollar of 
revenue. 
Importantly, in Bloomberg’s computation of efficiency ratios, shown 
below, Operating Expenses—the numerator—is distinct from the operating 
costs of compliance. Instead, it essentially measures both interest expenses 
and non-interest expenses accrued to generate revenues. 
 
(Operating Expenses / ((Net Interest Income + Commissions & Fees  
Earned + Other Operating Income (Losses) + Trading Account Profits 
(Losses) – Commissions & Fees Paid) + Taxable Equivalent 
Adjustment or Net Revenue – Net of Commissions Paid) * 100 
 
While not all of these costs relate to regulation—in fact, most do 
not—the key point is that because of underlying similarities between the 
U.S. and Canada,312 other costs—such as information technology and 
salaries—should be relatively constant.  Thus, major differences can—at 
 
 308.  SOMESHWAR RAO, JIANMIN TANG & WEIMIN WANG, MEASURING THE CANADA-U.S. 
PRODUCTIVITY GAP: INDUSTRY DIMENSIONS 3 (2014), available at http://www.csls.ca/ 
ipm/9/rao_tang_wang-e.pdf. 
 309.  Notably, the largest U.S. banks may face a distinct headwind factor from increased 
capital requirements for Global Systemically Significant Financial Institutions. It is unclear, 
however, if this in fact results in requirements above-and-beyond OSFI’s. See Gina Chon & 
Stephen Foley, US asset managers face tighter scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013, 10:48 
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/701914d4-2a15-11e3-9bc6-00144feab7de.html#axzz3 
QzFRKfpl.  
 310.  John Finneran, Bank Efficiency: Measure with Care, MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 16, 
2006) http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends-income/2006/12/14/bank-efficiency-
measure-with-care.aspx. 
 311.  Id. 
 312.  See infra, Part I.A. 
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least in large part313—be attributed to the nations’ highly differing 
regulatory frameworks.314 
 Figure 15 below shows efficiency ratios for U.S. and Canadian banks 
between 2006 and 2013.315  Two points are worth briefly noting.  First, on a 
year-to-year basis between 2000 and 2013, there are significant fluctuations 
in efficiency.  However, the trend lines rather clearly illustrate, that overall, 
Canada’s efficiency has been improving, while the large U.S. banks have 
performed worse and worse.  Second, while there have been periods of 
higher efficiency for U.S. banks, perhaps reflecting the aforementioned 
benefits of scale, the efficiency deficit has been relatively consistent over 
time.316  Further, there is good reason to believe that the trend will persist 
due to increasing regulatory costs from Dodd-Frank and other regulatory 
changes. 
 
Figure 15. Efficiency Ratios––U.S. & Canadian Banks: 2006–2013 
 
A direct comparison of a single bank operating in both the U.S. and 
Canada—in this case HSBC, a large UK-based, but Asia-Pacific focused 
 
 313.  Other country specific differences may potentially include costs of advertising, 
marketing, and labor.    
 314.  This approach is also beneficial because it allows for comparison across bank sizes, 
thus adjusting for an important difference between the U.S. and Canadian sectors. 
 315.  Chart based on data obtained through Bloomberg, downloaded using the term 
“EFF_RATIO” for the equity ticker of each bank listed in Figure 2.  
 316.  See Michael D. Bordo et al., The U.S. Banking System from a Northern Exposure: 
Stability vs. Efficiency, 54 J. ECON. HISTORY 325-41 (1994) (concluding that “the Canadian 
banking system was both more stable and more efficient than her American counterpart.”). 
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lender—best illustrates the trend of relatively less efficient U.S. banks.317 
Because HSBC’s subsidiaries file separate financial statements, we can 
compare its efficiency in the two markets—holding all other variables 
constant.318 Notably, total assets at HSBC USA are also higher than HSBC 
Canada, $185 billion compared to $84 billion, respectively, which would 
imply greater efficiency for the U.S. unit.  As Figure 16 shows, however, 
between 2006 and 2013, HSBC has been significantly less efficient while 
operating in the U.S.  One observation does not make a trend, but 
combined with analysis of efficiency across the sectors, it is highly 
persuasive.  Furthermore, though perhaps less pertinent with respect to 
compliance costs, Canadian banks have also steadily maintained a healthy 
return-on-equity319 around 15%, compared to highly volatile, but overall 
declining performance for the American sector.320 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 317.  Analysis based on 10-K filings from 2006 to 2013 for HSBC USA and HSBC 
Canada. 
 318.  See generally HSBC BANK CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2013 (2013), 
available at http://www.hsbc.ca/1/2/personal/about-us/financial-reports/shareholders-
reports#; HSBC USA INC., ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K (2013), available at 
http://www.us.hsbc.com/1/PA_1_083Q9FJ08A002FBP5S00000000/content/new_usshared/s
hared_fragments/pdf/Investor%20Relations/HUSI_Final_2013_10K.pdf.  Additionally, 
HSBC’s housing finance unit — which incurred huge mortgages losses and regulatory 
actions — files separately from HSBC USA, and thus should not taint the analysis. It is, 
however, possible that due to cross-holdings aspects of the mortgage unit’s performance 
impact HSBC USA’s performance data, to some extent.  
 319.  “[T]oday, most banks around the world use return on equity – RoE – as their main 
metric of profitability.”  Patrick Jenkins, Banks need to look past RoE on profitability, FIN. 
TIMES (Nov 7, 2011, 6:09 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/abd5403e-0955-11e1-a20c-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3QzFRKfpl.  
 320. Based on data obtained through Bloomberg, downloaded using the term 
“RETURN_TOT_EQY” for the equity ticker of each bank listed in Figure 2.  
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Figure 16. HSBC USA v. Canada: Efficiency Ratio 2006–2013 
 
The analysis of HSBC’s efficiency between the U.S. and Canada also 
highlights an important counterargument that will be discussed in the 
following section.  While some scholars have posited that Canada has an 
uncompetitive market structure that shields its largest lenders from 
competition,321 HSBC’s experience illustrates that this is unlikely.  HSBC 
is not a member of the home team—if the efficiency of Canadian banks 
was driven by anticompetitive conduct, it is not intuitive how HSBC would 
exhibit the same pattern as Canada’s domestic lenders. 
This analysis leaves an essential open question: all other things being 
equal, how much more does U.S. regulatory compliance cost, relative to 
Canada’s?  Unfortunately, the difficulties of measuring compliance costs 
are only compounded when assessing cost differences.  Based on the 
findings discussed above, however, an indirect approach can be applied to 
estimate the excess compliance expenses for the six largest U.S. banks.322 
First, based on regulatory filings, this analysis aggregates the non-
interest expenses for the six largest U.S. banks—a total cost of $288.1 
billion.  Then, it adjusts the U.S. banks’ NIE downward based on the 2013 
efficiency ratio of Canadian banks (ERCAN), 59.3% compared to a ratio of 
68.1% for the U.S. (ERUS).  Finally, this adjusted NIE is subtracted from 
the original to provide an estimate of excess regulatory compliance costs.  
 
 321.  Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, Canadian Banking is not the Answer, N.Y. TIMES 
ECONOMIX (Mar. 25, 2010, 6:37 AM), economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/canadian-
banking-is-not-the-answer/. 
 322.  Based on 10-K filings for all six U.S. banks listed in Figure 2.  
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In formulaic terms: 
 
NIEUS-2013 = 
 
          =     $288.1 billion 
(NIEUS-2013 * ERUS) - (NIEUS-2013 * ERCAN) = $25.3 billion 
                                                         
In other words, the relatively higher costs of regulatory compliance in 
the U.S. cost the six largest banks as much as $25.3 billion in 2013 alone.  
Discounting this figure to present value terms is somewhat nuanced due to 
the difficulty of estimating the right discount rate, but can also be 
approximated.  Using the 10-year Treasury rate plus 250bp323—a back-of-
the-envelope assumption about funding costs—yields an NPV of $586.2 
billion; based on the U.S. banks’ 2013 average ROE of 10%—likely a 
conservative assumption—the NPV of excess compliance costs is $253.2 
billion. 
3.  Structural Costs 
The structural costs of U.S. financial regulation are reflected in bad 
aggregate outcomes rather than monetary outlays.  Although regulatory 
competition presents benefits in certain contexts,324 the evidence suggests 
that American financial regulation is not one of them.  At the same time, 
America’s dual banking system imbeds an element of regulatory 
competition into the framework325—reducing the risk of developing “a 
classic monopolistic bureaucracy.”326 
Regulatory capture and arbitrage dynamics in American financial 
regulation have been well documented in the academic literature.327  This 
 
 323.  1.82% as of Jan. 14, 2015.  See Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-
rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield (last visited May 14, 2015).  
 324.  See, e.g., Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and 
Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 292-96 (2011) (describing the benefits of 
regulatory overlap in the context of environmental regulations). 
 325.  See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in 
Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32 (1977) (describing a view of regulatory agencies as 
“firms producing different brands of regulation and engag[ing] in a species of competition 
for market shares.”). 
 326.  STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 103, at 37. 
 327.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1277, 1285 (1989) (noting “[t]hus, each constituency has its own regulatory 
agency, which is not responsible to other interests. This state of affairs increases the 
likelihood that bank regulators will succumb to regulatory capture, because . . . [their 
interests] are not divided among a large number of constituents.”). See also Sudipto 
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Comment hopes to add to the body of research through a discussion of trust 
preferred securities (TruPS) and TruPS CDOs—a textbook example of 
regulatory arbitrage that degraded capital quality for hundreds of U.S. 
lenders. 
Traditionally, arbitrage refers to taking advantage of a pricing 
discrepancy for the same asset in different markets.328 Similarly, regulatory 
arbitrage329 refers to industry participants taking advantage of regulatory 
inconsistency to obtain unintended benefits or take socially suboptimal 
risks.330 However, whereas in traditional arbitrage trading eventually drives 
prices to convergence,331 there is no organic mechanism to close loopholes 
created by regulatory arbitrage.  Further, just as a larger number of markets 
increases arbitrage opportunities, a larger number of regulators increases 
the potential for policy inconsistencies that can be profitably leveraged. 
TruPS and TruPS CDOs illustrate how this works in practice, while 
offering another example of the wisdom of Canadian financial regulation.  
Essentially, TruPS allowed banks to issue securities that largely functioned 
like debt—including tax-deductible interest payments—but counted as 
capital for regulatory purposes.332  Thus, TruPS were a relatively cheap 
funding source. 
As shown by Figure 17 below, TruPS pool preferred stock and then 
issue securities with a fixed coupon regardless of actual dividend payments 
into the trust by the bank holding company.333  TruPS CDOs are simply an 
 
Bhattacharya, Arnoud WA Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, The Economics of Bank Regulation, 
30 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 745 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic 
Regulation, 5 BELL J.  ECON. & MGMT., 335 (1974) (describing regulatory and arbitrage 
dynamics in American financial regulation); Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in 
Banking (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 06/34, 2006), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0634.pdf (explaining how the banking 
industry is one of the most heavily regulated economic sectors). 
 328.  See generally Stephen A. Ross, The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 13 
J. ECON. THEORY 241 (1976). 
 329.  See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 244-72 (2010) 
(outlining opportunities, requirements, and constraints for regulatory arbitrage). 
 330.  See generally Macey, supra note 327. 
 331.  Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Frank Verboven, Market integration and convergence to 
the Law of One Price: evidence from the European car market, 65 J. INTL ECON. 49, 49 
(2005) (finding “surprisingly strong evidence of convergence towards both the absolute and 
the relative versions of the Law of One Price.”). 
 332.  Larry Cordell, Michael Hopkins & Yilin Huang, The Trust Preferred CDO Market: 
From Start to (Expected) Finish 4 (Research Dep’t, Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working 
Paper No. 11-22, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1872083 [hereinafter, Trust Preferred CDO Market]. 
 333.  In good years, it can create excess that is kept in trust to make up any later 
shortfall. In bad years, the trust is not required to make payments, but, depending on the 
terms, may have to make up the shortfall in the future. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, A 
Question of Trust, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
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extension of the same process, pooling TruPS instead of the underlying 
preferred shares, and then selling parts of the aggregate structure in risk-
calibrated tranches. 
 
Figure 17. TruPS CDO Structure334 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 While perpetual, non-cumulative TruPS without imbedded options 
may well be an efficient funding mechanism, the limited life, callable 
vintage used in the U.S. were objectively weaker capital.  For example, in 
S&P’s ratings, “the U.S. version of trust preferred is subject to a cap of 
10% of adjusted total equity.”335 The American structure developed through 
a multi-pronged regulatory arbitrage on both sides of the balance sheet, 
allowing U.S. banks to issue and invest in the same questionable securities 
and count both as loss-absorbing Tier 1 capital.336 
 
SB10001424052970204770404577080803185437584 (noting “[t]rust preferred securities—
or Trups—aren’t quite shares, yet they’re not exactly debt.  They are created when an 
issuer—usually a bank or large company—creates a trust to hold a single asset, usually a 
long-term bond issued by that bank or company.”). 
 334.  Mark R. Ruh, Bank Holding Company Bankruptcy: Enabling the Recapitalization 
or Sale of “Zombie Banks,” ASS’N OF INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING ADVISORS J., 2012, at 
4. See also Lang Gibson, Trust Preferred CDOs: A Primer, 2004 MERRILL LYNCH PRIMER 
SERIES 2. 
   335.  S&P: Canadian Capital Trust Preferred Securities Approved, PR NEWSWIRE, 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sp-canadian-capital-trust-preferred-securities-
approved-72713007.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 336.  “By issuing TruPS and buying CDOs containing them, the banks in effect were 
propping each other up. The industry was self-financing, using loopholes in rules.”  Alison 
Vekshin, Jody Shenn & Yalman Onaran, How Banks got Tripped up by TruPS, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, June 14, 2010, at 40, 41. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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On the liabilities side of the balance sheet, despite the FDIC’s 
objections, in 1996 the Fed “permitted bank holding companies to fulfill 25 
percent of their core capital requirements with the TruPS, thereby allowing 
them to dodge the more restrictive forms of capital stipulated by the Basel 
Committee.”337 Banks took advantage of this discrepancy by issuing TruPS 
“at the holding company level, which is regulated by the Federal Reserve, 
and not at the bank level, where the FDIC has its insurance.”338 TruPS 
CDOs developed to facilitate TruPS issuance by “small banks and insurers 
that don’t have access to the public capital markets.”339 Approximately 
1,800 small banks took advantage of the opportunity and issued securities 
pooled into TruPS CDOs.340 
This regulatory arbitrage also helps illustrate the FDIC’s difficult 
position.  On the one hand, as the deposit insurer, it needs banks to hold 
adequate capital; but, on the other, it is not operating at arms-length from 
the industry, making it harder to price and charge for risk to its insurance 
fund.  Along with degrading capital quality, TruPS have also made 
recapitalizing troubled banks more difficult, adding to pressure on the 
FDIC’s deposit fund. 
On the left side of the balance sheet, small American banks 
“purchased some $12 billion of TruPS CDOs . . . [becoming] a primary 
investor in the debt of the banking industry.”341 Banks are normally not 
allowed to count equity investments in other banks as capital.  However, 
“no such restrictions were placed on TruPS CDO investments at banks”342 
because “the opaqueness of the structure . . . made it difficult for regulators 
to actually determine how to account for TruPS CDOs for regulatory 
accounting purposes.”343 
The Philadelphia Federal Reserve “estimate[s] that 77% of all TruPS 
CDO securities will suffer full or partial write-downs.”344 This was 
exceptionally problematic because “wiping out common and preferred 
shareholders would whack other banks’ capital levels,” exacerbating shock 
 
 337.  Bora Yagiz, Small Banks Await Regulatory Fix on Trust Preferred Securities 
Portion of the Volcker Rule for Capital Decisions, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/small-banks-await-regulatory-fix-trust-preferred-
securities-portion-volcker-rule-capital-decisions/. 
 338.  Trust Preferred CDO Market, supra note 332. 
 339.  Gibson, supra note 334, at 2. 
 340.  Trust Preferred CDO Market, supra note 332, at 3. 
 341.  Id. 
 342.  Id. at 31. 
 343.  Id. 
 344.  Id. at 26.  The Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s finding suggests the potential for 
significant deterioration of the “10 percent of all [Bank Holding Company] Tier 1 capital 
consist[ing] of TRuPS.”  Yagiz, supra note 337.  
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to the banking system.345 In fact, “[m]any of the 200 bank failures since the 
beginning of 2009 have been accelerated by losses in trust preferred 
securities.”346 In one case, Riverside National Bank, a mid-sized Florida-
based lender, acquired TruPS CDOs “with a book value of $211 million 
between 2005 and 2007,” to see the value collapse to just $79 million by 
the end of 2009.347 These losses accelerated Riverside’s deterioration, 
forcing it to be placed into receivership by the FDIC, which by 2010 held 
over $400 million in face value of the very securities it had warned 
against.348 Notably, Canada’s Toronto Dominion Bank ended up purchasing 
“the most valuable pieces” of Riverside from the FDIC—sans the TruPS 
CDOs.349 
Combining the multi-pronged arbitrage of U.S. TruPS, an 
enterprising, risk-seeking American bank could fund 25% of its Tier 1 
capital by issuing TruPS and then purchase TruPS CDOs to fill another 
25%—leaving it with 50% of Tier 1 capital of questionable quality.  A 
Canadian bank could count neither the TruPS issuance nor investment as 
Tier 1 capital, necessitating a greater equity cushion. 
Unlike the Fed, OSFI “stuck to a fairly basic rule, which was that the 
bulk of Tier 1 capital had to be in equity”350—a proposition consistent with 
the view of some scholars.351 Regarding TruPS, OSFI ruled that the “inter-
company subordinated debt instrument associated with U.S. trust preferred 
securities is an instrument that would qualify as Tier 2B capital in Canada,” 
a lower, non-core form of regulatory capital compared to Tier 1.352 
However, OSFI did allow U.S. subsidiaries of Canadian banks to count up 
to 15% as Tier 1 capital and the balance in Tier 2B, roughly splitting the 
 
 345.  Yves Smith, Should We Believe the Bank of England’s “No More Bailouts” 
Promise?, NAKED CAPITALISM, (Nov. 11 2014), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/11/ 
believe-bank-englands-bailouts-promise.html. 
 346.  Robin Sidel, Toxic CDOs Beset FDIC as Banks Fail, WALL ST. J., (May 18, 2010, 
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704314904575250811 941096 
220. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id. 
 349.  Id. 
 350.  Alexander & Pasternak, supra note 10. 
 351.  See generally, Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul 
Pfleiderer, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: 
Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working 
Paper No. 161, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2349739 (noting that “[a]n obvious way to lower systemic risk is to require 
banks to fund themselves with significantly more equity.”). 
 352.  OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INST., INNOVATIVE TIER 1 CAPITAL AND OTHER 
CAPITAL CLARIFICATIONS 7 (2008), available at http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/docs/ 
innt1_cc.pdf.  
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difference between the Fed’s 25% allowance and S&P’s 10% cap.353 In 
other words, relative to the Fed, OSFI would assess an identical structure 
for U.S. operating subsidiaries as having lower Tier 1 capital.  
However, being reasonably accommodative of financial innovation, 
OSFI did allow Canadian banks to use a more robust version of TruPS—
TruCS—for up to 15% of their regulatory capital.  According to Standard 
& Poor’s, “[f]rom the perspective of capital credit . . . the Canadian capital 
trust securities . . . [are] fairly strong.  Unlike trust preferred securities in 
other countries, particularly the U.S., the instrument is perpetual rather than 
limited life,”354 making them more akin to true equity for loss absorbing 
purposes.  Further, unlike TruPS, Canadian TruCS were non-cumulative, 
meaning that if a bank couldn’t make interest payments in one period, the 
shortfall did not accrue into the next; in other words, banks could miss 
payments without default.  Notably, unlike U.S. authorities, OSFI counted 
neither TruCS pooled into CDOs nor investments in similar structures for 
regulatory capital purposes. 
After passage of the ‘Volcker Rule,’ there was significant uncertainty 
as to whether “interests in collateralized debt obligations backed by trust 
preferred securities (‘TruPS CDOs’) are ownership interests in Covered 
Funds,”355 and thus not permitted to be owned by banks.  Ultimately, the 
five agencies involved in the deliberations “let banks keep CDOs backed 
by trust-preferred securities established before May 19, 2010, and obtained 
by Dec. 10, 2013,”356 effectively grandfathering in the initial problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 353.  Id. at 4.   
 354.  S&P: Canadian Capital Trust Preferred Securities Approved, supra note 335.  
 355.  Joint Press Release, Bd. of Gov. of Fed. Res. Sys., Fed. Deposit Insurance Corp., & 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, FAQ Regarding Collateralized Debt Obligations 
Backed by Trust Preferred Securities under the Final Volcker Rule 1 (Dec. 19, 2013), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20131219d1.pdf. 
 356.  Jesse Hamilton & Cheyenne Hopkins, Volcker Rule Curbs on Banks Owning CDOs 
Eased in U.S., BLOOMBERG BUS., (Jan. 15, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2014-01-14/u-s-regulators-said-ready-to-ease-volcker-cdo-limits-for-banks. 
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IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
“Canadians are like hobbits. They are just not as rapacious as 
Americans.” 357 
- Matthew Winkler, former Editor in Chief, Bloomberg News 
 
As the Financial Times points out, “[t]he first argument you are likely 
to hear when you start asking what made Canada different is cultural.”358 
The second focuses on industry structure, and broadly suggests that 
Canada’s concentrated banking industry harms consumers.  While both are 
theoretically reasonable, this section will show that the weight of the 
evidence goes against them. 
A. Culture 
Many, including former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker— 
who notably proposed reforms that “look[] more like the Canadian system 
than the American system”359—believe that the success of Canadian 
banking is “partly a cultural thing—they are more conservative.”360  Culture 
is of course important, but it develops as a function of the environment—
which for banking is the regulatory framework—not the other way 
around.361  Further, the evidence shows that Canadians are a lot like 
Americans with respect to risk-taking and rule-breaking—just not when it 
comes to banking in Canada. 
 
 357.  Chrystia Freeland, What Toronto Can Teach New York and London, FIN. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/db2b340a-0a1b-11df-8b23-00144feab 
dc0.html#axzz3WkCUa9gs. 
 358.  Id.  According to Ed Clark, CEO of Toronto Dominion Bank, “US bankers maybe 
see themselves as more important than we do.”  Id. 
 359.  Christopher Mason & Bernard Simon, Canada Banks Prove Envy of the World, 
FIN. TIMES, (Feb. 20, 2009, 12:31 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55654d74-fec3-
11dd-b19a-000077b07658.html#axzz3RyDeBdnS. 
 360.  Freeland, supra note 357. 
 361.  But see Anita Anand, Canada’s Banks: Conservative by Nature, FIN. POST, (Mar. 
31, 2009), http://www.law.utoronto.ca/news/article-anand-canadas-banks-conservative-
nature.  Anand noted: 
However, in addition to strong regulation, Canadian banks have survived 
because a more conservative culture pervades all aspects of banking business, 
from lending to trading.  With . . . other countries turning to examine the 
Canadian financial system in redesigning their own regulatory regimes, it is 
important to remember that prudence and conservatism do not emanate from 
law . . . .  Rather, they are cultural phenomena particular to this country and this 
economy.  [L]aw can only do so much. 
Id. 
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First, Canadian pension funds are well-known as aggressive, 
opportunistic investors; simply put, they shatter the caricature of gentle 
Canadian finance.362  Unlike their passive American counterparts,363 
Canada’s public pensions operate large in-house private equity firms and 
engage in activist campaigns364—successfully “competing against every 
other investor in the world.”365  For example, the private equity arm of 
Ontario Teachers’ pension fund has generated annualized returns of 19.6% 
since its inception, “in line with top firms,” such as KKR and Blackstone.366 
It is not intuitive how Canadians have the requisite aggressiveness to 
compete in private equity and hedge funds, but not in banking. 
Second, when operating in the U.S.—but not in Canada—Canadian 
banks have run into the same regulatory and compliance issues as their 
American counterparts.  For example, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) 
has been found liable for numerous violations in both advisory and trading 
roles in the U.S. Yet, its annual reports between 2008 and 2013 
demonstrate no similar violations in Canada.367 
In 2011, RBC’s securities division paid a $30.4 million settlement to 
the SEC for selling “complex derivatives that were unsuitable to five 
 
 362.  Between January and October of 2013, Canada’s six largest pension funds 
“participated directly in $18.4 billion of mergers and acquisitions[,] . . . more than double 
the $7.4 billion of the three biggest U.S. buyout shops, Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, 
and Apollo Global Management.”  Katia Dmitrieva & Matthew Campbell, Canadian 
Pension Funds, the New Buyout Kings, Take on Private Equity, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 16, 2013, at 44. 
 363.  Id. (noting that “[m]any U.S. public pension plans are barred from participating 
directly in acquisitions.”). 
 364.  See Ben Dummett, Ackman Gains Support in Proxy Fight with CP Railway, WALL 
ST. J. (May 16, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527 
02303448404577408010695700338 (illustrating this difference through an example of when 
“two of Canada’s biggest and most active pension-fund investors”—whose “voting 
intentions carry outsize weight”—backed an activist campaign led by Bill Ackman.). 
 365.  Dmitrieva & Campbell, supra note 362. 
 366.  Jason Kelly, The Pension Fund Beating Private Equity, BLOOMBERG BUS., (Feb. 18 
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/10_09/b4168048796720.htm. 
 367.  This assessment is based on RBC’s 10-K filings and other reports.  Although it is 
entirely possible that this excludes instances of malfeasance, qualitatively, the volume of 
disclosures pertaining to U.S. legal issues relative to the dearth of similar disclosures for 
Canada suggests that it is a materially larger set of problems in the U.S.  See generally, 
Annual Meetings and Reports, ROYAL BANK OF CAN., http://www.rbc.com/investorrelations/ 
annual-meeting-reports.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).   
  Consistent with the culture argument, one could posit that the culprits were solely 
Americans working in RBC’s U.S. operations, but based on RBC’s Manhattan “conference 
room . . . filled with pictures of soothing icebergs and idyllic Canadian prairies,” one gets 
the image of a distinctively Canadian firm.  Nathaniel Popper, Royal Bank of Canada Gains 
by Putting the Brakes on Traders, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25, 2013, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/royal-bank-of-canada-gains-by-putting-the-brakes-
on-traders/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
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school districts without fully informing them of the risks.”368 Subsequently, 
in March 2014, its investment banking unit was found guilty of aiding and 
abetting violations of fiduciary duties in connection with the 2011 buyout 
of the hospital chain operator, Rural Metro Corp.369 Vice Chancellor Laster 
of the Delaware Chancery Court sharply criticized the bank because 
“[r]ather than pushing for the best deal possible for Rural, RBC did 
everything it could to get a deal, secure its advisory fee, and further its 
chances for additional compensation from Warburg.”370 
The point here is not to criticize or single out RBC, but rather, to 
illustrate how quickly an institution with a relatively pristine track record in 
its home market gets caught up in a race-to-the-bottom while operating in 
the U.S.  This shows that regulatory structure, rather than culture has 
altered primary behavior in the Canadian banking industry; with effective 
oversight, socially suboptimal conduct becomes less appealing.  Attributing 
stark differences in regulatory performance to ‘culture’ while ignoring the 
underlying facts gives American regulation an unwarranted pass while 
doing regulatory reform a disservice. 
B. Industry Structure 
A second counterargument centers on Canada’s concentrated banking 
industry structure, which some scholars and commentators371 have 
criticized.  Most notably, Professor Simon Johnson—a former Chief 
Economist of the International Monetary Fund now at MIT’s Sloan School 
of Management—stated that “[p]roposing a Canadian-type model to create 
 
 368.  Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges RBC Capital Markets In Sale of Unsuitable 
CDO Investments to Wisconsin School Districts (Sept. 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-191.htm. 
 369.  Vice Chancellor Laster “identified decisions that fell outside the range of 
reasonableness, thereby giving rise to a fiduciary breach under the enhanced scrutiny 
standard” and found that “[o]n the facts of this case, RBC acted with the necessary degree of 
scienter and [could] be held liable for aiding and abetting.”  In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 
A.3d 54, 96-97 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 370.  Id. at 95.  Further, “[a]t the same time that RBC’s leveraged finance bankers were 
engaging in last-minute lobbying with Warburg, the RBC M & A team was working to 
lower the analyses in its fairness presentation to make Warburg’s bid of $17.25 look more 
attractive.”  Id. 
 371.  According to one commentator, “[s]omething tells us Canadian sovereign CDS, not 
to mention Canadian bank CDS, are both about to go quite a bit wider . . . .”  Tyler Durden, 
Is the Next Domino to Fall Canada?, ZERO HEDGE (Aug. 18, 2011, 3:25 PM), 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/next-domino-fall-canada.  The commentator further noted, 
“of the banks with a TCE ratio of under ~4% a whopping 30% are those situated in Canada, 
the same place where nobody thinks anything can go wrong, and which has been completely 
spared from the retribution of the bond vigilantes.”  Id. 
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stability in the U.S. is, to be blunt, nonsense.”372  Professor Johnson argues 
that government support rather than underlying stability are responsible for 
Canadian banks’ performance, and further that the concentrated industry 
structure hurts Canadian consumers.  For example, Professor Johnson 
points out that at the end of 2008, JPMorgan and Wells Fargo were less 
leveraged and had higher Tier 1 capital than Canada’s banks.373 However, 
there are a few flaws with the comparison. 
First, by the end of 2008, JPMorgan and Wells Fargo had already 
received $25 billion each in capital infusions through the TARP program, 
which had the specific purpose of increasing Tier 1 capital and reducing 
leverage.374 Canada’s banks received a total of $0.375  Second, the 
comparison is stymied by selection and survivor biases.  JPMorgan and 
Wells Fargo are widely considered to be America’s best-managed banks—
as demonstrated by their crisis-era performance.  Professor Johnson leaves 
out that at the end of 2007, the five large U.S. investment banks—Lehman 
Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan 
Stanley—were levered more than 30:1 on average and fared less well 
during the crisis, having already collapsed or restructured by the end of 
2008.376 Third, as the discussion in Part III.B.3 illustrates, capital quality 
matters just as much as quantity—especially in a crisis.  A nominally 
healthy Tier 1 ratio built from callable TruPS CDOs is far less reassuring 
than a slightly lower one composed of equity. 
Finally, given that Canada’s banking system assets are nearly double 
its GDP, it is unclear whether Canada would even have the resources to 
 
 372.  Professor Johnson appears to critique both the industry structure and regulatory 
framework in his article, which has been reprinted in the New York Times Economix Blog, 
the Huffington Post, and Professor Johnson’s own website.  Boone & Johnson, supra note 
321.  
 373.  “JPMorgan Chase was 13 times leveraged at the end of 2008, and Wells Fargo was 
11 times leveraged.  Canada’s five largest banks averaged 19 times leveraged, with the 
largest bank, Royal Bank of Canada, 23 times leveraged. It is a similar story for Tier One 
capital . . . .” Boone & Johnson, supra note 321. 
 374.  See Bailed out Banks, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/ 
storysupplement/bankbailout/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2015); see also Phillip Swagel, The 
Beginning of the End of the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX (Oct. 29, 2013, 1:10 
PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-
financial-crisis/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (explaining how the implementation of 
TARP helped resolve the financial crisis).  
 375.  See Torrie, supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 376.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-739, FINANCIAL MARKETS 
REGULATION: FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS SYSTEM 18 (2009). See also Virginia Torrie, 
Weathering the Global Financial Crisis: An Overview of the Canadian Experience, 16 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 25, 38 (2010) (providing context regarding capital structure and leverage of 
Canadian lenders). 
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rescue its banks.  This uncertainty would logically be priced into CDS on 
Canadian banks. Yet, the analysis in Part I illustrated that this is not the 
case, suggesting that Canadian banks’ balance sheets, rather than 
government guarantees, underlie their stability.377 
Professor Johnson also argues that “camaraderie” between banks and 
regulators allows for an oligopoly that harms consumers through higher 
costs of credit.378 In fact, one could argue that the superior efficiency of 
Canada’s banks, discussed in Part III, is the result of such anticompetitive 
behavior.  However, along with the analysis of HSBC—which is similarly 
more efficient in Canada despite not being a member of the ‘home 
team’379—the results provide little support for positing cartel-like conduct. 
There is also no evidence that Canada’s banking market is particularly 
onerous to enter.  If supra-normal profits were being generated, powerful 
American banks like JPMorgan would surely enter the fray by undercutting 
Canada’s domestic lenders. 
While Canada’s banking industry is concentrated—with its six largest 
banks holding 95.0% of system assets, compared to 63.6% in the U.S.380—
there is also no evidence of consumer harm.  The analysis in Part I showed 
that Canadians in fact have similar access to credit on similar terms as 
Americans.381 Unlike Americans, however, Canadians actually like and 
trust their banks—“95 per cent [of Canadians] say that, when they see what 
has happened with banks around the world, it makes them proud about 
Canadian banks.”382 In short, if Canadian banks are ‘colluding’ to minimize 
prices and maximize consumer welfare, it sounds far closer to genuine 
competition than a ‘conspiracy.’  
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN REGULATION 
The evidence demonstrates that America needs to improve both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of its financial regulatory architecture.  While I 
do not advocate a wholesale transition to Canada’s model, the results do 
speak for themselves.  Thus, this Comment suggests incorporating some of 
the fundamental principles that have made the Canadian regulatory 
 
 377.  See supra Part I.C. (discussing that market participants deem Canadian banks so 
safe that there are no actively traded CDS referencing them). 
 378.  Boone & Johnson, supra note 321 (positing that such an “oligopoly means banks 
can make profits in rough times – they can charge higher prices to customers and can raise 
funds more cheaply, in part because of the knowledge that no politician would dare 
bankrupt them.”). 
 379.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 380.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
 381.  See supra Part I.C. 
 382.  What Canadians Think, supra note 11. 
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framework effective, but adapting them to America’s unique economic and 
political dynamics. 
Most importantly, the U.S. needs to consolidate macroprudential 
supervision into a regulator akin to Canada’s OSFI.383 As a secondary, but 
functionally related matter, the U.S. framework would benefit from 
transitioning towards sole-mandate regulators.384 Particularly with respect 
to the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, this change would simultaneously be 
a substantial step toward achieving the primary goal of consolidated 
prudential supervision. 
Finally, while the dual banking system must be retained, both state-
chartered banks and taxpayers could benefit from a broader range of 
options.  As will be discussed below, merging state-specific banking 
regulators into ‘regional hubs’—modeled along the Federal Reserve’s 
branch network—could generate significant cost savings for both taxpayers 
and state-chartered institutions. 
This section will proceed in five brief parts.  First, it will outline 
Senator Dodd’s original proposal to consolidate prudential supervision 
under the OCC, while illustrating how this Comment’s recommendations 
incorporate legitimate concerns to make the core idea politically palatable.  
Second, it will elaborate on this Comment’s original proposals to 
consolidate supervision under a restructured agency—‘New OCC’—and 
changes that could be made to improve its performance.  Third, it will 
briefly discuss the second structural priority—setting more clearly defined 
roles for the other regulators.  Fourth, it will estimate potential federal-level 
cost savings from the proposed changes.  Finally, it will discuss the 
Comment’s proposal for a state regulatory ‘regional hub’ system for state-
level bank regulation. 
A. Senator Dodd’s Original Proposal 
Consolidating prudential supervision is not an entirely new idea; 
Senator Dodd’s original legislation—ultimately abandoned in favor of 
Dodd-Frank—sought to fold all prudential responsibilities under the OCC 
to create a single bank regulator.385  Dodd-Frank’s co-author, 
 
 383.  See Alexander & Pasternak, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that “[a]s far back as 
January 1999, OSFI sent a letter to Canadian banks telling them to set aside at least 10 
percent of total capital as a cushion for losses.”). 
 384.  See supra Part III.A (These include: prudential supervision, central banking, 
consumer protection and deposit insurance.).  
 385.  Jim Puzzanghera, Senate bill would create single bank regulator, L.A. TIMES, 
(Nov. 11, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/11/business/fi-dodd-reform11.  
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Representative Barney Frank, echoed the sentiment, stating that there was 
“great logic” to consolidation under the OCC.386  
Notably, there is a level of uncertainty as to whether such integration 
was seriously considered at just the federal level.  For instance, during a 
2014 panel about the Act featuring Senator Dodd and Representative 
Frank, the moderator raised this point, but—and perhaps not deliberately— 
neither of the former lawmakers provided an answer.387 
For differing reasons, two powerful constituencies—community banks 
and other regulators—were steadfastly against Senator Dodd’s original 
proposal.  Community banks vehemently opposed being regulated by the 
OCC due to the perception that it was biased towards large lenders.388  
Sheila Bair, the crisis-era head of the FDIC, echoed this concern in a New 
York Times op-ed—but, notably, expressed being an “active supporter 
of . . . consolidat[ing] the supervision of federally chartered financial 
institutions in a new national bank supervisor.”389 
The second source of contention stemmed from regulators—for whom 
consolidation could mean surrendering existing powers.390  Bair touched on 
this point in her op-ed, noting that losing its “regulatory role would limit 
[the FDIC’s] ability to protect depositors by identifying and assessing risks 
in the financial system.”391 Similarly, Alan Greenspan, the former Chair of 
 
 386.  Building on 150 Years, supra note 263. Many market commentators have agreed 
with Senator Frank’s sentiment; for instance, Felix Salmon, wrote that “we have to put all 
our regulatory eggs in one basket, [otherwise] regulatory arbitrage will simply result in a 
race to the least-safe basket.”  Felix Salmon, Why There Can Only be One Basket of 
Regulatory Eggs, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2009/09/01/untitled-34/. 
 387.  Building on 150 Years, supra note 263. 
 388.  Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the CEO of Wells Fargo, John Stumpf, was quite 
public in his support for Bair’s position; he described eliminating the dual banking system 
as “a mistake” because it has “served this country exceedingly well.”  Pat Garofalo, Wells 
Fargo Joins Sheila Blair to Quash Proposal for Single Bank Regulator, THINK PROGRESS 
(Sept. 2, 2009, 12:09 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2009/09/02/172919/wells-bair-
bank/. 
 389.  Sheila Bair, The Case Against a Super Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/opinion/01bair.html?_r=0. 
 390.  As the New York Times noted: 
Some of Mr. Obama’s advisers and some senior Democratic lawmakers have 
suggested creating a single bank regulator. But the administration’s current 
version, which could be announced as early as this week, would not combine the 
regulatory agencies. Instead, it would give Mr. Dugan [head of the OCC] and 
Ms. Bair [head of the FDIC] significant new powers—and could intensify their 
turf battles. 
Stephen Labaton and Edmund L. Andrews, As U.S. Overhauls the Banking System, 2 Top 
Regulators Feud, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/ 
us/politics/14power.html.  
 391.  Id.  
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the Federal Reserve, felt that conducting effective monetary policy 
necessitated the Fed having an active role as a prudential supervisor.392 
Senator Dodd noted, however, that his staff could not “find one instance” 
from Fed meeting minutes even mentioning—let alone utilizing—its 
prudential supervision powers.393 At the same time, neither Canada’s 
Central Bank nor its Deposit Insurer have prudential supervisory roles and 
have had no trouble fulfilling their respective mandates. 
Combined with opposition from community banks and regulators, two 
other factors weighed against Senator Dodd’s initial proposal.  First, as 
Representative Frank pointed out, at the time the public’s attention was 
fixated on health care legislation, making it difficult to gain traction, 
especially regarding fairly technical regulatory issues.394 Second, as 
previously discussed, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report significantly 
downplayed the importance of structural factors, which—based on this 
Comment’s findings appears incorrect—thus providing some justification 
for shifting course.395 
While this Comment is more concerned with forward looking 
prescriptions, rather than replaying past events, it humbly heeds Lawrence 
Summers’ important point: “[c]ritics who disagree at this late date are 
obliged to provide an alternative analysis of the political calculus.”396 
Most importantly, this Comment supports retaining—in fact, 
potentially strengthening—the dual banking system, thus incorporating 
legitimate concerns expressed by community banks and their regulators.  
Further, the Comment provides a potent new source of political leverage: 
cost savings.  Since the recession—and extending to today—a broad anti-
spending mood has swept through Washington. To that end, this Comment 
offers significant efficiency-driven savings – as much as $350 billion at the 
federal level and potentially over half a trillion for the financial industry, in 
net present value terms.  While not necessarily a silver bullet, cost savings 
remain popular on both sides of the aisle.  This could have significantly 
strengthened Senator Dodd’s hand politically and remains a viable tool for 
the future.  Reducing government spending is basically the cornerstone 
position for some lawmakers—and also the area where they have the least 
room to maneuver.397 Thus, coupling the bill with large cost savings could 
 
 392.  Building on 150 Years, supra note 263. 
 393.  Id. 
 394.  Id. 
 395.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 396.  This quote is from Summers’ critique of scholars’ proposal regarding the mortgage 
cram-down, but is applicable nevertheless.  Lawrence Summers, Lawrence Summers on 
‘House of Debt,’ FIN. TIMES (June 6, 2014, 1:14 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ 
3ec604c0-ec96-11e3-8963-00144feabdc0.html. 
 397.  For officials elected on a platform of reducing government spending and 
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help make these changes politically palatable enough to overcome 
entrenched opposition.398 
At the same time, significant structural changes to the financial 
regulatory system have been successfully implemented elsewhere.  For 
example, in November 2014, the Eurozone transitioned towards the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, which grants the “European Central Bank . . . 
powers to supervise all 6,000 banks operating in the 17 country bloc.”399 
Relative to the political and economic complexity of a sovereign nation 
relinquishing such powers, a federal agency doing so is not unrealistic. 
Figure 18 below presents a summary of the structural transition for the 
U.S. financial regulatory architecture. For ease of reference, it removes the 
consumer protection and crime prevention roles; while important parts of 
the broader architecture, these functions are less impacted by the proposed 
structural changes. At the same time, because no changes are proposed to 
the operation of the monetary policy or deposit insurance roles in the U.S., 
these functions are omitted from the post-transition side of the diagram to 
facilitate focus on the proposed changes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bureaucracy, voting ‘no’ on a bill doing just that may be difficult to explain to voters.  See, 
e.g., Peter Ferrara, Entitlement Reform, Tea Party Style, AM. SPECTATOR (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://spectator.org/articles/56467/entitlement-reform-tea-party-style (noting “[t]he Tea 
Party/Republican House majority was elected in 2010 to stop the runaway Obama 
Progressive Democrat big government spending spree.”) 
 398. Notably, the cost savings may materially increase due to recently-applied dynamic 
scoring. See generally N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, Dynamic Scoring: A 
Back-of-the-Envelope Guide, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1415 (2006). 
 399.  James Fontanella-Khan, EU agrees on ECB bank regulatory role, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 
19, 2013, 4:04 PM), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/076a3880-90a2-11e2-862b-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2yJnnuflh. 
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Figure 18. Proposed Structural Regulatory Changes & Transition 
 
B. Consolidate Prudential Supervision 
As discussed above, developing effective macroprudential supervision 
is the first priority for the U.S.  We are not starting with a blank canvas; 
any proposal must be realistic about the pieces at play and how they can 
feasibly be moved.  Thus, in a big picture sense, this Comment emphasizes 
consolidation of functions, rather than agencies.400 
This Comment largely agrees with the underlying premise of Senator 
Dodd’s original proposal, but—along with retaining the dual-banking 
system—it recommends more somewhat comprehensive changes.  Largely 
as a function of regulatory history—rather than the current agency’s fault—
even if structurally placed into an OSFI-like role, it is frankly unclear if the 
OCC could achieve the same results. 
 
 400.  See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The 
Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. 
LAW. 447 (1995) (concluding that regulatory consolidation is unlikely, but outlining various 
benefits and drawbacks of regulatory consolidation and competition). 
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The consolidation of regulatory functions should conceptually 
resemble something analogous to a Chapter 11 restructuring, rather than a 
set of acquisitions by the OCC.  Changes must to be made with the basic 
mindset that the entity is troubled and being rehabilitated, not rewarded.  
Although, realistically, the existing OCC will form a core of the post-
transition prudential supervisor—‘New OCC,’ let’s call it—the reorganized 
entity will fundamentally differ in both its organization and operation, and 
thus, hopefully its performance. 
Importantly, this Comment’s position fundamentally diverges from 
Dodd-Frank’s reliance on FSOC for macroprudential supervision.  As 
previously discussed, FSOC’s unwieldy structure—with the heads of over a 
dozen regulators—is unlikely to be effective as a macroprudential 
supervisor; in fact, it codifies, rather than mitigates, many of the system’s 
shortcomings. 
1. Structural Changes 
Prudential supervision should be consolidated under the ‘New OCC’ 
to the extent possible—bearing in mind practical and political realities.  
The most important consolidation is with respect to federal-level 
supervision of banks and their broker-dealer subsidiaries, along with 
housing finance.  Consolidation of prudential oversight of insurance and 
the current roles of the capital markets regulators would also be beneficial, 
but is less of an immediate need.  Thus, it can be pursued as a second 
phase; further, in practice, doing too much at once may also not be feasible 
or productive. 
First, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC—both of which serve other 
required functions—should transition their prudential supervisory roles to 
the OCC.  This will require the transfer of personnel, data, and other 
resources to the OCC—along with a portion of the agencies’ cost savings 
for the first five years (as will be discussed in the subsection below) so that 
the OCC can fund its new responsibilities. 
With respect to housing finance, the prudential functions of the FHFA 
should also be consolidated under the ‘New OCC’s’ expanding umbrella.  
Structurally, the FHFA would be maintained as an administrator overseeing 
housing finance—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the twelve Federal Home 
Loan Banks, and their $7 trillion in obligations—but ultimately reporting to 
the OCC.401 Along with effective oversight of housing, this approach will 
also provide the ‘New OCC’ with a broader picture of financial markets. 
 
 401.  This Comment does not explicitly take a position regarding the GSE’s long-term 
structure.  Instead, the Comment assumes that due to some combination of political inertia, 
expedience, or exogenous factors, the GSEs will remain largely as they are now, thusly 
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Although the cause-effect relationship between the housing markets 
and recent financial crisis remain hotly debated,402 it would be difficult to 
argue that the housing market was unimportant.  Further, given the impact 
of a housing crisis on average Americans—for whom the majority of 
wealth is in home equity—excluding housing finance from the 
macroprudential framework would appear shortsighted.  Notably, despite 
the relatively robust performance of Canada’s CMHC during the crisis,403 
Canada wisely looked forward towards potential future problems and 
restructured regulation of housing finance by placing the CMHC directly 
under OSFI’s oversight in 2012. 
The National Credit Union Administration’s (NCUA) role is 
somewhat more complex, because, like the OCC, it is also solely a 
prudential regulator.  Thus, transitioning its prudential powers could mean 
closing the agency—which is unlikely to be politically viable.  At the same 
time, with over $1 trillion in assets, credit unions are too large and 
important to ignore.404  Further, the industry has rapidly grown, suggesting 
that if they are excluded from macroprudential supervision, risk-seeking 
activity will increasingly migrate there, resulting in an innate structural 
weakness in the framework.405 A potential middle ground could be to 
transition the NCUA to be part of the Treasury department, with the 
ultimate goal of making it an independent division of the ‘New OCC.’ 
 
placing even greater importance on integrating them into the broader macroprudential 
framework.  
 402.  See FRAGILE BY DESIGN, supra note 58, at 203-56 (describing how “The New U.S. 
Bank Bargain” between large banks and housing activists facilitated the deterioration of 
underwriting standards, ultimately culminating in the mortgage crisis.).  See also Ryan Bubb 
& Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage Regulation Can 
Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe - from Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015) (discussing housing market bubbles and potential policy solutions.). 
 403.  As discussed in Part II.C., the structure and priorities of Canada’s CMHC – most 
importantly, not maximizing home ownership or profits – facilitate more robust risk-
management practices.  It is likely as a result of this structure and OSFI’s prudent regulation 
of credit providers that the CMHC remained relatively unscathed through the crisis. 
 404.  Computation based on U.S. Census data. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, BANKING, FINANCE, & INSURANCE: 1183 - FEDERAL AND STATE-CHARTERED 
CREDIT UNIONS - SUMMARY (2012), available at https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ 
cats/banking_finance_insurance.html. 
 405.  Credit unions have growth significantly in size, as “[t]en years ago there were only 
70 credit unions with assets of more than $1 billion.  Now there are 195,” and also 
experienced consolidation similar to banks, as “the number of credit unions has dropped by 
more than half since 1990.”  However, “[f]or the ones that remain, growth — in members, 
loans, and deposits — continued almost unabated during the financial crisis. . . .”  See 
Brendan Greeley, Have Credit Unions Become Stealth Banks?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
May 20, 2013, at 14. 
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The capital markets regulators – the SEC, CFTC, and FINRA— 
should also transition oversight of banks’ broker-dealer units to the OCC, 
while retaining full oversight of the securities and derivatives markets— 
including the $12.3 trillion market for U.S. treasuries, which currently 
suffers from an unfortunate regulatory gap.406 As discussed in Part II, the 
SEC is responsible for overseeing the securities units of bank-holding 
companies.  Along with clouding the SEC’s mandate, this results in 
multiple agencies overseeing parts of the same bank, but no agency 
overseeing all of it.  Further, Dodd-Frank has only expanded the prudential 
responsibilities of the SEC and CFTC.  While coordinating with the 
securities regulators will continue to be important,407 the OCC should 
assume the prudential oversight of banks’ securities units, which, past 
experience has shown, are often the nexus of risk-taking for the institution. 
Insurance supervision presents a unique set of challenges because the 
market has long been overseen at only the state level.408 The establishment 
of the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Treasury Department is 
thus a welcomed development.  However, given the potential systemic 
importance of insurers, demonstrated by American International Group, it 
would be much preferred if the FIO, like the NCUA, ultimately transitioned 
towards becoming a unit of the OCC, rather than a standalone regulator. 
2.  ‘New OCC’ & its Operation 
There are at least three baseline drivers for cautious optimism about 
the ‘New OCC.’ Most importantly, improving the regulatory system 
itself—through structural streamlining and elimination of regulatory gaps 
and arbitrage opportunities—will make the overall framework stronger and 
more robust. 
Second, the OCC is a practical choice for leading this effort.  A 
significant portion of financial regulation also already occurs within the 
 
 406.  See Matthew Leising, The Treasury Market Needs a Lifeguard, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2014, at 37 (noting “[w]hile the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York exercise some oversight, there’s no one central 
authority charged with policing the market to prevent illegal trading activity in what is the 
world’s largest, most active bond market.”). 
 407.  See generally Miriam F. Weismann, Jason H. Peterson, & Christopher A. 
Buscaglia, The New Macroprudential Reform Paradigm: Can It Work?, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
1029 (2014). 
 408.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FED. INS. OFFICE, HOW TO MODERNIZE 
AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/How 
%20to%20Modernize%20and%20Improve%20the%20System%20of%20Insurance%20Reg
ulation%20in%20the%20United%20States.pdf. 
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Treasury Department—including, FinCEN, OFAC, and FIO—facilitating 
coordination and regulatory consistency while generating economies of 
scale and scope.  At the same time, due to the OTS integration, the OCC is 
the only financial regulator with recent experience consolidating another 
agency’s functions and personnel—which are not easy matters. 
Finally, the OCC’s organizational culture and mindset appear 
conducive to change and improvement.  The OCC’s staff take their jobs 
seriously—a culture rooted in the venerable history of an agency founded 
to fund the Civil War.409 To this day, its bank examiners “are 
commissioned like military officers” and “view themselves as an elite, 
tight-knit group” that takes pride in starting their day far earlier than other 
regulators.410 The OCC has also acknowledged past shortcomings and has 
taken some—albeit, not enough—steps to improve.411 For example, its 
recent unilateral decision—and not one followed by other agencies—to 
have its operations peer-reviewed and audited by other regulators 
(including those from Canada) was a positive move, although, perhaps 
more in theory than in practice.412 
Like any reorganizing entity, ‘New OCC’ needs to take aggressive 
steps to address past weaknesses and position itself for success—ideally 
matching OSFI’s.  To that end, the ‘rebranding’ aspects of this proposal are 
beneficial by removing the stigma of the past while reinforcing the idea 
that changes are not only needed, but actually happening.  Such changes for 
‘New OCC’ fall into two broad buckets: (i) operational, which are largely 
 
 409.  Gina Chon, US Regulator to Take Tougher Stance on Big Banks, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 
5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a041f652-5cfc-11e3-a558-00144feabdc0.html#axzz 
3IX3RAGIM (noting that Comptroller Thomas Curry remarked that “‘[i]t’s important to 
show externally that we are top notch and with the OCC, you are getting strong, credible 
supervision.”). 
 410.  Id.   
 411.  See Michael R. Crittenden, Bank Examiners To Face Rigorous Reviews, WALL ST. 
J., Sep. 30, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230479580457910147 
1233121750 (describing new review program for OCC, which will be combined with a 
“separate initiative allowing regulators from Canada, Singapore and Australia — all of 
which weathered the financial crisis — to perform their own independent evaluations of the 
OCC.”); see also Andrew Martin, Does This Bank Watchdog Have A Bite?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/business/28dugan.html?pagewanted=all 
(finding that “[l]ike his recent predecessors, [Comptroller] Mr. Dugan often takes positions 
that align with banks, even as they have come under withering attack for their role in the 
financial crisis.”). 
 412.  Although criticized by some for not being sufficiently independent, the recently 
completed study - led by a former deputy Comptroller and regulators from Canada, 
Australia, and Singapore –called for the agency to make “‘safety and soundness’ of financial 
institutions . . . its main goal.”  Gina Chon, Review of US Regulator OCC Calls for Focus on 
Sound Institutions, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3b93caec-
5db9-11e3-95bd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3IX3RAGIM. 
ARTICLE 6 (BREYDO).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:25 AM 
2015] STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 1065 
 
actionable in the near term, and (ii) political, which are outside of the 
agency’s control, and thus must be assessed over a longer time horizon. 
Operationally, the new OCC should align its capabilities and 
supervisory process with the needs of the banking industry while enhancing 
its human capital.  The financial services industry has rapidly changed, and 
as illustrated by the ‘London Whale’ incident described in Part III, in part 
because of the fragmentation of responsibilities in the current framework, 
the OCC has not necessarily kept up.  In the short-to-medium term, much 
of this void can be filled through transitioning staff from other agencies, in 
particular the Fed.  In the longer run, however, the new OCC should 
enhance its hiring pipelines and training frameworks, while potentially 
adjusting the allocations of current employees. 
Naturally, the supervisory process itself must evolve alongside the 
industry that it oversees; but, while conceptually innocuous, this 
proposition is difficult in practice.  Although the OCC’s recent decision to 
deemphasize on-site monitoring is a step in the right direction, more 
remains to be done.  In part, this may be aided by the ‘rebranding’ benefits 
of the proposal; the industry may perceive the new agency differently and 
thus be more attuned to staying in its good graces.  Further, the ‘fresh start’ 
may make it easier to integrate staff from other agencies and wrest control 
of the ‘New OCC’ from the old.  In practice, having higher caliber staff 
that is more attuned to cutting-edge developments in academia and the 
financial industry will help the agency position and rebalance its role over 
time. 
To enhance its human capital, the OCC should broadly look to the 
Federal Reserve as a successful model.  There is nothing inherently ‘sexier’ 
about conducting monetary policy than prudential supervision.  Yet, in 
qualitative, but widely accepted terms, the Fed’s capability to recruit and 
retain top-caliber staff outmatches other financial regulators—both 
amongst its top brass and also at more junior levels, which are crucial for 
analytics and day-to-day operations. 
An important—though hardly the only—factor underling this dynamic 
is the Fed’s deep relationship with academia, particularly at top economics 
departments.  This creates a natural pipeline of scholars seeking to apply 
their work through public service, which the Fed facilitates.  The FOMC 
structure, for instance, nicely meshes with universities’ requirements for 
maintaining tenured positions.  The OCC can take similar steps to 
encourage top-caliber faculty from law schools and finance departments to 
serve on key decision-making and oversight committees.  Incorporating 
more influence from academia would also dilute the politicized nature of 
appointments to the OCC.  As the Fed’s experience bears out, relative to 
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political appointees, the incentive structure for tenured academics may be 
better aligned with the public’s long-term interest.413 
For the ‘New OCC,’ the first step may be retaining—but also 
repositioning—the Office of Financial Research.  While enhanced research 
capabilities are positive, integrating the OFR into the ‘New OCC’ may 
mean clouding its intellectual independence and degrading research quality.  
Thus, at least initially, it may be best to operate the OFR as more akin to a 
think-tank than an in-house research division.  In this role, the OFR could 
also be responsible for hosting conferences and events for academics and 
practitioners.  Such events may be important for building the new OCC’s 
relationships within academia—ultimately expanding its pipeline of 
talented employees.  At the same time, the OCC could also incorporate 
positions for visiting scholars, while also encouraging its staff to conduct 
academic research.414  Since the organization will not be able to compete 
with the private sector purely with respect to compensation, this may be a 
unique benefit that it could offer—a strategy that has been successful for 
the Fed. 
The new OCC would also benefit from greater independence and a 
level of insulation from the political process, akin to OSFI.  As a function 
of being situated within the Treasury, the OCC is directly accountable to 
the executive branch and the President.415  This oversight has notable 
benefits, such as the use of Cost-Benefit Analysis described in Part III.  
However, the complex linkages between financial regulation and social 
policy—best exemplified by housing policy—suggest this structure may be 
suboptimal relative to providing greater independence for the agency, as is 
the case with the Federal Reserve. 
C.  Untangle the Allocation of Responsibilities 
Closely related to the core goal of effective macroprudential 
supervision is that of untangling the other regulatory functions.  Especially 
 
 413.  It is difficult to parse the precise drivers of this dynamic. However, it can be 
posited that academics with tenure are generally—but certainly not always—more 
concerned with preserving their intellectual credibility by making the ‘right’ decisions, 
rather than the right moves politically.  
 414.  Google, for instance, is known for giving employees a built-in window—about ten 
to twenty percent of total hours—to work on essentially their own intellectual pursuits. As 
one engineer described it, they can spend “one day a week working on projects that aren’t 
necessarily in our job descriptions.”  Alex K., Google’s ‘20 percent time’ in Action, GOOGLE 
OFFICIAL BLOG (May 18, 2006) http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/05/googles-20-
percent-time-in-action.html (describing a program’s development during twenty percent 
time). 
 415. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
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with respect to the Fed and FDIC, transitioning their prudential roles to the 
‘New OCC’ will have the added benefit of streamlining the allocation of 
other essential responsibilities. 
As a consequence, the Federal Reserve will be able to focus on its 
dual mandate – maximum employment and price stability—rather than 
prudential supervision.  The importance of the Fed’s role cannot be 
overstated; in fact, the Fed’s consolidated power—and political 
independence—is likely a substantial factor underlying America’s 
economic recovery.  In contrast, the Eurozone—which employs 
fragmented, country–specific monetary authorities—has been less able to 
steer out the crisis. 
The FDIC will also be able to concentrate on providing properly 
priced deposit insurance and protecting its fund without conflicting 
mandates as a supervisor of the same banks.  Additionally, since the FDIC 
and Fed currently oversee state chartered banks in conjunction with state 
level regulators, integrating their responsibilities within the OCC will also 
help mitigate some of the fragmentation resulting from America’s dual-
banking system. 
As discussed in Part II, while reasonable arguments can be made for 
integrating prudential supervision and monetary policy under the Central 
Bank, there are a number of considerations weighing against combining 
prudential supervision and monetary policy in the U.S.  First, in practice, 
this would mean closing the OCC—almost surely a non-starter, at least, 
politically.  At the same time, such a model is relatively untested in large 
advanced economies—although, the United Kingdom’s newly streamlined 
regulatory architecture under the Bank of England416 and the European 
Central Bank’s Single Supervisor Mechanism (SSM) will provide 
important test cases.  If the SSM—which is likely a closer analog for the 
U.S. than the U.K.’s transition—proves effective, the possibility of 
integrating the OCC into the Fed’s structure could later be researched and 
explored. 
However, irrespective of the SSM’s performance, as previously 
discussed, there is the clear potential for conflict amongst the roles.  This 
has been identified by Professors Calomiris and Litan—“weakness in the 
financial sector can tempt a central bank with supervisory authority over 
financial institutions to pursue a looser monetary policy than it would 
 
 416. “Post-crisis, the Bank of England handles almost all financial regulatory oversight 
in Britain.  Post Dodd-Frank, the United States still has its balkanized and turf-conscious 
architecture.”  Jesse Eisinger, Central Bankers Find Bubbles, but are Cautious on Deflating 
Them, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/recognizing-
bubbles-but-still-cautious-on-deflating-them/. 
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otherwise follow,”417  which others have noted  “would be particularly 
acute if the Fed were the systemic regulator.”418  In either case, pursuing a 
monetary policy based on the needs of constituent institutions, rather than 
its dual mandate could impair the Fed’s credibility—which is essential for 
conducting effective monetary policy. 
Public perception and accountability present an additional 
consideration.  As discussed, the Fed has a uniquely politically insulated 
structure, extending to the boards of its regional branches, which are 
largely composed of academics and business leaders, rather than elected or 
appointed officials.  While the structure has been effective, it is important 
to tread carefully, as assuming too much power without political oversight 
may result in an eventual overcorrection, through which the Fed is forced 
to succumb to the political branches. In short, the macroprudential 
regulator “should have the health of the institutions it supervises solely in 
mind when it makes its decisions;”419 on balance, it is unclear if the Fed 
could be in a position to do so. 
D.   Potential Cost Savings 
Along with enhancing regulatory effectiveness, the changes proposed 
by this Comment will also create a more efficient system, generating 
significant—potentially even tremendous—cost savings.  Given the 
aforementioned complexities of calculating regulatory costs, estimating 
cost savings with sufficient precision is even more difficult.  However, this 
section will attempt to do so by applying models—largely borrowed from 
corporate finance—to value potential cost savings in net present value 
(NPV) terms. 
As discussed in Part III, 2013 institutional costs for U.S. federal-level 
financial regulation were approximately $6.16 billion.  Based on two 
benchmarks—Europe and Canada—this Comment estimates that regulatory 
changes in the U.S. could generate federal-level institutional cost savings 
of $82.6 and $350.2 billion, respectively. 
The European benchmark is based on a comprehensive study to 
estimate the cost of Europe’s pre-SSM regulatory framework, previously 
discussed in Part III.420  Conceptually, the study found that “increasing 
 
 417.  Charles W. Calomiris & Robert E. Litan, Financial Regulation in a Global 
Marketplace, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 283, 304 (2000). 
 418.  PETER J. WALLISON, BAD HISTORY, WORSE POLICY: HOW A FALSE NARRATIVE 
ABOUT THE FINANCIAL CRISIS LED TO THE DODD-FRANK ACT 366 (2013). 
 419.  Id. 
 420.  Costs of Supervisory Fragmentation, supra note 270, at 1-2. 
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economies of scale in banking supervision”421 drive much of the cost 
savings from regulatory consolidation.  In other words, once a regulator is 
already established, the incremental cost of overseeing more banks 
decreases—a phenomenon well documented in the economics and business 
literature.  Specifically, the study, found that a 1 percent increase in the size 
of the banking sector supervised corresponded to increased institutional 
costs of “only some 0.5 percent.”422  Building off these findings, the study 
“predict[ed] institutional cost saving of around 15 percent in a plausible 
simulation scenario representing a cost-efficient European supervisory 
framework.”423 
Given the innate differences in the nature of regulatory fragmentation 
in the U.S. and Europe, it is unclear to what extent this finding can be 
interpolated to the U.S.—it simply provides a benchmark.  The other 
benchmark is based on Canada’s regulatory system, which, as discussed in 
Part III.B.1, was 63.4% less costly than America’s between 2010 and 2013, 
after adjusting for banking sector size.  
Figure 19 below illustrates potential cost savings based on a synergy 
and efficiency enhancement valuation model, commonly applied in the 
private equity and investment banking industries.  The model computes 
cost savings based on both the European and Canadian projections—15% 
and 63.4%, respectively—resulting in savings with a net present value of 
$82.64 billion based on the European figures and $350.23 billion based on 
Canada’s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 421.  Id. at 1. 
 422.  Id. at 13. 
 423.  Id. at 1-2. 
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Figure 19. Cost Savings Model & Computation 
 
 A number of model adjustments and assumptions are important to 
point out.  First, the model assumes that U.S. institutional costs at the 
federal level will grow by the OCC’s level of average cost growth rate 
between 2010 and 2013—8.4% a year—over the next five years.  This is a 
notably conservative estimate; it is well below the 10.4% annualized 
growth rate for federal level institutional costs as a whole.  It also assumes 
that costs will stop growing after five years; while unlikely, this provides a 
built-in hedge against potential overestimates elsewhere in the model.  The 
model also incorporates $300 million in total restructuring costs for the 
OCC spread out over the five-year period.  It is assumed that the ‘New 
OCC’ will need the most money upfront, estimated to be about 10% of its 
annual budget—$100 million—which declines by $20 million a year until 
2019, at which point the terminal value is computed.  All figures are 
discounted to present value directly off the U.S. treasury yield curve—the 
Federal government’s borrowing rate—per standard practice under the 
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990.424 
 
 424.  Scholars at Harvard Business School critiqued this approach in a 2014 paper, as it 
fails to sync the discount rate with the relative riskiness of the specific cash flows and also 
generally ignores the costs of, and potential distortions from, accruing tax revenue. While an 
important point—and in the author’s view, likely correct—this Comment nevertheless 
performs the computation as the Federal government would.  Samuel G. Hanson, David S. 
Scharfstein & Adi Sunderam, Fiscal Risk and the Portfolio of Government Programs 1 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Apr. 3, 2014), available at, http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/ 
Govt_Programs_ 20140624.pdf.  
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Terminal 
Value
All Figures are in Billions $USD (.1 = $100 Million)
U.S. Intitutional Costs 
(Fed Level Only) 6.16 6.68 7.24 7.84 8.50 9.22 9.99
Est Growth Rate 8.4%
Cost Savings (EUR) 15% 1.00 1.09 1.18 1.28 1.38 1.50
Cost Savings (CAN) 63% 4.23 4.59 4.97 5.39 5.84 6.33
    - OCC Restructuring Costs 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00
NPV Net Savings (EUR) 0.90 1.00 1.07 1.17 1.28 77.22
NPV Net Savings (CAN) 4.13 4.47 4.73 5.08 5.46 326.37
NPV Total Cost Savings (Billions $USD)
European Synergy Projections 82.64
Canadian Efficiency Basis 350.23
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Irrespective of where in between, or outside of, the two benchmarks 
the U.S. ultimately falls, the potential institutional cost savings are clearly 
significant. Further, combined with compliance cost savings—estimated to 
be between $253.2 and $570.3 billion in Part III—the total direct benefits 
are likely well into the twelve-figures. 
E.  State-Level Regulation 
This proposal unambiguously supports retaining the dual-banking 
system.425 At the same time, changes are not essential at the state level; 
unlike larger institutions, state chartered banks do not pose systemic 
risks—and thus societal consequences.426 For instance, approximately 464 
small banks failed between 2009 and 2013 without causing harm to the 
broader economy.427 
However—though sensitive to the fact that the states cannot, and 
should not, be required to do anything—state-level regulation could make 
changes that benefit its constituents while strengthening the dual system for 
the future.  In my view, adopting a system of ‘regional hubs’ could 
generate tremendous cost savings while retaining the core benefits of—and 
ultimately buttressing—America’s unique dual banking system.  If 
successful, this approach could also be applied to state-level regulation of 
insurance and securities, potentially creating integrated state-level cross-
product regulation. 
Such a hub system could be modeled along the Fed’s time-tested 
branch network, but with notable changes to reflect the nation’s evolution 
since the Fed was founded.  As shown in Figure 20 below, the Fed’s branch 
network is heavily centered on the east coast.  It also includes some historic 
quirks—such as two Missouri branches (Kansas City and St. Louis)—that 
 
 425.  For example, Professor Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. wrote: 
An experimental role for the states with regard to the desirability and safety of 
new bank powers would be consistent with the history of our nation’s dual 
banking system. Under that system, the federal and state regulatory components 
have each played a creative role in helping the banking industry to adapt to 
changing competitive conditions. 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and 
the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1990). 
 426.  For large banks, it is an entirely different matter, however.  Current legislation 
proposes amending the bankruptcy code to facilitate reorganization of such institutions.  See 
generally Lev Breydo, Can We Finally Fix ‘Too Big to Fail?,’ REGBLOG (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://www.regblog.org/2015/01/29/breydo-banks-and-bankruptcy/.  
 427.  Based on FDIC historical data; there were 140, 157, ninety-two, fifty-one, and 
twenty-four failures in the years between 2009 and 2013, respectively.  Failed Bank List, 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last 
updated Mar. 27, 2015). 
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should not be incorporated into the new model.  Given the composition of 
the modern banking system, additional western hubs would likely be 
needed, with Salt Lake City and Seattle—both significant regional banking 
centers—arguably being two of the logical choices.  Additionally, rather 
than serving as hubs, Philadelphia and Richmond may be better served by 
consolidating their regulators with New York and D.C., respectively. 
 
Figure 20. The Fed System - A Model for Regional ‘Hubs’428 
 
In practice, the ‘regional hub’ model will empower the states while 
enhancing productive regulatory competition by making state charters more 
attractive.429  At the same time, it may also better reflect changes in the 
banking industry.  As discussed in Part III, the number of banks in the U.S. 
has dropped 55% over the last two decades.  This, in and of itself, may 
support the view that fewer agencies are required to cater to individualized 
needs of the institutions. 
Harmonizing regulations across regions could also reduce the costs of 
doing business—a benefit that accrues to society.  Further, it could 
facilitate stronger regional lenders as a viable alternative to the large full-
service banks, which may be valuable for consumers and smaller 
businesses.  The ‘regional hubs’ would still benefit single-state lenders by 
making compliance overall cheaper—reducing their costs as well as those 
 
 428.  BD. OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SYS. THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & 
FUNCTIONS 8 (9th ed. 2005). 
 429.  As the FDIC points out, “competition . . . for member institutions has led the OCC 
to assert its authority to preempt certain state laws that obstruct, limit, or condition the 
powers and activities of national banks,” which state regulators could counter through 
uniform regional regulations.  Christine E. Blair & Rose M. Kushmeider, Challenges to the 
Dual Banking System: The Funding of Bank Supervision, 18 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 4 
(2006). In the future, there may be a hypothetical potential for regulatory arbitrage between 
‘New OCC’ and the hubs.  While I do not think that in reality this would be a major issue—
since the two systems would be serving different types of institutions—steps could be taken 
to mitigate any potential harms that may arise in the future.   
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of multistate banks.  Especially for regions with tight economic integration, 
a more powerful regional regulator may also be better equipped in 
resources and political clout to influence policy in Washington (or even 
abroad)—giving constituents a voice that they may otherwise lack. 
Admittedly, multistate collaboration has a mixed track record.  For 
example, the two multistate infrastructure banks failed to even get off the 
ground.430 Yet, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has been a 
successful, albeit politically messy, long-term partnership—showing that 
when diligently structured, multistate collaboration is entirely feasible.431 
An example based on New York (NY) and New Jersey (NJ) will help 
illustrate the operation and potential cost savings of the ‘regional hub’ 
model.  In 2013, NY spent approximately $552 million on bank regulation, 
while NJ spent $64 million.432 Because of the economies of scale in 
banking supervision,433 the incremental cost of supervising additional banks 
is much smaller for NY than it is for NJ.  The finding that a 1% increase in 
banking assets only generates a 0.5% increase in regulatory cost suggests 
that New York could oversee New Jersey’s banks for about half the cost, 
generating annual cost savings of $32 million.434  Under this structure, NJ 
would annually compensate NY for the cost of supervising its banks, 
roughly $32 million, plus a royalty payment of about half of the generated 
cost savings, $16 million. 
Putting all this together, NJ would save roughly $16 million a year—a 
net present value of nearly $880 million435—and relinquish concerns over 
bank oversight.  New York would similarly gain $16 million a year, which 
it can use to offset its institutional costs.  If the ‘regional hub’ was 
expanded to include Connecticut and other nearby states—along with 
 
 430.  The partnerships proved ineffective due to “disagreements about which projects to 
finance. . . .”  See ROBERT PUENTES & JENNIFER THOMPSON, BROOKINGS-ROCKEFELLER 
PROJECT ON STATE AND METROPOLITAN INNOVATION, BANKING ON INFRASTRUCTURE: 
ENHANCING STATE REVOLVING FUNDS FOR TRANSPORTATION 6 (2012) (summarizing 
activities of two multi-state infrastructure banks). 
 431.  For example, the Port Authority is structured such that each state’s governor selects 
six commissioners.  See Governance, PORT AUTHORITY N. Y. AND N.J., 
http://www.panynj.gov/corporate-information/governance.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) 
(describing the structure of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey).  
 432.  Figures are from annual budgets of New York and New Jersey. See infra app. tbl. 
2. 
 433.  Costs of Supervisory Fragmentation, supra note 270, at 1.  
 434.  This also conservatively assumes a consistent cost of supervision relative to assets 
across the two states, suggesting that the savings could be even higher.  See Id., at 5-6.  
 435.  Valued as a perpetuity (without growth), and discounted to prevent value using the 
ten-year US treasury rate, 1.82% as of Jan. 14, 2015.  See Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, 
U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-
rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
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potentially insurance and securities regulation—it could generate even 
greater savings. 
Entity structure could also assuage states’ potential apprehension 
about the ‘regional hub’ model.  For instance, it could include an out-
provision for the ceding states in case performance or other enumerated 
factors are not satisfactory within the first three to five years, for example.  
The hub also need not be perpetual; it could include a provision requiring 
re-chartering every ten years—thus providing states continuous 
opportunities to reassess their best interests (which may also change and 
evolve).  The ‘regional hub’ regulator’s board could also be an important 
tool for balancing priorities and providing monitoring.  In this respect, the 
board structure for Fed branches—which typically includes representatives 
from the banking industry and academia—provides an interesting model.  
While this structure need not be applied in full, broadening the base of 
constituents directly represented could improve performance while 
mitigating political influence—which has been a notable problem for the 
Port Authority. 
The ‘regional hub’ model requires ceding regulatory powers—an 
inherently difficult course of action for lawmakers.  However, with respect 
to the aggregate welfare, the baseline inquiry is much simpler: why would 
New Jersey want to keep regulating its banks, wouldn’t it rather have $880 
million? 
CONCLUSION 
Through forward-looking analysis, Canada proactively developed a 
strong and effective regulatory framework tailored for the changing global 
economy.  In contrast, the U.S. has looked backward, reforming the system 
to prevent the last crisis but failing to anticipate the next.  However, 
through practical structural changes, the U.S. can achieve a better outcome. 
At the federal level, prudential supervision should be consolidated 
under the ‘New OCC’ to create a true macroprudential regulator overseeing 
banking, housing finance, insurance, and securities.  Structurally, this 
would require transferring the prudential supervisory powers of agencies 
with multiple mandates—such as the Fed, FDIC, SEC, CFTC, and 
FINRA—to the OCC.  Agencies focused on prudential supervision, such as 
the NCUA, FHFA, and FIO should be transitioned towards becoming 
divisions of the new OCC with the potential for full integration in the 
future.  As a direct consequence, the newly enhanced OCC will have full 
macroprudential jurisdiction over the financial sector. At the same time, the 
other agencies will be able to focus on their respective roles without the 
burden of conflicting mandates. 
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Along with substantially strengthening the regulatory framework, such 
an approach will also generate tremendous cost savings for taxpayers and 
financial institutions. At the federal level, structural changes could generate 
institutional cost savings with a net present value of nearly $83 billion 
based on projections from Europe—and over $350 billion based on 
Canada’s efficiency level.  Further, based off the lower compliance costs 
enjoyed by Canadian banks, the 6 largest U.S. banks alone are projected to 
realize savings with a net present value between $253.2 billion and $586.2 
billion, depending on model assumptions. Putting all this together implies 
institutional and compliance cost savings ranging from $335.84 to $936.43 
billion—before factoring in savings at the state-level, lower compliance 
costs for banks outside of the top 6, or the benefits of reduced structural 
costs. In short, the aggregate value to society may be immense, likely in 
excess of a trillion dollars, in net present value terms. 
The efficacy of the regulatory framework and amount of cost savings 
could be further increased through modest changes at the state-level. 
Instead of utilizing solely state-specific regulators, states could consider 
adopting the ‘regional hub’ model.  Based on the example above, this 
approach could generate cost savings with net present value of nearly $880 
million each for both New Jersey and New York. The value of the regional 
hubs could also be increased by including additional states or products, 
such as securities or insurance. 
 By incorporating insights that have proven extraordinarily effective 
for Canada, the United States has the opportunity to realize billions in 
savings and, most importantly, vastly increase the safety and stability of its 
financial system for the future.  
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APPENDIX 
App. Table 1: Bank Index Selection 
The primary bank data set used in this Comment is composed of the 6 largest banks in the 
United States and Canada, shown in Figure 2. These banks were selected as a proxy for the 
each nation’s aggregate banking sector. As discussed in the text, the comparison is 
inherently imperfect; for instance, Canada’s index encompasses 95% of banking sector 
assets, compared to only 63.6% for the U.S. index. However, Canada’s banking sector 
structure—6 large banks and a number of much smaller lenders—did not readily lend itself 
to expanding the index in a meaningful way.  
	  
With respect to the U.S. index, selection of constituents was somewhat more nuanced. 
Inclusion of the large universal lenders—JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells 
Fargo—was relatively straightforward. However, selection of the two additional banks—
specifically whether to use Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs (large investment banks) or 
State Street and Bank of New York Mellon (custodial banks)—proved more challenging. 
Ultimately, the former pair was selected as they were perceived to be a better proxy for the 
U.S. banking sector and a better comparable for the Canadian banks, given the underlying 
similarities in business models.  
 
Importantly, as illustrated by Figure 5, altering the U.S. index does not diminish— and, in 
fact, may buttress—the results discussed in Part 1. As shown below, the Canadian Index 
remains the same as in prior analyses; the U.S. index, however, includes a larger portion of 
banking sector assets and a wider dispersion of banks with respect to size and business 
model.  
 
Bank Index Constituents for Figure 5
CAN: S&P/TSX Equal Wt. Index (TXDE) US: KBW Bank Index (BKX)
Name Index Weight Name Index Weight
Bank of Montreal 16.67% Bank of America Corp 9.03%
Bank of Nova Scotia 16.67% Bank of New York Mellon Corp 3.17%
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 16.67% BB&T Corp 3.95%
National Bank of Canada 16.67% Capital One Financial Corp 3.86%
Royal Bank of Canada 16.67% Citigroup Inc 8.22%
Toronto-Dominion Bank 16.67% Comerica Inc 4.33%
Commerce Bancshares Inc 2.00%
Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc 2.09%
Fifth Third Bancorp 4.35%
First Niagara Financial Group Inc 1.00%
Huntington Bancshares Inc 3.99%
JPMorgan Chase & Co 8.27%
KeyCorp 4.00%
M&T Bank Corp 4.27%
New York Community Bancorp Inc 2.74%
Northern Trust Corp 1.84%
People's United Financial Inc 1.29%
PNC Financial Services Group Inc 4.09%
Regions Financial Corp 4.24%
State Street Corp 2.72%
SunTrust Banks Inc 4.99%
US Bancorp 3.71%
Wells Fargo & Co 7.82%
Zions Bancorporation 4.02%
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App. Table 2: State-Level Expenditure on Financial Regulation  
The table below illustrates state-level expenditures on financial regulation between 2012 
and 2015, for states for which annual budget data was available. Computations of total 
expenditures are based off the year 2013, or the closest to 2013 that was available for the 
respective state. 
 
 
  
State Name of Regulator 2012 2013 2014 2015 Final*
All figures are in $MM
1 Alabama
Alabama Banking 
Department 13.1 16.3 15.1 $15.1 
2 Alaska Consumer Protection Dept 36.2 $36.2 
3 Arkansas State Banking Dept 14.2 $14.2 
4 Arizona
Dept of Financial 
Institutions 5.6 6.2 5.5 $6.2 
5 CA
Department of Business 
Oversight 79.50 $79.5 
6 Colorado Division of Banking 5.4 $5.4 
7 Connectinut Dept of Banking 18.5 $18.5 
8 Delaware State Banking Commission 4 $4.0 
9 DC
Department Of Insurance, 
Securities And Banking 20.9 21.6 $21.6 
10 FL
Office of Financial 
Regulation 37.4 $37.4 
11 Hawaii Name Unknown 3.4 3.4 $3.4 
12 Georgia
Dept of Banking and 
Finance 11.4 11.2 $11.2 
13 Idaho Dept of Finance 6.2 $6.2 
14 Ilinois
Department of Financial 
and Professional 
Regulation 94 95.4 $95.4 
15 Indiana
Dept of Financial 
Institutions 8 8 $7.5 
16 Iowa Bank Dept 9.1 9.2 9.4 $9.2 
17 Kansas
Office of the State Bank 
Commissioner 11.1 $11.1 
18 Kentucky
Dept of Financial 
Institutions 9.7 10.5 10.5 $10.5 
19 Louisiana
Office of Financial 
Institutions 13.2 12.1 $12.1 
20 Maryland
Division of Financial 
Regulation 8.4 10.1 10.5 $10.1 
21 MA Dept of Fin Services 15.8 16.2 18.7 $18.7 
22 Michigan
Michigan Department of 
Insurance and Financial 
Services 84.4 75.3 $75.3 
23 Minnesota
Dept Commerce: Fin. 
Institutinos 14.2 9.6 $14.2 
24 Missisipi
Banking & Consumer 
Finance 6.6 7.7 $7.7 
25 New Jersey Banking & Insurance 64 64 $64.0 
26 NY
Department of Financial 
Services 555 552.2 $552.2 
Total $1,146.9 
 *2013 or closest year available. This value was used in corresponding computations.
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App. Table 3: U.S. Federal-Level Expenditures  
Note: Unless otherwise stated, data is from Dudley & Warren, supra note 283. 
App. Table 4: Canada - Total Costs of Financial Regulation 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
All figures are in $MM
OSFI 103    109    124    128    464    
FCAC1 12     12     12     13     49     
CDIC2 - - +180 - +180
Bank of Canada3 353    353    476    606    1,788 
Total (w/o surplus or industry levies) 365    365    488    619    1,836 
Adj for size of bank sector (*4.25) 1,550 1,550 2,073 2,631 7,804 
1FCAC is primarily funded through levies on financial institutions.
2CDIC earned FY 2011/12 net income of $180 MM, which is not netted against other costs.
3Bank of Canada,  Management's Discussion and Analysis, 2012 Annual Report.
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013
I. Annual Budgets All Figures are in $MM
OCC 11     32     113     256        382           733           740           959           979           
FinCEN 0 0 0 0 29             102           119           115           108           
OTS 9       21     20       249        159           230           194           0 0
CFPB 0 0 0 0 0 0 53             222           283           
FCA 2       4       12       36          32             50             53             59             64             
FDIC 13     30     121     476        660           866           985           1,285        1,259        
FFIEC 0 0 0 5            3               17             17             16             17             
FHFB 0 0 0 1            18             0 0 0 0
FHFA 0 0 0 0 0 123           173           229           236           
FED: Rsv Banks 0 0 86       212        537           802           934           934           934           
FED: BoG 2       5       19       30          79             141           157           169           169           
NCAU 3       6       21       44          69             115           159           140           144           
CFTC 1       2       16       36          62             167           188           226           297           
SEC 8       22     74       154        357           1,003        1,161        1,502        1,672        
Total 49    122  482    1,499    2,387      4,349      4,933      5,856      6,162      
II. Employees
Total: Finance & 
Banking Regulators 2,509 5,618 9,524 15,308 13,317 13,719 15,124 16,483 16,689
CFTC 128 180 459 527 556 605 666 719 1,015
SEC 1,007 1,490 2,050 2,130 2,841 3,748 3,844 3,907 4,468
Total Employees 3,644 7,288 12,033 17,965 16,714 18,072 19,634 21,109 22,172
Total FDIC Insured 
Institutions1 15,158   9,904        7,658        7,357        7,083        6,812        
Cost per Bank ($):2 98,892   241,014    567,903    670,518    826,768    904,580    
Regulators per Bank3 1.40 1.62 2.46 2.68 2.88 3.02
Sources: 
1Based on FDIC data
2 Total Cost / Total FDIC Insured Institutions
3 Total Regulatory Employees / Total FDIC Insured Institutions
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App. Table 5: U.S. Industry-Level Cost Savings  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013 Non-Interest Expense (NIE):
Top 6 U.S. Banks
Bank (By Ticker) ($MM)
BAC 69,214
JP 70,467
C 49,185
WFC 48,842
GS 22,469
MS 27,935
Total: NIEUS-2013 288,112
ERUS 68.11%
ERCAN 59.32%
Estimated 2013 Excess Compliance Cost for U.S. Banks:
(NIEUS-2013 * ERUS) - (NIEUS-2013 * ERCAN) = $25.32 billion 
NPV of Excess Compliance Costs
10 yr Treasury: 1.82%
+ Est. Spread (250bp) 4.32%
NPV (based on 2013) $586.2 billion
Sources: Banks' 10-K filings for 2013
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